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MODERN    PHILOSOPHY, 


BY  JAMES   MURDOCK,  D.  D. 

AUTHOR   OF  MURDOCK'S  MOSHEIM. 


NEW-YORK:    M.W.  DODD, 

HARTFORD;   JOffi^I  C.  WELLS. 

1814. 


Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1S42,  by 

■  JA3IES  MURDUCK, 

in  the  Clerk's  Office  of  the  District  Court  of  Connecticut. 


MB 


PREFACE 


This  work  was  commenced  about  a  year  ago,  at  the  re- 
quest of  several  gentlemen,  chiefly  clergymen,  who  said 
ihey  could  obtain  no  definite  ideas  of  the  modern  Germa 
Philosophy.  To  meet  the  wants  of  these  friends,  and  oth- 
ers in  like  circumstances,  the  author  undertook  to  publish 
some  short  Essays  in  the  Congregational  Observer,  edited 
by  Messrs.  Tyler  &  Poiter  of  Hartford.  Soon  after  the 
publication  commenced,  the  editors  proposed  striking  off  a 
number  of  copies  in  the  volume  form;  and  also  encouraged 
some  enlargement  and  extension  of  the  plan  of  the  work. 
But  before  its  completion,  the  Newspaper  was  discontinu- 
ed ;  and  the  two  last  Chapteis  now  first  appear  in  print. — 
The  piecemeal  composition  of  the  work  will  account  for 
some  want  of  uniformity  in  the  style  and  manner  of  treat- 
ing the  subject;  and  the  author's  distance  from  the  press, 
and  the  difficulty  of  Newspaper  correction,  must  excuse 
several  unfortunate  errata. 

The  author  here  brings  before  the  public  no  new  system 
of  philosophy,  nor  smy  a.ttempted  improvemoits  of  the  sci- 
ence. Neither  does  he  offer  a  critique  upon  the  writings 
and  speculations  of  others.  He  is  not  a  philosopher ;  he 
has  no  favorite  opinions  to  introduce  an''  recommend  ;  and 
he  does  not  assume  the  office  of  a  teaciicr  of  philosophical 
science.  He  comes  forward  as  a  mere  historian,  narrating 
the  progress  of  speculative  philosophy  in  modern  times,  es 


>V'  PREFACE. 

{  ecially  among  the  Germans.  And  for  this  purpose,  after 
a  brief  statement  of  the  two  principal  modes  of  philoso- 
1  hizing,  he  endeavors  to  describe  summarily  but  di.-*- 
tinctly,  all  the  more  noted  systems  proposed  by  the  meta- 
I'hysical  philosophers  from  the  times  of  Des  Cartes  to  the 
present  day.  In  this  survey,  he  endeavors  to  discriminate 
accurately  between  the  different  systems  mentioned,  to  state 
clearly  and  concisely  the  fundamental  principles  of  each 
.system,  its  objects  and  aims,  the  estimation  in  which  it  was 
held,  and  the  extent  to  which  it  has  prevailed. 

The  principal  authorities  consulted  in  the  twelve  first 
chapters  of  the  work,  are  JV.  G.  Tennemanri's  Grundriss  der 
Geschichte  der  Philosophie,  ed.  1829 :  T.  A.  Rixner's 
Handbuch  der  Gesch.  der  Philos.  ed.  1822 ;  W.  T.  Krug's 
Encyclopadisch-Philosophisches  Lexikon.  ed.  1832-33 : 
and  the  Algem.  Deutsche  Real-Encyclopadie.  ed.  1824. 
In  the  remaining  chapters,  the  authorities  are  generally  sta- 
ted in  the  work.  While  writing  the  four  chapters  on  the 
Kantean  Philosophy,  the  author  had  not  the  Critik  der 
reinen  Vernunft  before  him,  but  relied  upon  very  copious 
t.)  tracts  w\i\c\i  he.  made  from  that  work  about  eight  years 
ago.  Since  obtaining  the  Critik,  he  has  not  had  leisure  for 
a  thorough  verification  ;  but  he  hopes  his  statements  will 
be  found  substantially  correct. 

JAMES  MURDOCK. 

New  Haven,  Sept.  17,  1842. 


CONTENTS. 


CHAP.    I. 

TWO  MODES  OF  PHILOSOPHIZING. 

Description  and  Character  of  the  two  modes.     .     Page    7 

CHAP.    II. 

EMPIRICAL  PHILOSOPHIZING. 

Bacon,  Locke,  Berkeley,  Reid,  &c 14 

CHAP.    III. 

METAPHYSICAL  PHILOSOPHERS. 
Des  Cartes,  Spinoza,  Malebranche.         ...        22 

CHAP.    IV. 

THE  FIRST  GERMAN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Leibnitz  and  Wolf.         ......  33 

CHAP.    V. 

KANT  AND  HIS  CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

Introductory  Remarks.      Critic  on  Sensation.     Time 
and  Space 44 

CHAP.    VI. 

THE  CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

Understanding  defined.     Its  Conceptions.     The  Cat- 
egories.        ........        55 

CHAP.    VII. 
THE  CRITICAL  PH!LOSOPHY. 

Pure  Reason,     Transcendental  Ideas.     Rational  The- 
ology  68 

CHAP.    VIII. 

THE  CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

Results  to  whicn  this  Philosophy  arrives.         .         .        79 

CHAP.    IX. 

ANTI-CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

Effects   of  the   Critical   Philosophy.     Reinhold's  Doc- 


m  CONTENTS. 

trine  of  Thought.     FiclUc's  Doctrine  of  Science,  or 
WissenschaftsJeUre. 9S 

CHAP.    X. 

PANTHEISTIC  PHILOSOPHY. 

Schelling''s    Doctrine     of     Identity,     Identitatslehre. 
Fichte's  altered  Doctrine  of  Science.     Other  Pan- 
theists .  Boutericek,  Bardili,  Eachenmayer,    Wagner, 
Krause 104 

CHAP.    XI. 

PANTHEISTIC  PHILOSOPHY. 

HegeVs  absolute  Idealism.  Logic  the  only  lM#l!qPhys- 
ics 118 

CHAP.  xn. 

INSTINCTIVE  PHILOSOPHY. 

Jacobins  Philosophy  of  Faith  or  Instinct.  His  follow- 
ers, Koepen,  von  IVeiler,  Salat.  Ability  and  Hon- 
esty of  the  German  Philosophers.  Scltulzc,  the  on- 
ly Skeptic  among  them, 129 

CHAP.    XIII. 

FRENCH  PHILOSOPHY. 

The  new  School  in  France.  Its  Origin,  and  Pres- 
ent State.    Its  Advocates.     Its  Doctrines.         .  141 

CHAP.    XIV. 

GERMAN  PHILOSOPHY  IN  AMERICA. 

Its  Introduction.    Coleridgeism.  .         .         .  156 

CHAP.    XV. 
AMERICAN  TRANSCENDENTALISM. 
Propriety  of  the  Name.     Its    origin    among  us.     It? 
radical  Principles.         ......      167 

CHAP.    XVI. 

PHILOSOPHY  OF  DR.  RAUCH. 

JBiographical  Notice.  His  Psychology,  Transcer.den- 
tal,  Hegelian.  Outline  of  his  Philosophy.  Its 
bearing  on  Theology.         .....         183 


^7 

or  THE  ^ 

c 

two    MODES    OF    PHILOSOPHIZING. 

Description  and  Chardcter  of  the  two  Modes. 

Two  fundamentally  different  modes  of  Pbilos- 
opiiizing  have  long  prevailed,  and  have  divided 
Philosophers  into  two  general  classes.  Aristotle 
and  Plato, — Bacon  and  Descartes, — Locke  and 
Leibnitz, — the  Scotch  and  English  on  the  one 
hand,  and  the  modern  Germans  with  some  of 
the  recent  French  on  the  other, — represent  the 
two  classes.  The  first  consider  the  human  mind 
as  born  without  knowledge,  and  as  incapable  of 
originating  any  knowledge,  from  itself,  or  by  the 
mere  exercise  of  its  own  powers.  It  must,  they 
say,  receive,  from  without,  the  subject  matter  of 
all  knowledge  ;  and  this  it  does,  especially, 
through  the  senses.  Reflection  on  its  own  sen- 
sations and  perceptions,  gives  form  and  consis- 
tency to  the  given  matter  derived  from  without ; 
and  thus  leads  to  that  true  and  perfect  knowledge 
of  things  which  is  properly  called  philosophy. — ' 
The  other  class  of  philosophers  do  not  deny,  that 
the  bodily  senses  are  an  inlet  of  knowledge;  and 


8  TWO    MODES    OF    PHILOSOPHIZING. 

that  reflection  on  our  sensations  and  perceptions 
will  give  form  and  consistency  to  this  sort  of 
knowledge.  But,  say  they,  this  is  not  properly 
philosophical  knowledge  ;  it  is  merely  empirical 
knowledge,  or  knowledge  derived  from  sensa- 
tions and  experience.  It  is  the  acquisition  of 
the  Intelle  c  or  Understanding,  and  not  of  the 
Reason,  which  is  a  higher  power  of  the  mind,  and 
capable  of  a  higher  and  more  important  kind  of 
knowledge.  According  to  some  of  this  class, 
the  human  mind  has  certain  innate  or  connate 
ideas,  which  exactly  correspond  with  the  essence 
of  things,  by  contemplating  and  comparing 
which  and  by  reasoning  from  tliem  correctly,  this 
higher  and  more  important  knowledge  is  obtain- 
ed. Others  among  them,  not  admitting  of  in- 
nate ideas,  maintain  that  human  Rettson—  that 
higher  faculty  of  the  soul  — is  capable  of  acquir- 
ing knowledge,  by  mere  inspection  or  intuition, 
and  likewise  by  reasoning  a  priori  ;  and  in  these 
ways,  it  does  acquire  that  iiigher  and  more  per- 
fect knowledge,  which  is  properly  called  philoso- 
phical or  rational  knowledge,  that  is,  knowledge 
acquired  by  the  aid  of  Reason.  This  rational  or 
philosophical  knowledge,  they  say,  differs  essen- 
tially frona  empirical  knowledge,  or  from  the  ex- 
perimental knowledge  acquired  by  the  Under- 
standing.— First ;  it  is  more  certain.     For  it  is 


TWO    MODES    OF    PHILOSOPHIZING.  J# 

always  either  immediate  vision,  or  it  is  derived 
from  demonstration  ;  whereas  empirical  knowl- 
edge is  derived  directly  or  indirectly  from  the 
senses  ;  which  are  always  liable  to  fail  us,  and  to 
give  us  either  false  impressions,  or  impressions 
too  feeble  and  too  indistinct  to  be  relied  upon. — 
Secondly  ;  it  is  more  solid  or  fundamental.  For 
it  is  knowledge  of  the  real  nature  and  essence 
of  things  ;  whereas  empirical  knowledge  is  al- 
ways superficial  and  extends  only  to  the  phenom- 
ena  or  appearances  ofthingp.  It  does  not  ac- 
quaint us  with  things  themselves,  or  with  their 
internal  nature  and  character,  but  only  with  their 
effects  or  operations  upon  our  bodily  organs. — 
Thirdly  ;  rational  knowledge  has  a  character  of 
necessity  and  universality^  wliich  empirical 
knowledge  never  can  have.  When  we  see  the 
real  nature  and  essence  of  thing,  we  know  at 
once  what  must  of  necessity  and  universally  be 
its  operation.  But  when  we  know  a  thing  only 
empirically,  we  actually  know  only  what  was 
the  fact  in  the  several  instances  in  which  we  ob- 
served it,  or  put  it  to  the  test  of  experiment. — 
We  may  illustrate  the  difference  by  a  case  in 
pure  mathematics.  Geometry  demonstrates  that 
the  three  angles  of  every  right  lined  triangle  are 
equal  to  two  right  angles.  And  the  demonstra- 
tion is  so  complete,  that  the  mind  is  fully  satis- 


s/' 


]0  TWO  MODES  OF  niiLosornizixa. 

fled  that  this  must,  necessarily,  and  universally, 
hold  good  of  every  possible  right  lined  triangle. 
But  the  empirical  measurement  of  the  angles  of 
two,  twenty,  or  a  thousand  triangles,  could  not 
produce  the  same  result;  It  would  only  prove 
to  us,  that  all  the  triangles  we  had  examined,  had 
been  found  to  be  of  this  character,  not  that  all 
others  must  necessarily  and  certainly  be  of  the 
same  character.  And  so  of  all  general  truths 
or  principles,  '\i  Reason  discovers  them  or  bring-s 
us  acquainted  with  them,  they  have  this  charac- 
ter of  universaHty  and  necessity  ;  but  if  we  have 
only  empirical  knowledge  of  them,  they  liave 
not  this  character  ;  they  are  only  maxims  of  ex- 
perience, and  though  they  may  serve  as  useful 
guides  in  matters  of  common  life,  they  can  not  be 
made  the  foundation  of  demonstrative  reasoning^, 
or  of  absolute  certainty  ;  they  can  not  be  ad- 
mitted into  scientific  reasoning  ;  they  belong  not 
to  the  science  of  philosophy,  but  only  to  the 
mass  of  our  empirical  knowledge. 

The  two  general  modes  of  philosophizing 
above  described,  may  be  denominated  the  empi- 
rical^ and  the  metaphysical.  The  term  empirical, 
so  current  among  the  Germans,  comes  from  the 
Greek  empeiria,  experience,  which  is  derived 
from  PEiRAN  to  try.  It  is  not  disrespectful  in  its 
import,  and  it  well  expresses  the  thing  intended. 


TWO    MODES    OF    PHlLOSOrniZING.  11 

'The  term  metaphysical  is  used,  as  being  suited 
to  convey  to  Americans  a  correct  idea  of  the 
other  mode  of  philosophizing.  The  Germans 
do  not  use  it  in  this  connexion,  but  call  this 
mode  of  philosophizing  the  rational,  and  the  sci-  .,- 
entific  mode.  ^ 

The  manner  in  which  tiiese  two  classes  of 
philosophers  regard  each  other,  may  easily  be 
conceived.  The  empirical  class,  not  believing 
the  human  mind  to  possess  any  higher  power 
than  that  of  the  intellect  or  understanding,  and 
supposing  man  to  be  incapable  of  any  other  than 
empirical  knowledii:e,  of  course  look  upon  the 
metaphysical  philosophers  as  idle  dreamers,  who 
mistake  the  workings  of  the  imagination,  and 
unreal  speculations,  for  truths  of  the  highest 
order.  Despising  such  fancied  wisdom,  they 
will  not  take  pains  to  acquaint  themselves  with 
it.  It  is  to  them  all  moonshine,  and  unworthy 
the  attention  of  one  who  seeks  only  for  solid  and 
useful  knowledge.  On  the  other  hand,  the  met- 
aphysical philosophers  regard  the  empirical  as 
mere  children  in  science,  and  strangers  to  the 
.noble  powers  of  human  Reason^  that  divine  or 
Godlike  principle  in  man.  Like  the  ancient 
navigators,  they  timidly  coast  along  the  shores  of 
the  vast  ocean  of  human  knowledge,  keeping  y 
always  in  sight  of  land  :  they  never  venture  to 


12  TM^O    MODES    OF    PHILOSOFHIZIIS'G. 

launch  forth  in  search  of  foreign  realms,  depen- 
ding on  tlie  sure  principles  of  science  to  guide 
their  adventurous  course.  Such  explorers,  say 
the  metaphysicians,  may  indeed  advance  the 
physical  sciences  by  their  close  observation  of 
nature,  and  by  their  laborious  experiments  upon 
her  phenomena  ;  but  they  must  ever  remain 
strangers  to  even  the  first  principles  of  true  phi- 
losophy, and  can  never  erect  a  solid  and  endur- 
ing system  of  philosophical  science.  For,  al- 
though they  actually  adopt,  unconsciously,  many 
of  the  principles  of  rational  knowledge,  and  ap- 
ply them  in  their  philosophical  investigations, 
yet  not  relying  solely  on  such  principles,  or  build- 
ing exclusively  upon  them,  but  relying  equally 
upon  empirical  principles,  commingling  both, 
and  erecting  superstructures  out  of  both,  their 
systems  lack  entirely  that  character  for  certainty, 
solidity,  and  pure  science,  which  will  entitle  them 
to  confidence  and  to  the  appellation  of  true  phi- 
losophy. 

We  may  add,  that  the  sjjirit  and  the  tendency 
of  the  two  modes  of  philosophizing  are  very  dif- 
ferent. The  one  is  slow,  cautious,  dubitating, 
and  modest.  It  examines  every  thing,  fears  de- 
ception and  mistake,  and  seldom  ventures  to  be 
positive  or  dogmatical.  The  other  is  more  dar- 
ing, bold,  and  self-confident  :    it  feels  its  own 


TWO    MODES    OF    PHILOSOPHIZING.  13 

Strength,  is  proud  of  its  lofty  powers,  and  there- 
fore inclines  to  be  dogmatical  and  overbearinoj. 
The  former  prompts  men  to  enquire,  to  hesitate, 
to  confine  themselves  down  to  sense,  and  to  dis- 
trust all  that  can  not  be  put  to  the  test  of  fair 
experiment.  Hence  it  has  actually  led  multi- 
tudes to  skepticism,  to  materialism,  and  to  in- 
fidelity. Tile  other  prompts  to  an  over-weening 
estimate  of  the  powers  of  human  reason,  to  bold 
and  hasty  conclusions,  and  to  the  excessive  love 
of  novelty  and  of  paradox.  And  henco  it  has 
actually  led  to  the  exaltation  of  reason  above  rev- 
elation, to  bold  and  confident  dogmatism,  to 
idealism,  to  pantheism,  and  to  transcendent  su- 
pernaturalism. 

In  conclusion,  we  remark  that  the  English,  the 
Scotch,  and  the  Americans,  almost  universally, 
belong  to  the  empirical  school  ;  while  nearly  all 
the  Germans,  several  of  the  latest  French  philos- 
ophers, with  a  very  few  in  England  and  Amer- 
ica, belong  to  the  metaphysical  school. 


CHAPTER  II. 

EMPIEICAL      PHILOSOPHIZING. 
Bacon,  Locke,  Berkeley,  Reid,  &c. 

"In  the  first  Chapter,  two  fundamentally  dif- 
ferent modes  of  philosophizing  were  described. 
Tiie  present  Chapter  will  relate  to  the  history  of 
tliem,  anterior  to  the  recent  German  systems  of 
philosophy. 

The  founders  of  the  two  schools  were  Aristotle 
and  Plato  :  the  former  pursuing  the  empirical, 
the  latter  the  metaphysical  method.  During  the 
middle  ages,  Aristotle  had  most  adherents,  but 
Plato  found  here  and  there  a  few  followers. 

Prior  to  the  17th  century,  the  empirical  phi- 
losophers made  almost  no  experiments,  but  took 
up  their  first  impressions  as  adequate,  and  pro- 
ceeded immediately  to  generalization  and  the 
construction  of  systems.  But  in  the  beginning 
of  this  century,  Francis  Bacon,  Lord  Verulam, 
published  his  Chart  of  the  Sciences,  and  his 
New  Method  of  fiursuing  them — de  Augmentis 
Scientiarum,  in  1605,  and  Novum  Organum,  in 
1520 — in  which  lie  recommended  dependence  on 
reiterated  and  well  conducted  experiments,  as 
being  the  only  sure  method  of  advancing  the 
physical  sciences.     Lord  Bacon's  works  put  the 


EMPIRICAL    PHILOSOPHIZING,  1^' 

friends  of  these  sciences  upon  a  new  course ; 
which    has  been  pursued   to  the  present  time, 
and  with  the  most  splendid  results.     The  bril- 
liant achievements  of  the   empirical  method  in 
these  departments  of  knowledge,  tended  to  bring 
the  metaphysical  method  of  philosophizing  into 
discredit  in   regard  to  every  branch  of  philoso- 
phy, especially  in  England  and  France  ;  yet,  foi* 
a  time,  there  were  a  few  who  pursued  the  meta- 
physical   method,  especially   in  ethics^  natural 
theology,  and  the  law  of  nations.     Thus,  Lord 
Herbert  of  Cherbury,  a  contemporary  of  Bacon, 
held  to  connate  knowledge,  or  to  general  truths 
latent  in  the  soul  as  it  comes  into  life.     And  H. 
More  and  R.  Cudworth,  both  Platonists,  believed 
in  moral  and  religious  ideas  either  born  with  us, 
or  coming  to  us   by  immediate  inspiration  from 
God      In  France,  also,  Des  Cartes  attempted, 
though  with    little  success,  to  revive  the  meta- 
physical method  in  all  the  sciences.     In  Eng- 
land, however,  the    metaphysical    method  was 
nearly  extinct,  when  Mr.    Locke,    in  the  year 
1698,  attacked  it,  and  wholly  exterminated  it 
from  the  British  soil,  by  his  famous  Essay  on 
the  Human  Understanding.     In  this   elaborate 
and  classical  work,  Mr.  Locke  confutes  the  doc- 
trine of  innate  or  connate  ideas,  and  maintains, 
that  all  human  knowledge  is  acquired,  or  is  the 
result  of  sensation  or   reflection  ;  that  is,  it  is 


16  EMPIRICAL    PHILOSOPHIZING. 

eitlier  obtained  directly  through  the  bodily  sen- 
ses, or  it  originates  from  reflei^tion  on  what  is  so 
obtained.  In  addition  to  these  common  and 
fundamental  principles  of  the  empiric  school,  he 
maintained  the  objective  reality  of  our  knowl- 
edge of  the  external  world.  In  his  viovF,  all  our 
ideas  are  either  simple  or  complex  :  the  former 
are  derived  immediately  from  our  sensations  and 
reflection,  and  exactly  correspond  with  the  real 
nature  and  essence  of  things.  The  latter  are 
formed  by  the  understanding,  being  compound- 
ed of  simple  ideas  ;  and  when  duly  compounded, 
they  also  correspond  with  the  nature  of  things. 
Mr.  Locke's  book  has  been  classical,  and  its 
principles  have  maintained  the  highest  authority, 
in  all  the  empirical  schools  down  to  the  present 
time.  The  work  Avas  soon  translated  into  French^ 
and  subsequently  into  other  languages  ;  and  for 
more  than  a  century  it  was  revered  and  followed, 
very  much  as  the  writings  of  Aristotle  were  in  the 
days  of  the  schoolmen. 

It  has  already  been  stated,  that  the  spirit  of 
this  mode  of  philosophizing  is  slow,  cautious, 
dubitating  and  modest  :  it  examines  every  thing, 
fears  deception  and  mistake,  and  seldom  ven- 
tures to  be  positive  or  dogmatical.  At  the  same 
time,  as  it  prompts  men  to  inquire,  to  hesitate, 
to  confine  themselves  much  to  the  senses,  and  to 
distrust  all  that  cannot  be  put  to  the  test  of  ex- 


PHILOSOPHIZING.  17 

periment,  it  has  led  multitudes  to  skepticism,  to 
materialism,  and  to  infidelity.  The  proof  of  this 
lies  in  the  fact,  that  from  this  school  have  pro- 
ceeded all  the  English  and  French  freethinkers, 
deists,  skeptics,  materialists  and  atheists,  from 
the  age  of  Bacon  down  to  the  present  day ;  and 
that  these,  one  and  all,  have  depended  on  argu- 
ments which  they  derived  from  this  philosophy, 
and  from  no  other,  to  support  their  peculiar  opin- 
ions ;  and  they  have  claimed  for  themselves  ex- 
chisively  the  appellation  o^ philosophers,  because 
they  thus  followed  this  philosophy  to  its  legiti- 
mate results,  unrestrained  and  untrammeled  by 
vulgar  prejudices  and  by  traditional  belief.  Of 
the  skeptics,  David  Hume,  and  his  imitators  and 
admirers,  are  a  striking  example.  As  to  the 
deists,  we  might  cite  the  whole  catalogue,  both 
English  and  French :  Hobbe^,  Blount,  Roches- 
ter, Toland,  Shaftesbury,  Collins,  Woolston,  Tin- 
dal,  Morgan,  Chubb,  Bolingbroke,  Hume,  Gib- 
bon, ifec,  among  the  EngHsh  ;  and  Rousseau, 
Voltaire,  D'Argens,  Toussaint,  Buffon,  Raynal, 
Condorcet,  St.  Lambert,  Dupuis,  D'Alembert 
and  Diderot,  the  encyclopedists,  and  all  the 
other  infidel  philosophers  of  France.  Of  ma- 
terialists from  this  school,  (and  I  know  of  none 
from  any  other,)  we  may  name  as  pre-eminent, 
Hobbes,  Shaftesbury  and  Priestley,  among  the 
2 


18  IMPERfAL 

Englisli ;  and  De  la  Mettrie  and  Helvetius,  amon^ 
the  French.  Among  the  avowed  atheists  in  this 
school,  we  may  mention  De  la  Mettrie,  Diderot, 
the  Baron  d'Holbach,  Naigeon,  Marechal,  and 
the  astronomer,  De  la  Lande. 

As  all  these  erratic  philosophers  belanged  to 
the  empirical  school,  and  professed  only  to  fol- 
low this  philosophy  into  its  legitimate  conse- 
quences, the  defenders  of  the  Bible  and  of  Chris- 
tianity have  labored  much,  to  shew  that  this  phi- 
losophy, instead  of  subverting  Christianity  and 
all  revealed  religion,  really  confirms  and  supports 
them,  if  it  be  rightly  understood  and  applied. 
And  to  make  good  this  position,  some  of  them 
have  ventured  to  modify  certain  tenets  of  Mr 
Locke,  yet  without  departing  from  his  funda- 
mental principles.  Thus,  Bishop  Berkeley  dis- 
carded the  idea,  that  by  the  bodily  senses  we 
apprehend  material  objects  themselves,  and  be- 
come acquainted  with  tlieir  real  nature.  Tlie 
senses,  he  maintained,  cavi  apprehend  only  the 
phenomena  of  external  objects,  or  their  impres- 
sions on  our  organs.  Hence,  he  inferred,  we 
know  nothing  of  the  nature  of  the  world  with- 
out, or  the  material  world,  except  that  it  is  an 
incomprehensible  cause  of  various  eftects  or  im- 
pressions on  our  bodily  senses.  And  he  deemed 
it  most  philosophical,  to   suppose  that  the  great 


PHILOSOPHIZpGf.  ^  0>    l^ii'l^       ^ 

/(U  jinrPT'  '^^^'^'^ 

First  Cause  and  Author  of  all  things,  is,'liimself 
the  immediate  producer  of  these  sensations  in 
us  ;  and  that  material  objects,  as  SBcondary  and 
intervening  causes  between  God  and  us,  are 
mere  fictions  of  our  imaginations.  In  short,  he 
denied  the  existence  of  matter  altogether ;  and 
maintained,  that  God  and  inferior  or  finite  spirits, 
(angelic  and  human,)  are  the  only  real  existen- 
ces in  the  universe.  By  this  amendment  of  Mr. 
Locke's  system,  the  excellent  bishop  hoped  to 
bring  all  philosophers  to  believe,  that  they  lite- 
rally see  and  hear  and  feel  the  immediate  power 
of  God,  present  every  moment  with  them,  and 
operating  all  around  them.  And  such  a  belief, 
he  imagined,  would  banish  infidelity  and  irreli- 
gion  from  every  philosophic  mind  :  but  the  ideal- 
ism or  spiritualism  of  Berkeley,  has  not  met  gen- 
eral approbation. 

After  this,  Tho.  Reid,  Ja.  Beattie,  and  some 
others,  in  order  to  confute  Hume's  skepticism, 
Berkeley's  idealism,  and  other  aberrations  from 
the  common  belief,  without  renouncing  the  em- 
pirical mode  of  philosophizing,  called  in  the  aid 
of  common  sense,  or  the  common  apprehensions 
of  the  unsophisticated  mind,  as  a  supreme  arbi- 
ter in  such  controversies.  They  did  not  recall 
the  long  exploded  doctrine  of  innate  ideas,  nor 
adopt  that  of  the  intuitions   and  judgments   of 


/^.6^;  l^itr/u 


20  -^IMPERIAL 

reason^  as  a  higher  power  of  the  mind — which 
would  have  been  to  take  their  stand  among  the 
metaphysical  philosophers — but  they  held,  that 
certain  instinctive  apprehensions  of  mankind  at 
large,  apprehensions  which  mysteriously  accom- 
pany all  our  ordinary  sensations,  and  are  inde- 
pendent of  all  reasoning  and  all  philosophy,  are 
often  more  sound  and  correct  than  the  apprehen- 
sions and  conclusions  of  the  most  acute  philoso- 
phers. Thus,  by  making  the  principles  of  com- 
mon sense,  or  a  mysterious  and  incomprehensi- 
ble instinct,  more  to  be  relied  on  than  philosophi- 
cal reasoning,  and  by  teaching  that  the  latter 
must  succomb  to  the  former  in  case  of  disagree- 
ment— they  virtually  taught,  that  the  empirical 
mode  of  philosophizing  is  unsafe,  without  a  re- 
gulator and  a  guide  ;  and,  that  unphilosophical 
conclusions  are  often  more  correct  than  those  of 
philosophy.  This  new  doctrine  of  common 
sense,  without  being  formally  recognized  by  all, 
has  spread  widely  among  empirical  philosophers 
in  England,  France  and  America  ;  and  it  has 
been  the  frequent  refuge  of  many,  when  grap- 
pling with  adversaries  whose  arguments  they 
were  unable  to  confute  by  sound  logical  reason- 

</  ing. 

Subsequent  to  these  chief  innovators  upon  Mr. 
Locke's  system,  Dugald  Stewart,   Tho.  Brown, 


PHILOSOPHIZING.  21 

and  others,  have  carefully  revised,  enlarged  and 
perfected  the  whole  system,  by  elaborate  treatises 
on  the  Philosophy  of  the  Human  Mind,  con- 
structed on  pure  Baconian  principles.  In 
France  also,  the  Abbe  Condillac,  Chas.  de  Bon- 
net, and  some  others  have  attempted  to  improve 
upon  Locke. 

The  valuable  treatises  of  various  individuals 
of  this  school,  on  particular  branches  of  philoso- 
phy, such  as  ethics,  natural  theology,  the  law  of 
nations,  &c.,  are  omitted,  as  not  being  necessary 
to  the  main  object  of  these  essays,  which  is,  to 
convey  to  Americans  some  clear  and  correct  ideas 
of  the  modern  German  philosophy.  And  for  the 
same  reason,  the  elaborate  researches  and  in- 
valuable discoveries  of  numerous  successful  ex- 
plorers of  nature,  in  all  her  departments,  are  here 
passed  in  silence.  The  voluminous  publications 
of  the  so  called  Philosophical  Societies,  and  the 
numberless  other  profound  works  on  natural 
science,  show  the  wonderful  achievements  of  ex- 
perimental philosophy,  when  directed  to  its  pro- 
per objects,  and  prosecuted  according  to  Lord 
Bacon's  rules. 


CHAPTER   III. 

METAPHYSICAL    PHILOSOPHERS. 

Des  Cartes,  Spiuoza,  Malebrauche. 

The  metaphysical  n^ode  of  philosophizing' 
does  not,  Hke  the  empirical,  decide  every  pomt 
separately,  and  on  independent  grounds  ^  but  it 
searches  a^ter  general  truths,  or  first  i^rinciples, 
and  by  applying  them  to  specific  cases  in  a  logi- 
cal manner,  it  obtains  a  scientific  answer  to  every 
question. 

The  modern  history  of  this  mode  of  philoso- 
phizing commences  with  Rene  Des  Cartes,  a 
French  nobleman  of  fine  talents,  who  flourished 
in  the  2d  quarter  of  the  17th  century.  Dissatis- 
fied witli  all  the  systems  of  philosopliy  then  pre- 
vailing, he  undertook  to  form  a  more  sohd  one, 
based  on  certain  knowledge. 

He  began  with  the  enquiry,  What  does  man 
know,  with  perfect  certainty  1  And  he  found  '^n 
answer,  in   the   consciousness  that  he  was  tlien 


METAPHYSICAL    PHILOSOPHERS.  23 

thinking.  He  therefore  inferred  his  own  existence 
to  be  certainly  known  :  (cogito :  ergo  sum  :) 
and  also,  that  he  was  a  thinking  being.  But  he 
was  likewise  conscious,  that  his  mental  powers 
were  very  limited  ;  he  could  comprehend  only  a 
small  part  of  the  numberless  objects  around  him. 
At  the  same  time,  he  could  conceive  of  a  mind 
capable  of  comprehending  every  thing;  and  not 
only  capable  of  understanding,  but  also  of  creat- 
ing and  upholding  all  things,  and  possessing 
every  possible  perfection.  This  idea  he  found 
floating  in  his  mind,  and  he  was  not  conscious 
of  having  designedly  fabricated  it :  he  therefore 
concluded,  that  it  came  to  him  from  without,  and 
from  that  infinite  Being  himself,  of  whom  it  was 
the  idea.  There  is  then  a  God,  an  all  perfect 
Being;  and  our  idea  of  him  is  innate.  He  like- 
wise proved  the  existence  of  God,  by  the  marks 
of  wisdom  and  design  visible  every  where  in  the 
natural  world.  And  from  the  perfections  of  the 
divine  Being  who  created  us,  he  inferred  the  truth 
and  infallibility  of  human  reasoning,  when  pro- 
perly conducted  ;  because  it  is  not  conceivable, 
that  such  a  Creator  would  endow  us  with  facul- 
ties calculated  to  mislead  us.  Clearness  and  dis- 
iinctness,  he  supposed,  are  the  evidence  of  the 
truth  or  certainty  of  our  knowledge.  The  bodily 
senses  seldom  afford  clear  and  distinct  knowK 


24  METAPHYSICAL 

edge ;  and  thereibre  such  knowledge  as  tliey  af- 
ford, can  not  always  be  depended  on.  But,  be- 
sides the  perceptions  of  the  senses,  we  have  ideas 
formed  in  the  mind,  by  reasoning  and  reflection  ; 
and  also  innate  ideas,  or  ideas  implanted  in  our 
minds  by  our  Creator.  The  last  (our  innate 
ideas)  are  the  most  clear  and  certain,  and  there- 
fore the  best  sources  of  argumentation.  The 
ideas  formed  in  the  mind  are  the  next  in  value 
for  reasoning  ;  because  they  canrMft  be  made  clear 
and  distinct,  if  we  are  only  careful  to  always 
think  clearly  and  distinctly. 

Assuming  the  broad  principle,  that  all  clear 
and  distinct  ideas  contain  true  objective  knowl- 
edge, Des  Cartes  was  less  careful  to  search  for 
the  origin,  and  to  demonstrate  the  correctness  of 
our  ideas,  than  to  make  his  own  ideas  clear  and 
distinct.  And  this  was  the  chief  source  of  his 
many  errors,  and  of  his  baseless  theories  :  for 
when  he  had  analyzed  any  of  his  conceptions 
and  made  them  \ery  clear  and  distinct  to  his  own 
mind,  he  conceived  them  to  be  objectively  true, 
or  to  correspond  with  the  real  nature  and  essence 
of  things.  In  this  way,  he  was  led  to  believe, 
that  the  very  essence  of  J7iind  or  spirit  consists  in 
thinking  ;  and  the  very  essance  of  matter  in  mere 
extension.  Hence,  he  inferred,  spirits  can  have 
no  extension,   and  no  parts ;    and  matter  can 


PHILOSOPHERS.  25 

never  think,  perceive,  or  will.  And,  as  extension 
is  the  very  essence  of  matter,  there  can  be  no 
void  space,  or  space  unoccupied  by  matter;  and 
consequently,  the  material  universe  is  an  infinite- 
ly extended  plenum  ;  and  of  course,  all  motion 
of  bodies  must  produce  a  kind  of  vortices  or 
whirlpools.  The  soul^  having  no  extension,  is 
uncompounded ;  and  therefore,  it  can  never  be 
dissolved  oi  die,  being  in  its  very  nature  immor- 
tal. But  the  brutes  are  not  immortal ;  of  course 
they  can  have  no  souls,  and  are  mere  machines^ 
with  no  thoughts,  no  volitions,  and  no  percep- 
tions. To  explain  the  mode  of  communication 
between  the  soul  and  the  body,  he  supposed  a 
very  subtile  fluid,  secreted  from  the  blood  and 
called  animal  spirits,  to  circulate  in  the  nerves, 
and  to  convey  intelligence  from  every  part  of  the 
body  to  the  soul  resident  in  the  pineal  gland  of 
the  brain ;  and  thence,  also,  to  convey  the  com- 
mands of  the  soul  to  all  the  muscles  employed  in 
voluntary  motion. 

Des  Cartes  was  a  man  of  genius,  a  fine  wri- 
ter, and,  in  general,  a  sound  logical  reasoner. 
Yet  his  premises  were  too  often  mere  assump- 
tions ;  and  his  conclusions  of  course,  without 
support.  He  struck  out  many  new  thoughts,  and 
he  was  the  first  in  modern  times,  to  frame  a 
regular  system  of  philosophy  based  on  metaphy- 


26  METAPHYSICAL 

sical  reasoning.  His  writings  excited  much  at- 
tention, anci  they  prompted  many  to  engage  in 
philosophical  studies  ;  but  they  also  met  with 
great  opposition.  Gassendi  and  tlie  adlierents 
to  the  Baconian  method,  of  course  rejected  Des 
Cartes'  views.  The  Jesuits  in  France,  and  many 
of  the  protestants  in  Holland,  did  the  same.  In 
England,  he  scarcely  had  a  follower.  His  prin- 
cipal adherents  were,  in  France,  several  of  the 
Messieurs  de  Port- Roy  al, especially  Malebranche, 
and  in  Holland,  Spinoza  and  a  few  others. 

Tlie  next  metaphysical  ])hilosopher  claiming 
a  place  in  this  sketch,  was  Benedict  Spinoza,  a 
learned  Jew  of  Amsterdam,  who  died  at  the  age 
of  45,  in  the  year  1677. 

He  had  studied  the  Talmud,  and  was  dissatis- 
fied with  its  doctrines.  Being  discarded  by  the 
Jews  for  his  opinions,  he  associated  with  Chris- 
tians, and  among  tliem,  read  and  admired  the 
writings  of  Des  Cartes.  But  he  thought  the  sys- 
tem of  that  philospher  susceptible  of  improve- 
ment. 

Des  Cartes  had  defined  a  substance  to  be,  "  a 
thing-whicli  so  exists,  as  not  to  depend  on  any 
thing  else  for  its  existence."  And  he  had  said, 
that  in  this  its  proper  sense,  the  term  belongs 
exclusively  to  the  self-existent  God.  Relying  on 
the  correctness  of  this  definition,  Spinoza  main- 


PHILOSOPHERS. 


27 


tained,  that  there  is  but  one  proper  substance  in 
the  universe;  namely,  the  self-existent  and  all- 
perfect  God.  All  other  creatures  and  things,  not 
only  originated  from  this  one  infinite  substance, 
but  in  such  a  manner  as  to  consist  of  it,  and  be 
inseparable  from  it.  They  exist  in  God,  and 
God  in  them.  As  to  essence  or  substance,  the 
whole  universe  is  God  ;  God  existing  and  ope- 
rating in  numberless  modes  and  forms,  which 
his  infinite  wisdom  has  devised.  According  to 
this  theory,  God  himself  is  natura  naturans,  as 
the  philosophers  express  it ;  and  the  created  uni- 
verse \ii?iatiira  nafurata.  Spinozism,  however, 
is  not  the  Berkeleyan  theory  so  extended  as  to  in- 
clude minds  as  well  as  material  things.  Berke- 
ley supposed  material  objects,  to  be  nothing  more 
than  a  constant  divine  operation^  supplying  the 
place  of  permanent  material  causes.  But  Spin- 
oza did  not  suppose  either  matter  or  mind,  to  be 
nothing  more  than  a  divine  operation  ;  he  admit- 
ted them  to  be  a  proper  product^  or  rather  effiux^ 
of  divine  power,  (though  sustained  and  actuated 
permanently  by  the  divine  Being,)  and  having 
in  themselves  the  power  of  action,  according  to 
certain  laws  impressed  upon  them. 

With  Des  Cartes,  he  held  the  essence  o^  mind 
to  consist  in  thinkings  and  the  essence  of  matter 
to  consist  in  extension.     And  believing  that  there 


28  METAPHYSICAL 

is  but  one  proper  substance,  or  self-exi&lent 
Being,  fronj  whom  and  in  wliom  all  created 
beings  and  things  have  their  existence,  he  sup- 
posed this' self-existing  substance  or  Being,  to  be 
at  once,  infinite  mind  or  thinking  power,  and  infi- 
nite extension  :  and  that  when  he  creates  finite 
minds,  it  is,  by  sending  forth  a  portion  of  his 
thinking  power,  to  think,  and  will,  and  choose, 
according  to  certain  laws  ;  and  when  lie  creates 
material  objects,  he  in  like  manner  sends  forth 
a  portion  of  his  other  essential  nature,  extension^ 
to  fill  assigned  places,  to  move  and  be  moved, 
and  to  exhibit  all  the  phenomena  which  we  as- 
cribe to  material  bodies. 

All  actions,  he  supposed  to  be  necessary,  or 
governed  by  the  laws  of  causation  ;  even  those 
of  God  liimself,  who  cannot  act  otherwise  than  he 
does,  beiiiu  compelled  by  his  own  infinite  attri- 
butes. Yet  we  may  say,  God  acts  freely  ;  be- 
cause he  is  self-moved,  or  acts  only  from  internal 
impulses.  J/rt/z,on  the  contrary,  does  not  act  free- 
ly ;  not  only  because  he  is  a  dependent  existence, 
but  also,  because  he  is  a  finite  being,  and  is  sub- 
ject to  a  thousand  influences  from  the  objects 
around  him. 

All  the  divine  perceptions  or  ideas,  he  suppos- 
ed, are  absolutely  perfect:  and  all  our  ideas 
would  also  fully  accord  with  the  nature  of  things, 


PHILOSOPHERS.  29 

if  we  were  always  careful  to  think  according  to 
the  laws  of  thinking.  It  is  only  illegitimate  and 
careless  thinking,  that  can  lead  to  error  ;  since 
the  human  mind,  though  finite,  is  an  efflux  of 
the  infinite  and  all-perlect  mind.  The  object 
which  we  can  the  most  perfectly  know  or  compre- 
hend, is  the  divine  Being  himself ;  in  whom  we 
exist,  and  who  is  constantly  developing  himself 
in  each  and  every  created  thing  around  us.  To 
know  and  contemplate  God,  is  man's  highest 
bliss  ;  and  to  obey  his  commands,  is  man's  high- 
est freedom. 

Such  is  the  best  outline  I  can  give  of  Spino- 
za's pantheistic  system.  It  is  manifest,  that  he 
carried  his  speculations  quite  beyond  the  bounds 
of  human  knowledge,  and  ran  into  downright 
transcendentism^  in  which  obscurity  must  ever 
reign.  But  he  also  wrote  in  vei-y  barbarous 
Latin,  and  is  a  very  obscure  writer.  I  have  not 
relied  so  much  upon  my  own  power  to  unravel 
his  enigmas,  as  on  the  labors  of  those  Germans, 
who  have  attentively  studied  his  works  in  order 
to  compare  his  opinions  with  those  of  the  recent 
German  pantheists.  Spinoza  had  scarcely  a 
single  follower,  in  the  age  in  which  he  lived  ;  and 
he  was  generally  regarded  with  abhorrence,  as 
being  an  atheist,  and  a  subverter  of  all  that  is 
rational.     And  yet  he  is  reported  to  have  been  a 


30  METAPHYSICAL 

very  ami;ible   man,   perfectly   correct  in  morals, 
and  devout  also,  in  his  way. 

The  next  philosopher  we  shall  mention,  was 
the  pious  Nicholas  Malebranciie,  ot'  the  Con- 
gregation of  the  Oratory  at  Paris,  who  died  in 
1715,  at  the  age  of  77.  ITjs  princi[)al  work  was, 
the  Searcli  after  Truth,  first  published  in  1673, 
and  afterwards,  much  altered  and  eidarffed  in 
1712,  only  3  years  before  his  death. 

Malebranche,  it  has  been  said,  was  the  most 
profound  metaphysician  that  France  ever  pro- 
duced. He  was  an  original  thinker ;  he  called 
no  man  master.  Yet  he  took  much  from  Plato, 
Augustine,  and  Des  Cartes.  From  the  last  he 
took,  unaltered,  his  ideas  of  substance^  of  mind. 
and  of  matter. 

He  undertook  to  searcli  out,  and  to  portray,  the 
sources  both  of  error  and  of  true  knowledge. — 
The  great  source  of  crror^  he  supposed  to  be,  the 
following  of  the  senses  and  the  imagination. — 
And  the  only  source  of  true  and  certain  knoicl- 
edge,  he  held  to  be,  God  himself.  His  grand 
principle  was,  we  see  all  things  in  God.  The 
manner  in  which  we  do  so,  (notwithstanding  the 
pains  he  took  to  explain  himself,)  is  not  very 
cleai.  Sometimes  he  seems  to  hold  to  a  sort  of 
mystical  union  and  communion  of  the  soul  with 
God,  in  which   God  imparts  knowledge  to  us. — 


PHILOSOPHERS.  31 

At  Other  times,  and  more  generallj,  he  seems  to 
come  very  near  to  Spinoza's  pantheistic  notions. 
For  he  held  the  soul  to  be  a  portion  of  the  divine 
Logos  or  Reason  ;  and  the  material  world,  to  be 
a  development  of  the  one  infinite  substance;  and 
both  to  exist  stiil  in  God,  and  to  be  incapable  of 
any  action  whatever, except  as  God  worksinthem. 
The  immediate  objects  of  all  our  knowledge  of 
things,  he  declares  to  be  the  ideas  of  things,  not 
the  things  themselves.  These  ideas  of  things 
existed  in  the  divine  mind,  or  in  God,  before  any 
thing  was  created  ;  and,  when  we  direct  our 
views  upon  God,  we  behold  these  ideas  of  things, 
just  as  they  exist  in  the  divine  mind  ;  and  this  ia 
true  knowledge.  These  ideas  of  things,  existing 
iu  God,  and  which  we  can  behold  in  him,  are 
not  the  ideas  or  images  of  individual  objects,  but 
general  or  abstract  ideas,  the  ideas  of  the 
genera  and  species  of  things  ;  by  knowing  which 
we  know  the  very  essence  or  the  true  nature  of 
all  things  material  and  immaterial.  And  as 
these  ideas  uf  things  are,  at  all  times,  to  be  seen 
in  God,  we  may,  by  viewing  them  in  him,  have 
a  true  knowledge  even  of  objects  that  never  fell 
underthecognizanceof  our  senses,  or  were  never 
the  objects  of  our  empirical  knowledge.  When 
vve  contemplate  external  objects  only  through  the 
bodily  senses,  we  obtain  only  indistinct  images 


32  METAPIISICAL    PHILOSOPHERS. 

of  those  things  ;  and  we  must  turn  our  view  to 
God,  and  contemplate  tiie  ideas  of  those  things 
in  him,  or  we  can  not  have  any  correct  and  ade- 
quate knowledge  of  them.  So  when  we  attend  to 
our  own  internal  consciousnesses,  and  endeavor 
thence  to  obtain  a  knowledge  of  our  own  souls  or 
minds,  we  have  only  indistinct  conceptions,  until 
we  look  to  God,  and  contemplate  the  idea  of  a 
soul,  as  it  there  exists  in  the  most  perfect  form. — 
We  may  now  see,  why  Malebranche  considered 
reliance  on  etnpirical  knowledge,  as  the  grand 
source  of  all  errors.  We  may  also  learn  what 
he  intended,  when  he  said,  Gud  is  our  intclligi- 
bh  iDorld.  God  himself,  we  are  able  to  behold 
with  immediate  vision;  and  in  him,  we  may  see 
the  perfect  ideas  of  all  created  things.  Innate 
ideas,  Malebranche  did  not  admit ;  such  ideas 
being  unnecessary  for  those  who  can  at  any  mo- 
ment see  the  perfect  ideas  of  all  things  in  the  ever 
present  God. 

The  truly  religious  spiriUn  which  Malebranche 
wrote,  his  easy  and  alluring  style,  and  his  very 
inijenious  reasoninjj,  caused  his  writino^s  to  be 
much  read  and  admired  ;  but  the  complete  as- 
cendency of  the  empirical  mode  of  philosophi- 
zing, prevented  his  views  from  gaining  much 
currency. 


CHAPTER   IV 


THE    FIRST    GERMAN   PHILOSOPHY. 

Leibnitz  and  Woif. 

We  come  now  to  the  rise  of  the  first  German 
Philosophy.  Its  author  was  Godfrey  William 
VON  Leibnitz,  a  contemporary  of  Locke  and 
Malebranche,  and  a  man  whom  any  nation  might 
be  proud  to  call  its  own.  He  was  a  general 
scholar,  acute,  ingenious,  and  indefatigable  in 
his  exertions  to  advance  both  literature  and 
science.  Although  he  gave  much  of  his  time  to 
the  study  of  philosophy,  and  became  the  father 
of  the  first  German  system  of  that  science,  yet 
he  had  not  leisure  to  compose  a  general  treatise 
on  the  subject. 

He  pursued  the  metaphysical  method  ;  imitat- 
ing in  this  the  example  of  Plato  and  Des  Cartes, 
whom  he  diligently  studied,  but  did  not  servilely 
follow.  His  aim  was,  to  reform  the  systems  of 
his  predecessors,  and  to  make  philosophy  as 
perfect  a  science  of  reason,   as  the  pure  mathe- 


34  THE    FIRST    GERMAN 

niatics.  In  this  way  he  hoped  to  put  an  end 
to  all  strife  and  all  controversy,  not  only  among 
philosophers  themselves,  but  between  them  and 
theologians,  moralists,  and  others.  To  accom- 
plish this  object,  he  proposed  to  treat  philosophy 
in  the  mathematical  manner;  that  is,  by  laying 
down  such  first  principles  as  none  can  deny,  and 
then  giving  logical  demonstrations  of  every  pro- 
position. This  method  he  deemed  practicable, 
because  necessary  general  truths  are  not  confin- 
ed to  the  mathematics,  but  belong  equally  to 
philosophy.  These  truths,  he  justly  supposed^ 
are  not  the  result  of  experience,  but  have  their  foun- 
dation in  the  mind  itself.  He  considered  i hem 
to  be  innate,  or  a  part  of  that  intellectual  furni- 
ture which  we  receive  from  the  Creator,  and 
which  become  developed  by  rejection.  The 
ground  of  their  certainty,  lies  in  the  divine  con- 
stitution of  things  ;  and  the  perception  or  knowl- 
edoje  of  them,  is  what  distinijuishes  a  rational 
sou!  from  the  souls  of  brutes. 

But  unfortuuiUely,  Leibnitz  did  not  build  his 
superstructure,  entirely,  of  such  solid  materials. 
He  held,  (with  Mr.  Locke,)  that  all  simple  ideas 
of  sensation  (simple  perceptions  by  the  senses) 
are  ohject'ivcly  true  ;  that  is,  they  correspond  per- 
fectly with  their  objects.  And  he  also  maintain- 
ed, (with  Des  Cartes   and  others,)  that  all   the 


PHILOSOPHY.  35 

simple  ideas  of  reason  are  objectively  true,  or 
accord  with  the  real  nature  and  essence  of  things. 
At  the  same  time,  he  confounded  the  logically 
true,  viz.  what  involves  no  contradiction  or  ab- 
surdity, with  the  rtalhj  true,  or  the  true  in  fact. 
Hence  he  supposed  that,  by  mere  thinkings  we 
may  arrive  at  the  knowledge  of  all  those  primary 
truths  or  first  principles  of  things,  from  which 
may  be  deduced,  by  logical  reasoning,  a  com- 
plete system  of  philosophical  knowledge.  The 
Cartesian  doctrine,  that  clearness  and  distinct- 
ness of  ideas  is  adequate  evidence  of  their 
truth  or  correctness,  Leibnitz  discarded  as  falla- 
cious. He  proposed  more  rational  and  logical 
tests  of  truth  ;  namely,  lor  all  abstract  and  gen- 
eral truths,  the  principle  which  lies  at  the  founda- 
tion of  mathematical  demonstrations,  that  of 
identity  ov  contradiction;  and  for  all  questions 
of  fact  or  real  existence,  the  principle  of  ade- 
quate cause,  or,  that  whatever  occurs  or  exists 
must  have  a  cause.  And  on  this  last  principle 
of  reasoning,  he  proved  the  being  of  a  God  from 
the  existence  of  the  world  around  us.  He  like- 
wise deemed  the  ontological  proof,  or  that  de- 
rived from  the  conception  of  a  God  in  our  own 
minds,  to  be  valid  proof. 

As  specimens  of  his  deductions  from  these  first 
principles  and  laws  of  philosophing,   we   may 


36  THE    FIRST    GERMAN 

consider  his  doctrines  of  Monads^  of  pre-estab- 
lished Uarmomj^  and  of  the  Best  System  of  the 
world. 

1.  His  doctrine  of  Monads.     All  the  objects 
apprehended  by  our  senses,  he   said,   are   com- 
pounded bodies,    or  such  as  may  be    separated 
into  parts.     How  far  the  subdivisions  of  matter 
may  be  carried,  our  senses  from  their  obtuseness, 
can  not  determine.     But  infinite   divisibility   is 
inconceivable  and  absurd.     Yet  the  smallest  pos- 
sible, subdivisions  of  any  and  every  substance, 
must  have  no  parts  ;  and  of  course,  can  have  no 
dimensions,  no  figure  or  shape,  and  no    exterior 
or  interior.     Such  elementary  parts,  he  denomi- 
nated ilTow^f/^-.     And  as  these  Monads  can   have 
no  external  qualities,   (dimensions,  shape,  color, 
&-C.)  all  their  qualities  must  be   strictly  internal. 
But  the  only  strictly  internal  qualities  are   those 
of  mind^  such   as   sensibility,   thought,    volition, 
&c.     Hence  all  Monads  must  be,  in  their  nature, 
living  active  beings,  or  minds. — Our  knowledge 
extends  io  jour  kinds  of  Monads,  and  no  more. 
First  in  the  order  of  excellence  is  the  self-exist- 
ing God,  the  author  and  upholder  of  all  the  other 
Monads,  the   IMonas  Monadum,   who  is  infinite 
in  all  his  attributes.     Next   in  order   are   finite 
spirits  and  human  sonls.     These  are  distinguish- 
ed from  their  great  parent  Monad,  by  being  finite 


"^^ 


PHILOSOPHY. 


and  dependent  minds ;  and  they  are  distinguish-  ^ 
ed  from  the  lower  orders  of  Monads,  by  posses-  '' 
sing  reason.  The  third  order  are  the  souls  of 
brutes  ;  which  have  the  power  of  perception, 
thought,  and  volition,  but  are  not  capable  of  un- 
derstanding either  general  or  necessary  and  eter- 
nal truths.  The  fourth  and  lowest  order  of 
Monads  are  sleeping,  unconscious,  and  unthink- 
ing beings  ;  yet  they  possess  life,  feeling,  and  the 
power  of  action;  and  they  are  always  blindly  strug- 
gling to  change  their  condition.  Aggregates  of 
Monads  of  this  fourth  and  lowest  order,  constitute 
material  bodies.  One  Monad  of  thethird  order,  sur- 
rounded by  an  organized  aggregate  of  Monads  of 
the  fourth  class,  constitutes  a  brute  animal.  And 
one  Monad  of  the  second  order,  surrounded  by  a 
similar  aggregate  of  Monads  of  the  lowest  order, 
constitutes  a  man  or  a  human  being.  Such 
being  the  essential  nature  of  all  existing  beings 
and  things,  space  and  time  can  be  nothing  more 
than  tlie  arrangement  of  Monads,  considered  as 
co-existent  or  as  existing  in  succession.  Both 
are  mere  ideal  things,  or  things  without  real  ex- 
istence. By  this  doctrine  of  Monads,  Leibnitz 
supposed  he  could  explain,  what  Plato  intended 
by  ideas,  and  Aristotle  by  his  entelechias ;  and 
likewise  overthrow  entirely  the  pantheism  of 
Spinoza, 


38  THE    FIRST    GERMAN 

2.  His  doctrine  of  pre-established  Harmon)^, 
As  the  created  Monads  have  no  external  qualities, 
no  shape,  no  dimensions,  no  interior  or  exterior 
parts, — it  is  impossible,  that  they  should  act  upon 
one  another  in  a  physical  manner.  One  Monad 
cannot  penetrate  another,  nor  can  one  touch  an- 
other externally.  Each  is,  in  its  nature,  as  in- 
dependent of  all  physical  actions  from  the  others, 
as  it  would  be  were  it  the  only  Monad  in  exis- 
tence. In  other  words,  as  Monads  have  only 
internal  qualities,  or  those  of  minds  ; — it  is  im- 
possible that  they  should  either  act,  or  be  acted 
upon,  mechanically. — How  then  can  we  accouut 
for  the  constant  action  and  reaction  apparent 
throughout  the  material  world;  and  for  the  con- 
trol of  the  mind  over  the  body,  and  the  influen- 
ces of  the  body  on  the  mind,  in  human  beings  ? 
He  replies  :  the  created  universe  is  an  organized 
whole.  Each  Monad  stands  connected  with  the 
whole  system,  but  has  special  relations  to  the 
Monads  nearest  to  it,  and  in  every  living  being, 
the  unthinking  Monads  form  a  sort  of  world 
around  the  intelligent  Monad  which  is  its  souL 
Now,  by  a  law  of  their  Creator,  impressed  on 
them  when  they  first  issued  from  his  hands,  every 
finite  Monad  is  compelled  to  act  conformably  to 
its  relations,  or  to  do  and  to  endure  whatever  its 
relations  require,  in  order  to   a  perfect  barmonj 


a»HILO  SOPHY.  39 

in  all  ihe  movements  of  thisva-t  and  complicat- 
ed machinery.  And  this  Jaw  of  tlje  Creator  is 
what  he  denominates  the  pre-established  Har- 
mony. Hence,  the  apparent  action  of  finite 
Monads  on  each  other  is,  in  reality,  divine  action, 
or  the  result  of  an  original  law  of  the  Creator  ; 
and  by  this  hiw,  God  secures  infallihly  those  re- 
sults, which  he  contemplated  when  he  formed 
t-he  universe. 

3.  His  Best  System  of  the  world. — In  his 
Theodicee,  or  Essay  on  the  goodoess  of  God, 
free-wiil  i.i  man,  and  the  origin  of  evil, — Leib- 
nitz maintained  that,  among  the  many  possible 
systems  for  a  created  universe,  God  has  chosen 
the  very  best:  and  that  this  may  be  proved  from 
his  perfections.  His  infinite  wisdom  could  de- 
vise the  best  system,  his  infinite  goodness  would 
choose  it,  and  his  infinite  power  would  then  pro- 
duce it.  Hence,  the  piesent  system  must  be  the 
best  possible  in  its  place:  and  nothing  eoul-d  be 
changed,  without  changing  the  system  and  ren- 
dering it  less  perfect.  God  indeed  chooses  noth- 
ing, for  its  own  sake,  but  what  is  good.  But 
physical  evil  or  imperfection,  is  inseparable  from 
whatever  is  finite  ;  and  of  course,  such  evil  must 
pervade  a  world  of  finite  beings  and  things. — 
From  this  imperfection  of  all  finite  beings  and 
tilings,  natural  £2;t7s(pain  and  suffering)  naturally 


40  THE    FIRST     GERMAN 

and  necessarily  follow  ;  and  moral  evil  or  sin,  is 
likewise  a  natural,  ihougli  not  a  necessary  con- 
sequence. Natural  evil  God  chose  ;  not  indeed 
for  its  own  sake,  but  as  the  means  of  good.  He 
designed  it  for  chastisement  or  punishment ;  and, 
by  the  pre-established  Harmony  of  the  universe, 
he  causes  it  naturally  to  overtake  sooner  or  later 
the  transgressors.  Moral  evil  or  sin,  arises 
naturally  from  the  free-will  of  finite  rational 
beings:  and  God  does  not  choose  it,  but  only 
permits  it;  and  he  permits  it,  because  he  could 
not  otherwise  have  the  best  possible  system. — 
Free-will conshU  in  acting  according  to  our  own 
choice^  and  without  any  compulsion  or  physical 
necessity.  But  our  choice  is  determined  always 
by  the  circumstances  in  which  we  are  placed.  It 
therefore  depends,  in  all  cases,  o.i  the  pre-estab- 
lished Harmony  of  the  universe;  and  of  course 
it  was,  from  eternitj',  absolutely  certain  how  we 
would  choose  in  e.wery  instance. 

This  system  of  })hiIosophy  spread  rapidly, 
and  soon  became  the  national  philosophy  of  Prot- 
estant Germany.  The  man  who  did  the  most  to 
explain  and  recommend  it  to  his  countrymen, 
was  Christian  Wolf,  who  died  in  1754,  at  the 
age  of  75.  He  drew  out  and  expanded  the  prin- 
ciples of  Leibnitz  into  a  complete  system  ;  and 
composed,  for  this  purpose,  elementary  works  on 


PHILOSOPHY.  4f 

nearly  every  branch  of  the  science.  And,  as 
many  of  his  treatises  were  written  in  the  vernacular 
language,  this  philosophy  spiead  among  the 
common  people.  Wolf  resolutely  met  every  as- 
sailant, and  spent  his  life  in  explaining  and  de- 
fending the  Leibnitzian  principles  :  and  hence, 
this  system  has  obtained  the  name  of  the  Lei- 
bnitzian-Wolfian  Philosophy.  In  regard  to  prin- 
ciples, Wolf  scarcely  deviated  at  all  from  Lei- 
bnitz; except  in  denying  sensations  to  the  lowest 
order  of  Monads,  and  in  confining:  the  so  called 
pre-established  Harmony  to  the  jiiutual  inter- 
course of  the  soul  and  body.  But  in  practical 
or  moral  philosophy,  of  which  Leibnitz  did  not 
treat.  Wolf  devised  a  new  central  point,  or  fun- 
damental principle;  viz.  that  o^  perfection^  q.s 
comprising  all  that  is  morally  right  and  obligato- 
ry. According  to  this  principle,  the  whole  duty 
of  man  consists  in  striving  after  perfection^  in 
himself  and  in  all  around  him  ;  the  perfection  of 
his  entire  character  and  condition, for  time  and  eter- 
nity. «As  Wolf  surveyed  the  whole  field  of  philoso- 
phy, so  he  distributed  it  into  its  several  depart- 
ments ;  a  thing  which  had  not  before  been  done. 
He  divided  all  philosophy  into  theoretical  and 
practical^  the  former  treating  of  rational  knowl- 
edge^ and  the  latter  of  rational  conduct.  Theoret- 
ical philosophy  he  divided  into  Logic  and  J/c^- 


42  THE    FIRST    GERMAN 

aphjsics ;  and  under  Metapliysics  lie  included 
Ontology^  metapliysical  (not  empirical)  Psy- 
chology, Cosmology,  and  natural  Theology. — 
Pracliciil  or  moral  philosophy  he  divided  into 
Ethics,  the  Law  of  Nature,  and  National  Policy. 
And  this  classification  of  the  Philosophical 
Sciences,  with  the  addition  of  Esthetics,  has 
been  generally  followed  in  Germany  quite  to  the 
present  time.  In  all  his  elementary  treatises, 
which  were  numerous.  Wolf  pursued  strictly  the 
mathematical  method.  He  also  introduced  a 
niultitndH  of  new  technical  term?,  derived  chiefly 
from  the  Greek  language  ;  nearly  all  of  which 
have  since  passed  into  common  use  in  the  Ger- 
man schools. 

This  Leibnitzian-Wolfian  philosophy  reached 
its  culminating  point,  about  the  middle  of  the 
18th  century.  Soon  afterwards,  from  various 
causes,  it  began  to  decline.  Many  had  all  along 
questioned  the  soundness  of  its  principles,  and 
still  more,  the  tendencies  of  some  of  its  doc- 
trines. The  downright  pedantry  of  most  of  its 
advocates,  who  dogmatized  ostentatiously,  and 
stuffed  their  writings  with  formal  demonstrations 
of  the  simplest  truths,  rendered  it  disgusting  to 
well  informed  minds.  About  the  same  time,  M^* 
Locke's  principles,  or  those  of  the  empirical 
gchool,  found   their   way  into  Gernjany.     And 


PHILOSOPHY.  43 

these  principles  were  propagated  in,  and  along 
with,  the  writings  of  the  English  and  French 
deists  and  skeptics,  (Hume,  Voltaire,  Rousseau, 
&.C.)  which  began  now  to  circuiute  extensively, 
and  to  produce  in  that  country  a  set  of  free- 
thinkers and  contemners  of  long  established  opin- 
ions. The  friends  of  revealed  religion  were 
alarmed  at  the  progress  of  infidelity  and  skepti- 
cism, under  the  assumed  name  of  philosophy  ; 
and  they  anxiously  enquired :  What  is  true 
philosophy?  It  was  amid  this  state  of  things, 
that  Emanuel  Kant  appeared  on  the  stage,  as  a 
masterspirit  controlling  and  guiding  public  opin- 
ion by  his  superior  talents. 


C  H  A  P  T  E  R  V 


KANT    AND    HIS    CRITICAL    PHILOSOPHY. 

Introductory  Remarks.     Critic  on  Sensation.     Time  and  Space. 

Emanuel  Kant  was  born  at  Konigsberg,  in 
the  year  1724,  and  spent  his  whole  life  in  that  city, 
never  havina^  been  more  than  22  Eno-lish  miles 
from  it.  He  first  studied  theology,  then  became 
a  lecturer,  and  afterwards  a  professor  of  logic 
and  metaphysics,  in  the  university  ;  and  died  in 
1804,  at  the  age  of  80.  That  he  was  a  man  of 
great  acuteness,  and  a  patient  investigator,  his 
works  evince  ;  and  that  he  was  a  man  of  pure 
morals,  conscientious,  upright,  modest,  and  ami- 
able, is  the  testimony  of  all  who  knew  him.  He 
has  been  called  the  modeiHi  Socrates  ;  and,  em- 
phatically, the  Philosopher  of  Konigsberg. 

Kant  arose  at  a  most  critical  period  in  Ger- 
many. French  and  English  infidelity  had  just 
broken  into  the  country,  and  threatened  to  sweep 
away  all  the  established  religious  opinions  and 
institutions.     Metaphysics  was  sinking  into  dis- 


KANT    AND    HIS    CRITICAL    PHILOSOPHY.        45 

repute.  The  Leibnitzian-Wolfian  philosophy 
was  waning ;  and  the  disgusting  dogmatism  of 
its  advocates  only  hastened  its  downfall.  Many 
were  bewildered,  and  having  little  confidence  in 
any  system  of  philosophy,  adopted  eclecticism 
as  the  safest  guide  to  truth.  And  Hume's  skep- 
ticism was  spreading  and  undermining  all  estab- 
lished opinions.  It  was,  to  arrest  this  progress 
of  infidelity,  to  raise  the  sinking  character  of 
metaphysical  learning,  to  discourage  dogmatism 
and  eclecticism,  and  to  guard  the  public  mind 
against  the  withering  influence  of  skepticism, 
that  this  great  man  undertook  to  discriminate 
between  true  philosophy  and  false,  to  point  out 
the  nature,  use,  and  ends  of  the  former,  and  to 
unmask  the  sophistry  of  the  latter. 

With  most  of  his  countrymen,  he   considered 

philosophy  to  be  rational  science^  or  the  product 

of  pure   Reason ;  and   divisible  into   two   parts, 

the  one  speculative  or  theoretical,  and  the   other 

practical  or  moral,  the  former  treating  of  rational 

knotoledge,  and   the  latter   of  rational   conduct. 

He  expresses  himself  thus :  "  All  the  interests 

of  my  Reason  center  on  these  three  questions  ; 

JVhat  can  I  know  1   What  ought  I  to  do  ?  and, 

What   may  I  hope  for  ?"    The  first  of  these 

questions,  he  says,  belongs  wholly  to  speculative 

Reason  ;  the  second  belongs  wholly  to  practical 


46  KANT    AND    HIS    CRITICAL 

Reason  ;  and  the  third  belonors  to  both ;  because^ 
when  practical  Reason  has  decided  the  question 
in  a  general  manner,  speculative  Reason  must 
come  in  to  define  more  particularly  what  it  is  we 
may  hope  for.  (Kritik  der  reinen  Vernunft,  p, 
833. 

Kant  believed,  that  the  failure  of  every  pre- 
ceding attempt  to  establish  a  sound  philosophy, 
had  arisen  from  the  admission  of  unsound  ma- 
terials into  the  foundations  of  the  building,  or 
from  the  assumption  in  the  outset,  that  we  have 
rational  knowledge  of  things,  of  which  we  have 
not  such  knowledge.  Hence,  he  wisely  conclud- 
ed that  the  only  safe  and  sure  method  of  pro- 
ceeding, was,  to  begin  by  tracing  human  knowl- 
edge to  its  sources,  to  examine  all  the  functions 
of  the  mind  concerned  with  the  production  or 
enlargement  of  knowledge,  and  to  subject  the 
whole  process  of  the  mind  to  the  most  rigid  criti- 
cism before  the  tribunal  of  pure  Reason.  Such 
therefore  was  the  method  of  proceeding  which 
he  himself  adopted,  and  which  he  pursued  rig- 
orously, and  with  uncommon  industry  and  per- 
severance. 

The  work  which  he  composed  in  answer  to 
the  first  inquiry  of  Reason,  What  can  I  hiom^ 
is  the  most  celebrated  of  all  his  works,  and  is 
intitled  a  Critic  of  Pure  Reason.     It  was  the 


PHILOSOPHY.  47 

result  of  many  years'  labor,  was  first  published 
in  1781,  and  fills  an  8vo  vol.  of  nearly  900  pages. 
The  title  of  the  book  is  expressive  of  its  true 
character :  it  is  a  criticism  of  pure  Reason  on  the 
powers  of  the  human  mind  in   regard  to  knowl- 
edge, showing  definitely  how  far  they  can  go,  and 
where  human  knowledge  must  ever  stop,  so  lono- 
as  the  mind  is  dependent   solely  on  its  own  re- 
sources.    The  work  is  not  properly  a  system  of 
philosophical  knowledge,  embracing  a  summary 
of  all  that  philosophy  can  teach  :  it  is  rather  an 
introduction  to  sound    philosophizing.     And,  so 
far  as  1  can  judge  from  their  titles,  and  from  the 
representations  of  others,  (for  I   have  not  had  ac- 
cess  to   them,)  most    of  his  other  philosophical 
works  are  of  a  similar  character  ;  that  is,  they  are 
critical  introductions  to  the  several  branches  of 
science  of  which  they  treat.     Such  I  understand 
to  be,  his  Critic  of  Practical  Reason  ;  his  Critic 
of  the   Judging   Faculty ;  his   Prolegomena    to 
every   future    system   of  Metaphysics    that   can 
claim  to  be  scientific  ;    a  Foundation   for    the 
Metaphysics  of  Morals;  &c.   &c. — Such  beino- 
the  character  of  Kant's  writings,  we   cannot  ex- 
pect to  find  in  them  a  statement  of  his  opinions  on 
all  the  important  questions  in  philosophy  ;   but, 
only  the   fundamental  principles  of  his  mode  o( 
reasoning  and  judging  on  such  questions. 


48  KANT    AND    HIS    CRITICAL 

In  the  Introduction  to  his  Critic  of  Pure  Rea- 
son, Kant  first  discriminates  between  pare  knowl- 
edge a  priori  and  empirical  knowledge.  The 
former  has  the  characteristics  of  universality  and 
necessity — (the  same  as  described  in  No.  I.  of 
these  Essays) — the  latter  has  not  these  charac- 
teristics, but  always  relates  to  particular  facts  or 
things  which  have  fallen  under  observation.  He 
then  tell  us,  that  the  former  kind  of  knowledge 
is  the  proper  basis  of  all  philosophy.  He  next 
observes,  that  philosophy  requires  a  previous 
science^  which  shall  determine  the ^ossi6^7^7^/,  the 
principles,  and  the  extent  of  this  pure  knowledge 
a  priori.  He  then  discriminates  between  ana- 
lytical and  synthetical  judgments.  In  the  for- 
mer, the  predicate  is  really  and  truly  contained 
in  the  subject ;  and  a  mere  explanation  evolves 
it.  But  in  synthetical  judgments,  the  predicate 
lies  out  of  the  subject,  and  the  judgment  advan- 
ces to  meet  it.  Of  this  kind  are,  all  our  judg- 
ments of  experience.  Now  it  is  a  question  of 
fundamental  importance,  whether  synthetical 
judgments  a  priori,  or  synthetical  judgments  of 
pure  Reason,  are  j9ossi6/e.  If  they  are  not  pos- 
sible, then  Reason  can  only  form  analytical 
judgments  ;  that  is,  she  can  only  analyze  her  few 
and  scanty  pure  ideas.  But  he  concludes  such 
judgments  to  be  possible,  in    certain  cases  ;  and 


PHILOSOPHY.  49 

that  they  actually  occur  in  all  the  theoretical 
sciences,  in  mathematics,  in  the  pliysical 
sciences,  and  in  metaphysics.  Such  judgments, 
however,  can  never  relate  to  the  matter  of  our 
knowledge,  which  must  always  be  given  ;  but 
solely  to  i\ie  forms  of  our  knowledge,  or  to  the 
general  principles  or  laws  by  which  our  intellec- 
tual faculties  are  governed.  These  general  prin- 
ciples or  laws  by  which  our  intellectual  facul- 
ties are  governed.  Reason  can  discover  a  priori, 
or  by  the  mere  inspection  of  these  faculties  and 
their  mode  of  operation  ;  and,  having  discovered 
them,  she  can  in  some  measure  anticipate  expe- 
rience, or  determine  beforehand  what  is  possible 
and  what  is  not  possible  in  human  experience. — 
And  hence,  there  is  a  field  open  for  exploration 
by  that  previous  science,  which  philosophy  re- 
quires. This  previous  science,  he  denominates 
Transcendental  Philosophy  ;  andofithe  will  treat 
in  his  Critic  of  Pure  Reason.  He  divides  the 
work  into  two  parts  ;  the  first  and  much  the 
largest,  treats  of  the  elements  of  this  new  sci- 
ence, or  it  surveys  all  the  faculties  of  the  mind 
that  afford  us  knowledge,  and  criticises  their 
several  products  ;  the  second  part  gives  the  gen- 
eral results  of  the  previous  survey,  and  states  the 
uses  of  this  preliminary  science. 

We  now  come  to  the  Critic  itself.     Followiug 
4 


50  KANT    AND    HIS    CRITICAL 

the  established  doctrine  of  metaphysical  philoso- 
phers, that  v/e  possess  three  distinct  facwlties,- 
Sensation,  Understanding,  and  Reason ;  Kant 
first  subjects  Sensation  to  the  scrutiny  of  Reason. 
And  he  makes  Reason  decide,  that  this  faculty 
is  a  mere  receptivity  of  the  impressions  made 
upon  our  senses  by  l^he  objects  around  us.  Sen- 
sation therefore  brings  to  us  no  knowledge  of  the 
essential  nature  of  external'  objects,  but  only  of 
their  Phenomena.  The  unknown  objects  which 
make  the  impressions,  Katit  calls-  Noumena 
(»oi^/«,5v«,  from  »«£<>  to  understand  ;)  that 
is,  things  which  are  understood  or  conceived  to- 
exist,  but  of  which  we  have  no  certain  knowl- 
edge, and  of  which  consequently  we  can  give  nc 
further  account.  Phenomena  therefore,  and 
phenomena  alone,  are  the  elementary  matter  of 
all  our  knowledge  of  the  sensible  world  around' 
as. 

But  Reason  can  discover  a  priori  or  by  pure 
intuition,  that  these  phenomena  must  present 
themselves  to  our  senses  either  as  being  simulta- 
neous, or  as  being  consecutive  ;  and  if  simulta- 
neous, they  must  have  a  relative  location,  and  if 
consecutive,  they  must  follow  each  oth-er  in  some 
order,  and  with  a  greater  or  le&s  degree  of  rapidi- 
ty. And  thus  pure  Reason  perceives,  intuitively^ 
that  all  external  phenomena  must  present  them- 


PHILOSOPHY.  51 

selves  to  our  senses  as  being  limited  and  bound- 
ed by  time  and  place.  Time  and  place,  then, 
are  pure  intuitions  of  Reason  :  they  are  not 
things  existing  in  nature,  nor  are  they  the  pro- 
perties  nor  the  relations  of  things  in  nature  ;  they 
are  purely  ideizl  things,  and  are  merely  the  laws 
of  sensation,  the  forms  of  tlie  phenomena  of  ex- 
ternal sense,  or  the  aspects  in  which  those  phe- 
nomena must  always  present  themselves  to  our 
senses.  Whether  any  other  beings — God,  for 
instance — must  also  view  material  objects  as  ex- 
isting in  time  and  place,  we  do  not  know.  And, 
as  time  and  place  are  merely  the  laics  of  Sensation, 
we  have  no  right  to  predicate  them,  or  either  of 
them,  of  God,  of  spirits,  or  of  any  abstract 
ti'uths  or  ideas.  For,  these  objects  never  pre- 
senting themselves  to  the  bodily  senses,  can  never 
fall  under  the  laws  of  sensation. 

But  although  time  and  space  are  merely  ideal 
tilings,  or  mere  laws  of  sensation,  yet  they  are 
empirical  realities ;  that  is,  they  always  accom- 
pany our  sensations,  and,  without  ther»,  set|sible 
perceptions  can  not  exist.  And  being  thus  em- 
pirical realities,  and  at  the  same  time  perfectly 
simple  ideas,  with  no  composition  and  no  quali- 
ties whatever,  except  mere  magnitude,  they  are 
capable  of  being  adequately  depicted  or  repre- 
■eated   by  diagrams  and   numbers,  and  thus  oit 


d»  KANT    AND    HIS    CRITICAL 

becoming  themselves  the  objects  of  sensible  in- 
tuition. And  hence  they  lay  a  foundation  for  a 
pure  science  of  Reason,  namely  mathematics. 
But  no  other  of  our  simple  ideas  can  be  thus  de- 
picted and  subjected  to  sensible  intuition  ;  and 
therefore  they  can  never  become  the  subject  of  a 
pure  science  of  Reason. 

Such  in  general  is  the  result  of  Rant's  criticism 
of  the  sensitive  faculty.  His  views  of  the  wide 
difference  between  noumena  and  phenomena, 
seem  to  have  met  general  approbation.  But  his 
ideas  of  time  and  place,  though  accordant  with 
the  dogmas  of  the  Wolfian  school,  have  been  con- 
troverted. Many  can  not  persuade  themselves 
that  noumena,  or  things  themselveSjhave  nothing 
to  do  with  time  and  place.  And  indeed,  if  we 
may  predicate  time  and  place  of  phenomena,  it 
seems  difficult  to  say  why  they  are  not  equally 
predicable  of  noumena ;  on  the  supposition  that 
noumena  really  exist,  and  are  the  immediate 
physical  causes  of  phenomena.  For  how  can 
physj^al  effects  be  limited  to  time  and  place,  and 
not  also  the  physical  causes  which  produce 
them  1  Can  a  material  thing  operate  or  produce 
effects,  where  it  is  not  present  ?  Or  can  Reason 
^ny  more  conceive,  a  priori,  of  a  necessity  for 
phenomena  to  exist  only  in  time  and  place,  than 
for  noumena  to  exist  in  the  same   manner?  If 


t>flILOSOPIIY.  53- 

then  Reason  decides  a  priori,  or  intuitively,  that 
phenomena  must  so  exist,  does  she  not  equally 
decide  a  priori,  or  intuitively,  that  noumena  must 
so  exist "?  It  is  no  objection  to  this  reasoning,  that 
we  do  not  understand  the  essential  nature  of 
noumena  ;  or  that  we  know  nothing  of  them, 
except  that  they  are  created  things  and  the  im- 
mediate cause  of  all  the  phenomena  of  the  ma- 
terial world.  For,  by  assigning  them  time  and 
place  to  exist  in,  we  affirm  nothing  respecting 
their  nature  or  essence,  but  merely  the  when  and 
the  where  of  their  existence  and  operation.  Be- 
sides, we  must  suppose  that  there  is  an  unknown 
difference  of  properties  in  different  noumena,  in 
order  to  account  for  their  producing  different  phe- 
nomena. And  if  we  are  compelled  to  make 
such  a  supposition,  notwithstanding  our  total 
ignorance  of  the  essential  nature  of  noumena  ; 
why  may  we  not  assign  them  locations  in  time 
and  place,  in  consistency  with  the  same  igno- 
rance of  their  essential  nature  1 

Kant  indeed  tells  us  in  a  subsequent  part  of 
the  Critic,  (Elements,  Pt.  11.  B.  II.  Ch.  IH.)  that 
all  our  knowledge  of  external  objects  is  limited 
to  the  conditions  which  render  experience  possi- 
ble ;  and  therefore  we  can  never  attain  to  a 
knowledge  [he  should  have  said,  to  empirical 
knowledge]  of  any   objects  which,  can  not  be 


54        KANT    AND    HIS    CRITICAt    PHILOSOPHY. 

subjected  to  the  senses.  Hence  the  only  objects 
known  to  us  [empirically]  are  phenomena.  The 
objects  of  real  existence^  which  present  to  us 
these  phenomena,  we  do  not  know.  Yet,  as  we 
admits  and  ought  to  admit,  their  existence,  they 
may  be  called  noumena.  This  statement  may 
be  fully  admitted,  without  reducing  time  and 
place  to  mere  forms  of  our  sensations,  having  no 
relation  to  things  themselves  or  to  noumena. — 
For  it  is  not  contended,  that  we  have  empirical 
knowledge  of  the  fact  that  noumena  exist  in  time 
and  place.  We  only  ijifer  the;  fact,  from  the 
known  and  necessary  existence  of  their  phenom- 
ena in  this  manner.  It  is  Reason  which  compels 
us  to  admit  the  fact,  and  not  experience  ;  just  as 
it  is  Reason,  and  not  experience,  which  compels 
us  to  admit  the  more  general  fact  that  noumena 
really  exist. 


CHAPTER    VI. 


THE    CRITICAL    PHILOSOPHY. 

Understanding  defined.     Its  Conceptions.     The  Categories. 

Tlie  faculty  of  Sensation  havinor  been  exam- 
ined at  the  bar  of  Reason,  the  Understanding  is 
next  arraijrned  before  the  same  tribunal. — Rea- 
son pronounces  the  Understanding  or  Intellect,  to 
be  an  active  faculty  of  the  mind  ;  and  not  a 
mere  receptivity  like  Sensation.  It  is  the  office 
of  this  faculty,  to  take  the  multifarious  impres- 
sions on  the  senses,  or  the  crude  matter  o^  knowl- 
edge, just  as  it  is  brought  into  the  mind  by  the 
sensitive  faculty,  and  to  shape  and  fashion  it  into 
conceptions  of  objects,  end  judgments  concerning 
them.  The  Understanding,  therefore,  is  that 
faculty  of  the  mind,  which  forms  conceptions 
and  judgments  of  the  objects  around  us.  In  other 
words,  it  is  the  faculty  which  tJiinJ:s  and  judges 
of  all  the  objects  apprehended  by  our  bodily 
senses.  To  facilitate  her  operations,  (which  are 
incessant,  and  endlessly  various,  and   requiring 


56  THE    CRITICAL    PHILOSOPHY. 

not  only  accuracy,  but  great  despatch,)  the  hu- 
man Understanding  classes  all  objects  of  fre- 
quent occurrence,  under  genera  and  species,  and 
forms  both  a  conception  and  a  name  for  each 
class. 

According  to  the  received  doctrine  of  the  met- 
aphysical school,  tliis  faculty,  like  that  of  Sensa- 
tion, is  common  to  man  with  the  brutes ,  yet  in 
men,  it  may  have  some  powers,  which  it  has  not 
in  brutes;  arising,  perhaps,  from  its  being  com- 
bined with  Reason  in  us,  and  not  in  them.  In 
men,  the  Understanding  is  distinguished  from 
Reason,  by  the  sphere  of  its  action,  by  the  objects 
with  which  it  is  concerned,  and  by  the  product 
of  its  hibors.  The  sphere  of  its  action  is  the 
sensible  world,  or  the  world  of  phenomena  ;  the 
objects  with  which  it  is  concerned,  are  sensa- 
tions, conceptions,  and  simple  judgments ;  and 
the  product  of  its  labors,  is  empirical  knowl- 
sy  edge.  The  sphere  of  the  operations  of  i2e«5ow, 
on  the  contrary,  is,  the  supersensible  world, 
or  the  world  of  spirits,  of  ideas,  of  gene- 
ral truths,  of  virtue,  &c. ;  the  objects  with  which 
it  concerns  itself,  are  ideas,  (not  conceptions,) 
things  which  the  mind  can  contemplate,  but 
which  can  never  be  subjected  to  the  senses  ;  and 
its  product  is,  rational  knowledge,  or  knowledge 
of  universal  and  necessary  truths.     The  con- 


THE    CRITICAL    PHILOSOPHY.  57 

foundina^of  Reason  with  Understandings  and  of 
Ideas  with    Conceptions,  by  Mr.  Locke,  in   his 
Essay  on  the    Human    Understanding,  and   by 
most  of  the  English,  Scotch,  and  American  wri- 
ters since   the  days  of  Locke,  (though  -it  was  a 
natural,  and   almost  necessary   consequence  of 
supposing  all  human   knowledge    to  be  derived 
from   sensations,  and    reflections  on  them,)  has 
spread   much   obscurity  and  confusion  through 
all  the  metaphysical  productions  of  these  writers ; 
and,  by   introducing  the    indiscriminate  use   of 
terms  which  should  never  be  confoiinded,  it  has 
contributed  not  a  little  to  render  the  English  lan- 
guage unfit  for  clear   and   conclusive  reasoning 
on    metaphysical  subjects.       And,   I  apprehend 
that    this  is   one    great  reason,  why   so    many 
among  us  can  not  understand  and  appreciate  the 
writings  of  the    German    philosophers.     Their 
clear,  precise,  and  definite  thoughts,  the  moment 
they  are  translated  into  English,  become  obscure, 
indefinite    and    vague ;    because   the  language,  /^ 
into  which  they  are  translated,  is  so.  It  is  true  that 
the  Germans  have  introduced  a  multitude  of  new 
technical  terms  into  philosophy,  which  sound  very 
strange  in  our  ears  ;   and  Kant,  in  particular,  has 
been  censured,  even  by  his  own  countrymen,  for 
his  excessive  coinage  :  but  if  our  language  had 
appropriate  terms  for  expressing  the  more  neces- 


58  THE    CRITICAL    PHILOSOPHY. 

sary  distinctions  of  thought,  we  mis^ht  contrive 
some  way  to  avoid  the  use  of  German  technics, 
and  yet  convey  to  English  minds  the  real  views 
of  the  German  writers. — After  this  necessary 
digression,  we  will  return  to  the  Rantean  Criti- 
cism. 

The  conceptions  of  the  Understanding  consti- 
tute all  our  knowledge  of  material  objects  or 
things  ;  or  rather,  they  are  the  very  objects  them- 
selves^ so  far  as  we  know  them  ;  for  they  are 
combinations  of  phenomena  ;  and  beyond  phe- 
nomena, our  knowledge  of  things  does  not  ex- 
tend. These  conceptions  are  a  sort  of  mental 
iman-es  of  sensible  thinsfs.  Each  imao^e  is  com- 
posed  of  more  or  fewer  distinct  impressions, 
which  were  made  by  the  object  on  our  senses, 
when  we  examined  it ;  such  as,  figure,  color,  di- 
mensions, attitude,  position,  motion,  taste,  smell, 
noise  or  sound,  its  feeling,  its  actions,  its  opera- 
tions on  other  objects,  and  the  effects  of  other 
objects  upon  it.  These  various  impressions  are 
called  the  characters  or  marks  of  the  thing  ;  and, 
when  duly  combined  in  the  mental  picture,  they 
constitute  the  conception  of  the  object.  As  we 
sometimes  wish  to  examine  individual  marks  or 
characters  of  objects,  separately,  or  uncombined 
with  other  marks,  this  gives  rise  to  abstract  con- 
ceptions^ or  conceptions  of  the  qualities  or  attri- 


THE    CRITICAL    PHILOSOPHY.  59 

butes  of  objects.  And,  observing  that  various 
objects  in  nature  possess  many  marks  in  com- 
mon, the  Understanding  combines  those  common 
marks  into  separate  conceptions  ;  and  thus  she 
forms  conceptions  of  species,  genera,  and  higher, 
and  still  liiglier  genera.  But  it  is  obvious  that, 
as  the  conceptions  mount  upwards  to  the  higher 
and  more  general  classes,  they  must  contain  few- 
er and  fewer  marks.  The  conception  of  an  in- 
dividual object,  will  contain  all  the  marks,  which 
belong  to  that  object ;  the  conception  of  the 
species,  will  contain  only  the  marks  common  to 
all  the  individuals  of  the  species;  and  the  con- 
ception of  the  genus,  only  the  marks  CQmmon  to 
the  genus:  and  so  of  the  higher  genera.  Con- 
ceptions, therefore,  always  become  more  meager 
or  more  simple,  the  more  extensive  their  sphere  ; 
that  is,  the  greater  the  variety  of  the  objects  they 
embrace,  the  fewer  are  the  marks  they  contain. 

In  forming  these  various  conceptions,  the  Un- 
destanding  exhibits  the  skill  and  judgment  of  a 
practiced  arciiitect.  Scarcely  any  object  in  nature 
presents  itself  to  the  senses,  as  absolutely  isolat- 
ed or  alone.  Along  with  the  impressions  from 
the  object  itself,  many  other  impressions,  from 
the  connected  or  surrounding  objects,  enter  the 
mind  ;  for  the  sensitive  faculty,  like  a  faithful 
mirror,  presents  them  all  just  as  they  strike  upon 


60  THE    CRITICAL    PHILOSOPHY. 

it ;  and  tlie  Understanding  lias  to  separate  them, 
in  order  to  combine  together  only  those  belong- 
ing to  the  object  itself.  This  often  requires  a 
very  critical  examination  of  the  impressions  or 
marks,  and  a  discriminating  judgment.  And 
when  the  proper  marks  or  impressions  are  select- 
ed, they  must  be  skillfully  combined,  in  order  to 
form  a  correct  mental  picture  of  the  object.  In 
referring  individual  objects  or  things  to  their  pro- 
per species,  and  species  to  their  genera,  accurate 
discrimination  is  necessary.  And  in  putting  her 
conceptions  together,  so  as  to  form  from  them  a 
correct  and  useful  system  of  empirical  knowl- 
edge, gr^at  skill  and  judgment  are  requisite. 
Yet  all  this,  the  Understanding  learns  by  prac- 
tice, to  perform  with  much  accuracy  and  de- 
spatch. 

After  glancing  at  these  manifold  and  impor- 
tant operations  of  the  Understanding,  (which  it 
is  the  proper  business  of  Logic,  or  the  Art  of 
Thitdiing,  to  describe  more  fully,)  Kant  makes 
Reason  to  decide,  that  the  Understanding  is 
wholly  dependent  on  the  sensitive  faculty,  for  all 
the  materials  of  her  knowledge.  She  is  tho 
mere  architect  to  select,  to  combine,  and  to  ar- 
ran"^e  the  materials  brought  into  the  mind  by 
Sensation.  Hence,  the  Understanding  can  pro- 
duce no  knowledge,  except  what  is  enipirical. — 


v^       OF  TH^  ^> 

THE    CRITICAL    PHIIIOSOPByT  '*   ''  "Bl'   \  "J 

She  can  not  enlarge,  at  all,  our  rational  or  philo-    .,P 
sopliical  knowledge. 

But,  by  inspecting  the  operations  of  this  skill- 
ful architect,  Reason  discovers,  that  the  Under- 
standing has  four  pu7'e  ideas  ;  which  serve  her 
as  general  laws  or  principles,  by  which  to  con- 
struct her  conceptions,  and  regulate  her  judg- 
ments, of  all  the  objects  of  sensible  intuition. — 
These  four  ideas,  to  which  Kant  gives  the 
name  of  Categories,  are  those  of  quantiti/,  qual- 
ity^ relation,  and  modaliti/.  When  the  Under- 
standing would  form  a  conception,  or  a  judgment, 
of  any  new  bundle  of  impressions  brought  to 
her  by  the  senses,  or  would  test  the  correctness 
of  any  conception  or  judgment  already  formed, 
she  calls  to  her  aid  these  four  ideas  ;  and  they 
suggest,  that  the  thing  must  be  examined  as  to 
its  quantiti/,  its  quality,  its  relations,  and  its  mo- 
dalitij  ;  and  they  also  teach,  that  there  are  three, 
and  only  tliree,  results  under  each  inquiry,  to 
which  the  Understanding  can  come. 

1.  The  first  inquiiy  respects  the  logical  quan- 
tity of  an  object  or  conception.  And  the  only 
possible  answers  are,  it  is  a  unity,  ^plurality,  or 
a  totality.  For  instance,  the  conception  bear- 
ing the  appellation  man,  must  denote  either  a 
single  man,  or  a  plurality  of  men,  or  man  in  gen- 
eral, that  is  mankind,  the  total  race  of  men. — 


62  THE    CRITICAL    PHILOSOPHY. 

There  are  only  these  three  subcategories,  under 
the  general  category  of  logical  quantity. 

2.  The  second  inquiry  resj.ects  the  logical 
qualitif  of  an  object  or  conception  :  (qualitas, 
from  quails,  of  ivhat  sort  or  kind.) — To  answer 
this  inquiry,  the  Understanding  places  the  ob- 
ject by  the  side  of  ano.hcr  object,  whose  quality 
is  known,  and  then  aifirins  tlieir  agreement,  or 
tlieir  disagreement,  or  decides  that  they  agree  in 
part,  or  in  a  limited  degree.  Proceeding  in  such 
a  manner,  the  Understanding  affirms  that,  this 
object  is  an  animal ;  that  other  object  is  not  an 
animal ;  it  is  a  plant ;  and  that  third  object  is 
partly  an  animal,  am\  partly  not ;  it  is  a  zoo- 
phyte. So  she  declares,  this  house  is  painted  ; 
that  house  is  unpaintcd  ;  and  that  third  house 
is  partly  painted,  tindi  partly  unpainted.  Thus, 
affirmation,  negation,  and  limitation  of  the  affir- 
mation or  negation,  are  all  the  subcategories  of 
logical  quahty. 

3.  The  third  inquiry  respects  the  relation  of 
the  object  or  conception  to  other  objects  or  con- 
ceptions. There  are  three,  and  only  three,  spe- 
cies of  relations  ;  namely,  inherence,  dependence^ 
and  external  connection  or  coherence.  Tlie  rela- 
tion of  inherence  is,  that  which  exists  between 
substances  and  the  attributes  of  substances. — 
The  relation  of  dependence  is,  that  which  exist* 


THE    CRITICAL    PHILOSOPHY.  63 

between  causes  and  their  effects.  The  relation 
of  external  connection  or  coherence  is,  that  which 
exists  between  any  object  and  the  surrounding 
objects  :  for  all  objects  have  their  places  in  the 
universe,  or  are  surrounded  bj  other  objects, 
with  which  thej  are  more  or  less  closely  con- 
nected. 

4.  The  fourth  inquiry  respects  the  modality^. 
or  the  mode  of  existence  of  an  object,  so  far  as  it 
is  known  to  us.  According  to  our  apprehensions 
of  things,  we  may  predicate  of  them  possible  ex- 
istence, actual  existence,  or  necessary  existence. 
Whatever  accords  with  the  formal  conditions  of 
experience,  or  is  not  contradicted  by  any  law  of 
human  experience,  is  possible  or  may  exist. — 
What  is  directly  attested  by  our  experience  or 
observation,  is  actuator  really  exists.  What  all 
human  experience  requires,  necessarily,  must 
exists  or  exists  necessarily.  Of  this  necessary 
existence,  there  are  two  kinds,  the  one  internal, 
absolute,  and  ^unconditional  ;  as,  roundness  in  a 
circle  ;  because,  if  you  take  away  the  roundness, 
it  is  no  longer  a  circle.  The  other  is  external, 
and  hypothetical,  or  conditional,  depending  on 
the  laws  of  causation ;  as,  every  child  that  is 
born,  must  have  a  father  and  a  mother.  "  Every 
house  is  builded  by  some  man."  A  ponderous 
body,  in  the  air,  mustfall^  if  it  is  not.  supported. 


64  THE    CRITICAL    PHILOSOPHY. 

It  is  manifest,  from  a  mere  inspection  of  these 
categories,  and  of  our  continual  use  of  them, 
that  they  give  form  or  shape  to  all  our  concep- 
tions and  judgments  of  sensible  objects.  They 
are  the  all-pervading  laics  of  human  thinkings 
and  of  human  language. 

It  is  therefore  of  importance  to  inquire,   from 
what  source  did  these  categories  originate  ;  what 
is  the  ground  of  their  validity  ;   and  what  limits 
are  there  to  the  application  of  them. — That  they 
did  not  originate  from  a  knowledge  of  the  nature 
of  things   themselves,  or  of  noumena,   must   be 
manifest ;  because  we  have  no  such   knowledge 
of  things  themselves  :  all  our  knowledge  of  sen- 
sible objects,  is  confined  io phenomena.     It  seems 
then,  tliat  the  categories  must  have  been  derived 
solely  from  the  inspection  of  phenomena.     And, 
as  they  are  pure  ideas,  they  must  be  the  product 
of  Reason,  the  only  faculty  which  produces  ideas. 
This  higher  faculty  of  the  mind,  in   contemplat- 
ing phenomenal  matter,  perceived  it  to  be  capa- 
ble of  being  arranged  under  the  categories  ;   and 
as  the  Understanding  needs   some   formulee  for 
her  conceptions  and  judgments,  in  order  to  make 
thein  capable  of  being  wrought  into  a   system  of 
empirical   knowledge   at  the    suggestion  of  her 
sister  faculty,  Reason,  the    Understanding   tried 
the  system  of  the  categories;  and,  finding  the  sys- 


THE    CRITICAL    PHILOSOPHY.  65 

tern  to  work  well,  and  to  produce  no  discovera- 
ble errors  or  mistakes,  she  continues  to  frame  all 
her  conceptions  and  judgmWits  according  to 
these  formulae.  Such,  Reason  pronounces  to  be 
the  origin  of  the  categories,  so  far  she  can  dis- 
cover. And  the  admission  of  such  an  origin  of 
them,  will  account  for  the  superiority  of  the  hu- 
man Understanding,  which  is  aided  by  Reason, 
over  the  Understanding  of  biiutes  which  is  not  so 
aided. — The  validity  of  the  categories,  therefore, 
or  the  right  of  the  Understanding  to  make  use 
of  them,  arises  from  the  necessity  of  her  having 
some  formulae  to  guide  her,  and  from  the  experi- 
ence of  solid  advantages,  and  no  serious  evils, 
arising  from  the  use  of  them. — But,  from  this 
view  ofthe  subject,  it  is  most  obvious,  that  we  have 
no  authority  for  extending  the  use  of  the  catego- 
ries beyond  the  sphere  of  our  sensible  intuitions. 
We  have  no  authority  for  applying  them  to  nou- 
mena,  nor  to  any  thing  supersensible ;  because  we 
do  not  knoic,  either  a  priori,  or  from  experience, 
that  such  things  can  be  brought  under  their  em- 
pire, without  producing  misapprehensions  and 
erroneous  conclusions.  We  can  not  test  the  re- 
sults of  such  application,  by  experience,  as  we 
are  able  to  do  in  the  sphere  of  sensible  intui- 
tions;  and  hence,  we  can  .never  make  such  ap- 
plication on  safe  and  solid  grounds. — Yet  when 
5 


66  THE    CRITICAL    PHILOSOPHY. 

we  venture  beyond  the  sphere  of  onr  sensible  in- 
tuitions, and  atteiiii3t  to  discuss  such  cjuestions^, 
as,  Whether  the*  world  had  a  beginning ; 
Whether  there  is  a  God  ;  &.c.  it  seems  allowable 
to  apply  the  categories  to  them  ;  because  knowl- 
edge on  such  subjects  must  rest  on  some  princi- 
ples ofreasoning,  and  we  can  discover  none  better 
than  the  categories.  Still  we  should  not  forget,  that 
this  is  a  transcendei^t  use  of  the  categories,  or  an 
application  of  them  transcending  the  principles 
of  certain  knowledge. — Such,  in  general,  are  the 
doctrines  of  Kant,  in  regard  to  the  human  Un- 
derstanding. 

Whether  he  has  not  gone  too  far,  in  confining 
the  legimate  application  of  the  categories  solely 
to  the  phenomena  of  the  sensible  world,  may  be 
questioned.  The  remarks  made  in  the  preceed- 
ing  Chapter  on  Kant's  doctrine  concerning  time 
and  place,  (the  categories  of  Sensation,)  that 
they  are  merely  our  mode  of  intuiting  phenom- 
ena, may  be  applied  with  little  variation  to  his 
doctrine  concerning  the  categories  of  the  Under- 
standing. It  was  there  stated,  that  we  must  sup- 
pose some  unknown  difference  of  properties  to 
exist  in  different  nouniena,  in  order  to  account 
for  their  producing  different  phenomena.  Now 
it  is  admitted  by  all,  tkat  phenomena  accord  very 
well  with  the  categories.  May  we  not  then  con- 
clude, that  noumena  also  must  possesssuch  a  differ- 


THE    CRITICAL    PHILOSOPHY.  67 

cnce  of  properties,  as  will  make  the  categories  in 
some  measure  applicable  to  them  ?  The  suppo- 
sition does  not  imply,  that  the  categories  lead  us 
to  any  objective  knowledge  of  the  inherent  pro- 
perties of  noumena,  or  of  any  other  supersensi- 
ble things.  It  only  permits  us  to  say  that,  from 
the  diversity  of  their  effects  or  phenomena,  we 
are  authorized  to  judge,  that  they  do  differ  ;  and 
that  they  so  differ,  as  to  present  to  us  phenome- 
na corresponding  with  their  own  inherent  differ- 
ences.— It  is  at  least  true,  that  Reason  can  dis- 
cover, a  priori,  no  valid  reason  why  the  catego- 
ries should  not  be  as  applicable  to  supersensible 
things,  as  to  the  phenomena  of  sensible  things. 
If  the  term  7nan  may  always  be  so  used  as  to  de- 
note either  an  individual  man,  or  a  plurality  of 
men,  or  the  ivliole  race  of  men  ;  why  may  not 
the  term  angel,  in  like  manner,  be  always  used 
to  denote  either  an  individual  angel,  or  aphirali- 
tij  of  angels,  or  the  whole  host  of  angels  1  Can 
Reason  discover  any  other  or  better  ground  for 
the  application  of  this  category  of  quantity,  in 
the  one  case,  than  in  the  other  ]  And  so  of  all 
the  categories.  Indeed,  the  simple  fact  that  phi- 
losophers and  metaphysicians,  in  all  ages,  have 
apphed  the  categories  to  supersensible  things,  un- 
hesitatingly, and  most  abundantly,  shows  that 
Reason  discovers  no  diffiulties  in  making  the  ap« 
plication. 


r 


CHAPTER    VII. 

THE    CRITICAL    PHILOSOPHY. 

Pure  Reason.    Transcendental  Ideas.    Rational  Theology. 

Kant  next  brings  theoretical  Reason,  that 
higher  intellectual  faculty  of  man,  under  a  criti- 
cal examination. 

The  distinction  between  speculative  or  theoret- 
ical Reason,  which  imparts  to  us  rational  hiowl- 
edge,  and  practical  OY  moral  Reason,  which  en- 
joins upon  us  rational  conduct,  has  already  been 
noticed.  Our  present  concern  is  with  the  for- 
mer.— It  will  be  recollected,  that  the  sphere  of 
theoretical  Reason  is  the  supersensible  world,  the 
VfovXdo^  spirits,  0^ general  truths,  o^  virtue,  &c. ; 
that  the  o^ects  with  which  it  is  concerned,  are 
ideas,  things  which  the  mind  can  contemplate, 
but  which  can  never  be  subjected  to  the  senses ; 
and  that  the  product  of  its  labors  is  rational 
knowledge,  the  knowledge  of  universal  and  ne- 
cessary truths. 

The  distinction  between  analytical  and  s^^n- 
i7teh"ca/ judgments,  was  stated  in  the  Introduction 
to  the  Critic :  and  the  power  of  Reason  to  form 


THE    CRITICAL    PHILOSOPHY.  69 

synthetic  judgments  a  priori,  was  there  limited  to 
the  mere  forms  of  our  knowledge  ;  that  is,  to  the 
determining  what  is  possible,  and  what  is  not 
possible,  in  human  experience.  In  regard  to  all 
objects  of  real  existence,  she  can  form  only 
analytical  judgments,  unless  the  objects  are 
given  or  already  known.  And  hence,  to  form 
analytical  judgments  by  means  of  middle  terms, 
or  to  reason  in  the  logical  manner,  is  the  only 
function  of  theoretical  Reason  in  regard  to  our 
knowledge  of  whatever  may  exist  around  us, 
within  us,  or  above  us.  But  analytical  judg- 
ments are  those  in  which  the  predicate  is  really 
and  truly  contained  in  the  subject  of  the  proposi- 
tion. Of  course  theoretical  or  speculative  Rea- 
son can  never  acquaint  us  with  any  unknown 
object,  that  may  exist  within  us,  around  us,  or 
above  us.  She  can  only  draw  forth  the  knowl- 
edge of  these  objects,  which  we  already  possess, 
Of  can  only  present  it  to  us  in  a  different  attitude 
and  form. 

To  establish  these  strong  positions  respecting 
the  importance  of  speculative  Reason,  Rant  in- 
stitutes an  elaborate  examination  of  what  he 
calls  the  transcendental  ideas  of  pure  Reason, 
that  is,  the  ideas  which  Reason  attempts  to  form, 
by  a  logical  deduction,  of  the  nature  and  essen- 
tial properties  of  the  human  soul,  of  the  material 


70  THE    CRITICAL    PHILOSOPHT. 

tvorld,  and  of  God :  and  he  shows,  tliat  the  sup- 
posed logical  deduction  is  unsound  and  falla- 
cious. 

I.  As  to  the  idea  of  the  soul: — The  reason- 
ing which  attempts  to  educe  a  knowledge  of  its 
nature  and  of  its  inherent  properties^  from  those 
acts  of  the  soul  of  which  we  all  are  conscious, 
is  a  mere  paralogism.  :  In  the  assertions,  /  thinks 
I  love,  I  hate,  I  will,  I  choose,  I  remember,  ^^c.^ 
various  actions  are  affirmed  of  the  subject  T ; 
and  on  the  most  solid  grounds,  because  we  are 
conscious  of  those  acts.  But  the  actions  of  any 
being  or  thing,  are  not  the  thing  itself;  nor  are 
they  any  part  either  of  its  essential  nature,  or  of 
its  inherent  attributes.  We  may  indeed  infer, 
that  whatever  acts,  must  really  exist  ;  and  that  it 
must  be  of  such  a  nature  as  to  be  capable  of  per- 
forming the  acts  ascribed  to  it.  But  all  this 
implies  no  knowledge  of  the  mode  of  its  exis- 
tence, or  of  those  inherent  qualities  which  make 
it  capable  of  performing  the  acts.  Hence,  the 
following  reasoning  is  wholly  inconclusive.  / 
thinJc  ;  therefore  I  am  a  thinking  Substance. — 
That  substance  is  not  perceived  by  the  external 
senses,  but  only  by  internal  consciousness ;  it  is 
therefore  immaterial  or  a  Spirit.  It  has  no  per- 
ceptible or  conceivable  pai-ts ;  it  is  therefore  a 
simple  Substance.      Being   a   simple  substance, 


TiiE    CRITICAL    PHILOSOPHY.  71 

*and  immaterial,  it  must  be  of  an  immortal  or  ««- 
dying  uatiire.  It  acts  in  and  by  tbe  bodily  or- 
gans ;  and  therefore  it  is  the  Soul,  the  animating 
principle  of  the  body.  All  this  is  sophistical  rea- 
soning; because  it  mistakes  the  ^M/yeci  of  the  con- 
sciousness, for  theo^jec^of  thatconsciousness.  It 
is  sophisma  figurse  dictionis. — But,  though  incon- 
clusive as  reasoning,  it  may  nevertheless  be 
true  :  and  it  may  serve  as  a  convenient  basis  of  a  y 
system  of  psychology. 

IE.  The  cosmological  idea^  of  pure  Reason,  or 
those  transcendental  ideas  which  Reason  forms 
of  the  ezternal  world,  are  equally  baseless,  con- 
sidered as  the  results  of  logical  reasoning. — 
For,  both  the  thesis  and  the  antithesis  of  them, 
may  be  proved  by  very  similar  arguments.  Thus 
it  may  be  proved — (I.)  That  the  world  had  a 
beginning  in  time,  and  is  of  limited  or  finite  ex- 
tent ;  and,  on  the  contrary,  that  it  had  no  begin- 
ning in  time,  and  has  no  limits  in  extent. — (2.) 
That  all  substances  consist  of  simple  elementary 
parts,  (or  Monads,  as  Leibnitz  called  them  ;) 
and,  on  the  contrary,  that  no  substance  whatever 
consists  of  such  simple  elements,  because 
such  simple  elements  can  not  exist.  (3.) 
That  pliysical  causes  can  not  be  the  only 
causes  in  existence,  there  must  be  a  free  cause, 
to   give   existence  to  the  physical  causes;  and, 


72  THE    CRITICAL    PHILOSOPHY. 

on  the  contrary,  that  no  free  cause  can  possibly 
exist,  and  conseqently  physical  causes  alone 
must  exist. — (4.)  That  there  must  be,  either  in 
the  world,  or  beyond  it,  a  Being  who  exists  neces- 
sarily, and  who  is  the  first  cause  of  all  things  ; 
and,  on  the  contrary,  that  no  such  Being  exists, 
either  in  the  world,  or  beyond  it. — As  sj)ecimens 
of  the  arguments  adduced  by  Kant,  take  the 
following : 

The  3d  Thesis  is  thus  proved  :  Unless  we 
assume  a  cause  prior  io  the  first  physical  cause, 
and  commencing  the  series  of  physical  causes, 
there  will  be  no  cause  for  the  whole  series  of 
physical  causes,  and  of  course  none  for  any  part 
of  it.  We  must  therefore  suppose  an  uncaused 
cause,  prior  to  the  first  physical  cause.  But  an 
uncaused  cause  must  be  one  that  is  free,  or  one 
that  acts  without  being  conqielled  to  act  by  any 
higher  cause.  The  Antithesis  is  tiius  proved  : 
Every  causality  is  itself  a  change,  since  it  is  the 
state  of  the  cause  when  in  action,  which  is  dif- 
ferent from  its  state  when  not  in  action.  Now 
as  every  change  presupposes  a  cause,  the  change 
in  the  supposed  free  cause,  by  which  it  proceeds 
to  action,  must  have  a  cause.  And  therefore, 
there  can  not  beany  free  cause,  or  one  that  acts 
without  being  caused  to  act. 

The  4th  Thesis  is  thus  proved :    The  world  is 


THE    CRITICAL    PHILOSOPHY.  73 

full   of  changes.     But  the  existence    of   every 
change  is  conditioned  ;  i.  e.  it  presupposes  some- 
thing which  is  its  condition^  or  a  cause  on  which 
it  depends.     Now  if  there  were  no  existence  that 
is  absolutely  unconditioned,  the  conditioned  could 
not  be  conditioned.     Consequently,    there    must 
be  an  absolutely   necessary  Beings  whose   exis- 
tence is  unconditioned  or  uncaused  :  otherwise 
the  series  of  the  conditions  or  causes  would  be 
incomplete.  The  Antithesisis  thus  proved :  Every 
member  of  a  series  of  changes  must  of  course  be 
conditioned.     Hence,    the  supposed    absolutely 
unconditioned  Being,  if  in  the  world,  and  a  part 
of  the   series,   must  himself  be   a   conditioned 
Being ;  contrary  to  the  thesis.     And   if  such  a 
Being   existed  out  of  the  world  and  commenced 
the  series  of  changes  in  the  world,  his  causality 
at  least  would  belong  to  the  loorld,  and  of  course 
he  would  constitute  a  parif  of  the  series:  which 
contradicts  itself.     We  must  therefore  reject  the 
thesis  altogether,  in  order  to  make  the  series  of 
the  conditioned  complete. 

The  objects  of  these  cosmological  ideas  lie 
wholly  beyond  the  reach  of  experience.  Hence, 
experience  can  never  decide  in  favor  of  either 
the  Theses  or  the  Antitheses.  Reason  alone 
must  solve  her  own  contradictions.  The  side  of 
the  Theses,  is  that  which  good  men  incline   to 


74  THE    CRITICAL    PIIILOSOPHY. 

take  ;  and  it  may  be  called  the  Dogmathm  of 
pure  Reason.  The  side  of  the  Antitheses  is  tliat, 
which  is  espoused  by  philosophizing  skeptics; 
and,  as  its  arguments  are  founded  on  the  princi- 
ples of  pure  empiricism^  tliis  side  may  be  called 
the  Empiricism  of  pure  Reason. 

Critical  Idealism^  which  admits  and  even 
demonstrates  the  existence  of  noumena  or  things 
lying  beyond  all  sensible  intuition,  can  alone 
solve  these  dialectical  contradictions.  This  criti- 
cal Idealism  is  equally  removed  from  material' 
ism,  which  supposes  we  can  have  sensible  intui- 
tions of  noumena,  and  from  empirical  Idealism, 
which  denies  the  existence  of  noumena.  Now 
this  critical  Idealism.,  by  maintaining  that  sensi- 
ble intuition  extends  only  to  phenomena,  or  that 
we  have  empirical  knowledge  only  of  what  is 
sensible,  does  not  deny  the  possibility  of  some 
knowledge,  other  than  empirical,  of  objects  lying 
beyond  the  reach  of  our  senses.  It  only  warns 
us  not  to  strive  after  erapincaZknowledge  of  such 
subjects,  and  not  to  reason  about  them  upon  the 
supposition  of  such  knowledge.  Taking  this 
stand,  and  carefully  examining  both  the  Theses 
and  the  Antitheses  respecting  the  cosmological 
ideas,  critical  Idealism  declares  that  both  may  be 
true,  because  they  relate  to  diiVerent  things.— 
The  Antitheses  direct  attention  only   to  phenom' 


THE    CRITICAL    PHILOSOPHY.  75 

ena  or  the  objects  of  empirical  knowledge  :  but 
the  Theses  look  beyond  phenomena,  to  their 
came  ;  and  they  consider  the  total  series  of  phe- 
nomena as  complete  and  dependent  as  a  whole, 
on  an  iutelligible  cause  lying  without  the  bounds 
of  nature.  Hence,  both  the  Theses  and  the  An- 
titheses may  be  true  ;  the  one  maintaining,  e.  g. 
that  there  is  a  God  beyond  nature^  and  the  other 
that  there  is  no  God  toithin  nature.  And  so  in 
all  the  contradictions,  one  side  includes  an  intel- 
ligihle  thing  among  the  phenomena  of  nature  ; 
which  the  other  does  not,  but  only  reasons  back 
through  phenomena,  to  an  intelligible  thing  lying 
beyond  them.  And  therefore,  though  the  side  of 
the  Theses  failed  of  proving  its  assertions  with 
apodictical  certainty,  yet  the  opposite  party  fail- 
ed of  proving  the  contrary,  there  not  being  any 
such  contradiction  as  would  make  the  one  proof 
overthrow  the  other.  Nor  can  the  latter  party 
overthrow  the  Theses  of  the  former,  unless  it  can 
prove,  e.  g.  that  out  of  and  beyond  nature  there 
is  no  God,  or  in  other  words,  that  the  supposition 
is  itself  absurd  and  self-contradictory,  which  it 
is  not. 

III.  The   third    transcendental    idea  of  pure 
Reason, is  thatof  a  supreme  and  all-perfect  Heing. 
Reason  is  disposed   to    admit  the  existence  of 
such   a  Being,  because  she  needs  this  perfect 


W  hihot,  /^^  ¥h:  '/^ 


76  THE    CRITICAL    PHILOSOPHY. 

ideal  of  absolute  excellence,  and  still  more,  be- 
cause her  moral  wants  demand  it.  But  the  ar- 
guments of  speculative  Reason  to  prove  that 
such  a  Being  exists,  are  defective. 

The  ontnlogical  proof,  or  that  derived  from 
the  very  idea  of  a  God,  (that  to  be  ^perfect  Being, 
he  must  be  a  necessary  existence,  and  that  a 
necessary  existence  can  not  but  exist,)  is  entirely 
fallacious,  being  a  mere  assumption  of  the  thing 
to  be  proved,  and  then  inferring  it  from  that  as- 
sumption. The  cosmolgical  proof,  or  that  stated 
in  the  Theses  of  the  third  and  fourth  cosmologi- 
cal  ideas,  besides  tiie  objections  already  noticed 
can  only  prove  o.  first  cause,  which  is  uncaused  ; 
and  not,  that  this  first  cause  is  the  great  ideal 
himself.  This  argument  therefore  rests  upon  the 
ontological  for  support.  And  the  physico- theol- 
ogical proof,  or  that  founded  on  the  marks  of 
wisdum  and  design  in  the  works  of  nature,  is 
illogically  reasoning  from  objects  of  experience 
among  men,  to  objects  lying  wholly  out  of  the 
reach  of  all  human  experience  ;  and  moreover, 
if  admitted,  it  does  not  prove  the  author  of  na- 
ture to  be  an  infinite  and  perfect  Being,  but  only 
a  Being  of  sufficient  intelligence  and  power  to 
produce  such  a  world  as  this.  Hence,  this  argu- 
ment also  falls  back  on  the  ontological  proof. 

Kant  here  goes  into  a  Critic  of  all  Theology, 


THE    CRITICAL    PHILOSOPHY.  77 

on  the  ground  of  speculative  Reason. —  Theolo- 
gy is  the  knowledge  of  an  Original  Beings  a 
God^  the  Author  of  all  things.  This  knowledge 
may  be  derived  either  from  mere  Reason^  or  from 
Revelation.  In  the  former  case,  it  is  rational 
theology  {\\\Qo\og\?i  rationalis;)  in  the  latter  case 
it  is  revealed  theology  (theologia  revelata.) — 
Again;  rational  theology  is  g'\\\\qx  transcendental 
theology,  or  it  is  natural  theology. 

Transcendental  theology^  which  is  that  of  a 
Deist,  contemplates  its  object  as  it  is  presented 
to  us  in  those  transcendental  ideas,  of  which  we 
have  been  treating.  It  therefore  regards  God  as 
being  known  to  us  merely  as  the  original  cause 
of  all  things,  (ens  originarmm,  realissimum,  ens 
entium.)  Yet  as  it  does  not  deny  him  to  be  an 
intelligent  Being,  we  must  say,  that  it  admits  the 
existence  of  a  God.  In  so  far  as  it  takes  the 
cosmological  ideas  for  its  basis,  it  may  be  called 
cosmO'theology :  and  in  so  far  as  it  relies  on  the 
ontological  argument  for  proof,  it  may  be  called 
onto-theology. 

Natural  theology  is  that  of  a  Theist.  It  con- 
templates its  object  as  being  an  infinite  Intelli- 
gence or  Mind,  of  which  the  human  mind  is  the 
finite  image  or  likeness.  It  therefore  recognizes 
a  living  God,  a  Being  of  boundless  intelligence, 
who  by  his  wisdom  and  power  created  and  gov- 


78  THE    CRITICAL    PHILOSOPHY. 

erns  the  world.  This  theology  alone  can  satisfy 
the  wants  of  man. — It  is physico-theology,  so  far 
as  it  relies  upon  the  physico-theological  proof  of 
the  existence  of  a  God  ;  that  is,  so  far  as  it  infers, 
from  the  beauty  and  order  of  the  natural  world, 
an  all-wise  Architect ;  just  as,  from  any  produc- 
tion of  human  art,  we  infer  that  it  had  an  intelli- 
gent fabricator.  But  it  is  moral  theology  when, 
from  the  moral  law  within  us,  it  infers  a  moral 
government  of  the  rational  universe ;  and  of 
course,  a  supreme  Lawgiver  and  Judge^  who 
takes  account  of  human  actions,  and  will  reward 
or  punish  esery  man  according  to  his  deserts. 

From  all  that  has  been  said  in  the  preceding 
criticism  of  Reason,  it  will  be  seen,  that  every 
attempt  to  establish  theology  on  a  scientific  basis, 
by  means  of  mere  speculative  Reason,  must  be 
futile.  It  can  not  be  done.  Yet  when /)r<7c//ca/ 
Reason,  by  means  of  the  moral  law  within  us, 
has  taught  us  to  believe  and  to  confide  in  God, 
speculative  Reason  may  be  of  use,  to  purify  our 
conceptions  and  to  give  form  and  consistency  to 
our  theoloofical  views. 


CHAPTER   VIII. 

THE  CRITICAL    PHILOSOPHY. 

The  Results  to  which  this  Philosophy  leads. 

We  now  come  lo  the  concluding  part  of  the 
Critic  of  pure  Reason. 

The  autlior  says  :  If  we  compare  a  system  of 
transcendental  philosophy  with  an  edifice,  the 
former  part  of  this  work  has  examined  the  ma- 
terials of  which  the  edifice  is  composed,  and  this 
second  part  will  survey  \\\e plan  of  it.  And  here 
we  shall  have  to  treat  of  a  Discipline^  a  Canoii^ 
an  Architectonic^  and  a  Hist  or?/  o^  pure  Reason, 

I.  Discipline  of  pure  reason. — A  discipline  is 
the  opposite  of  a  culture.  It  restrains,  and  ulti- 
mately destroys,  the  constant  inclination  to 
swerve  from  and  overleap  the  rules  by  which  we 
should  be  governed.  Culture  carries  us  forward 
in  the  right  way  ;  discipline  keeps  us  back  from 
pursuing  wrong  ways. 

(1.)  Discipline  of  pure  reason  in  its  dogmatic 
use. 

Philosophical  knowledge  is  rational  knowl- 
edge derived  immediately  from  ideas  or  abstract 
conceptions.    Mathematical  knowledge  is  ration- 


80  THE    CRITICAL     PHILOSOPHY. 

al  knowledge  derived  from  the  construction  of 
such  ideas  or  conceptions  ;  that  is,  from  schema- 
ta^  diagrams,  or  sensible  representations  of  the 
conceptions.  Mathematics  is  concerned  only 
with  quantities ;  which  are  always  capable  of 
being  adequately  constructed  or  represented  to 
the  eye.  But  philosophy  is  concerned  with 
qualities^  which  can  not  be  thus  constructed  or 
represented.  And  this  it  is,  makes  the  wide 
difference  between  mathematics  and  philosophy. 
For  all  our  knowledge  rests  ultimately  on»  intui- 
itions  of  the  objects  of  it.  But  philosophical 
knowledge  can  have  no  other  than  empirical  intit- 
tions  of  lis  objects,  while  mathematical  knowl- 
edge can  make  its  most  abstract  conceptions  the 
object  of  direct  intuition  by  means  of  its  con- 
structions. Thus  we  can  construct  a  conical 
figure^  which  shall  represent  all  cones  ;  but  we 
canneverconstructtheco/orof  acone:  nor  can  we 
draw  anyc^i^o'raw  which  shall  adequately  represent 
simple  existence^  though  we  may  easily  draw  one 
to  represent  extension  or  magnitude.  For  exam- 
ple ;  ask  a  mathematician  what  is  the  sum  of 
the  three  angles  of  every  right-lined  triangle,  and 
he  will  draw  his  diagram  to  represent  every  pos- 
sible triangle,  and  will  demonstrate  by  it  that 
the  sum  must  be  equal  to  two  right  angles  ;  and 
his  diagram  subjects  the  whole  to  our  intuition. 


THE    CRITICAL    PHILOSOPHY.  81 

Now  ask  a  philosopher  the  same  question,  and 
he  goes  to  analyzing  his  abstract  conceptions  of 
angles  and  lines,  but  can  never  find  an  answer 
in  this  way.  So  the  algebraist  represents  ade- 
quately his  quantities,  known  and  unknown,  by 
letters  ;  and  then  by  a  regular  process,  he  can 
solve  his  problems.  But  the  philosopher  can  not 
mak5  out  any  such  sensible  representations  of 
his.  general  conceptions  :  he  can  only  analyze 
them  ;  unless  he  will  recur  to  the  sensible  intui- 
tion of  the  objects  themselves,  i.  e.  of  some  indi- 
vidual thing  under  the  genus  ;  which  will  afford 
only  empirical,  and  never  philosophical  knowl- 
edge of  them.  Hence,  all  purely  philosophical 
reasoning  is  discursive  or  purely  logical,  that  is, 
is  based  immediately  on  our  conceptions.  But 
mathematical  reasoning  is  not  purely  logical,  as 
it  rests  on  intuitions  of  the  general  conceptions, 
hy  means  of  its  constructions.  Mathematics  and 
philosophy  are  therefore  essentially  different 
sciences  ;  and  the  precision  and  certainty  of  the 
former  can  never  be  carried  into  the  latter. 

Philosophy  can  not  make  out  complete  defi- 
nitions of  the  objects  of  which'  it  treats,  as 
mathematics  can  do.  For  those  objects  are 
either  empirical  facts,  with  regard  to  which  we 
are  liable  to  much  deception,  and  which  are 
moreover  always  particular  facts,  and  not  uni- 
6 


8*2  THE    CRITICAL    PHILOSOPHY. 

versal  truths;  or  they  are  pu7'e  conceptions  a 
priori,  (e.  g.  substance,  cause,  right,  equity,  iVc.) 
and  therefore  so  obscure  as  to  be  incapable  of  any 
adequate  description  on  which  reliance  can  be 
placed.  We  can  indeed  expound  our  conceptions 
of  the  thin<js  ;  but  we  can  never  be  certain  that 
our  conceptions  correspond  exactly  with  the 
things  as  they  exist.  On  the  contrary,  tlic  ob- 
jects of  the  mathematician^  being  always  arbitra- 
ry combinations  or  creations  of  the  mind,  and 
also  capable  of  construction,  and  of  course  of 
heiag  intuited,  are  the  only  objects  that  will  ad- 
mit of  perfect  clcjinitions. 

Philosophy  moreover  can  not  have  her  axioms, 
as  mathematics  can.  For  all  axioms  are  propo- 
sitions so  clear  and  evident,  from  mere  inspec- 
tion, as  to  need  no  proof.  Now  mathematics, 
by  means  of  her  constructions,  can  submit  many 
of  her  fundamental  positions  to  our  immediate 
inspection  ;  and  therefore  she  has  her  axioms. — 
But  philosophy,  being  unable  to  construct  any 
thing,  has  to  depend  wholly  on  discursive  or  logi- 
cal reasoning,  and  therefore  can  have  no  axioms. 
For,  all  discursive  reasoning  is  merely  the  analy- 
zing of  our  conceptions,  and  therefore  it  can 
educe  from  those  conceptions  only  what  is  really 
and  truly  contained  in  them.  Philosophy  can 
make  no  syntheticjudgnitnts  a^n'on* respecting  the 


THE    CRITICAL    PHILOSOPHY.  83 

objects  of  nature,  but  only  eminrical judgments', 
and  she  can  reason  about  them  only  discursively^ 
that   is,  logically. — Direct  synthetic  judgments 
from  perceptions^  are  Dogmata:  similar  judg- 
ments from  construction^  are  Blathernata^     Now 
all  Dogmata  are  uncertain  ;  Mathemata  are  not. 
(2.)  Discipline   of  pure  reason  in  its  polemic 
Kse.-By  its  polemic  use,  I  intend,  its  use  in  defend- 
ing positions  against  the  dogmatical   deniers  of 
them,  or  in  maintaining  that  the  contrary  cannot 
be  proved^  ur  even  be  shown  to  be  more  j^robable. 
Here  Kant  introduces   those  critical    remarks 
on  the  theses  and  antitheses  of  reason  in  regard 
to  her  cosmological  ideas,   which  were  quoted  in 
our  last  number. 

He  then  proceeds :  The  Critic  of  pure  rea- 
son is  the  proper  tribunal,  before  which  all  the 
contests  of  pure  reason  should  be  brought. — 
Without  the  aid  of  this  tribunal,  reason  issituat- 
ed  like  men  in  a  state  of  nature,  where  no  im- 
partial decision  of  controversies  is  practicable, 
but  the  parties  must  fight  it  out,  aud  never  come 
to  agreement. — This  critic  may  put  us  at  ease, 
and  dispel  all  fear  lest  the  enemies  of  religion 
should  succeed  in  overthro\V<ng  the  belief  of  a 
God,  of  the  immortality  of  the  soul,  a  future 
state,  &c.  They  can  never  do  any  such  thing. 
At  the  same  time,  it  teaches  us  not  to  relv  on  the 


84  THE    CRITICAL    PHILOSOPHY. 

ordinary  proofs,  (the  ontological,  cosmological, 
and  physico-theological,)  as  alone  adequate,  and 
such  as  none  but  bad  men  can  hesitate  to  admit : 
and  it  shews  us,  that  moral  proofs^  derived  from 
practical  reason,  and  from  the  reasonableness  of 
the  things  themselves,  must  be  our  chief  reliance. 
Such  a  critic  should  never  lead  us  to  become 
skeptics^  like  Hume  and  Priestley  ;  but  by  show- 
ing us  the  true  boundaries  of  rational  knowledge, 
it  should  keep  us  from  dogmatism.  The  first 
steps  taken  in  matters  of  pure  reason,  are  apt  to 
make  us  dogmatists^  as  being  yet  but  children  in 
knowledge.  The  next  steps  bring  us  into  per- 
plexities, and  seem  to  require  universal  skepti- 
cism. But  the  third  and  last  steps  (those  of 
sound  criticism)  show  us  the  limits  of  true  ration- 
al knowledge,  and  dispel  skepticism  as  well  as 
dogmatism, 

(3.)  Discipline  of  pure  reason  in  regard  to 
hypotheses. 

Admitting  that  the  conclusions  of  pure  reason 
in  matters  of  fact  are  not  proved  with  apodictical 
certainty,  it  may  still  be  a  question  whether  those 
conclusions  may  not  be  received  as  hypotheses, 
and  be  used  advantageously  as  such.  And  un- 
doubtedly they  may  be  so  received  and  used,  in 
certain  cases  ;  but  not  in  all  cases,  and  for  all 
purposes.     In  particular,  they  may  be  used  to 


THE    CRITICAL    PHILOSOPHY.  85 

answer  objections  ;  by  showing  the  objector  that 
his  arguments  are  liable  to  exceptions.  But 
they  must  never  be  made  the  foundation  of  any 
system  g£  positive  knowledge.  In  the  field  of 
speculative  reason,  this  rule  is  necessary,  in  order 
that  nothing  may  be  assumed  without  the  evi- 
dence of  certainty.  But  in  the  field  of  practical 
reason,  which  does  not  aim  to  evince  truths  but 
only  to  advance  the  best  interests  of  man,  the 
same  caution  in  regard  to  hypotheses  is  not 
liecessary. 

II.  The  Canon  of  pure  reason. — By  a  Canon^ 
he  tells  us,  he  intends  o.  summary  of  the  principles 
a  priori  of  the  right  use^  in  general,  of  any  of  our 
intellectual  powers.  Thus  the  analysis  of  the 
powers  of  the  understanding,  in  the  first  part  of 
the  work,  is  a  canon  of  pure  understanding. 

(1.)  Of  the  idtimatc  aims  of  the  pure  use  of 
our  reason.  —  It  may  be  asked,  What  are  the 
problems^  which  it  is  the  ultimate  aim  of  pure 
reason  to  solve  1  The  answer  is  :  The  specula- 
tions of  reason  in  her  transcendental  operations 
all  center  on  three  subjects  ;  viz.  the  freedom  of 
the  ivill,  the  immortality  of  the  soul,  and  the  eX' 
istence  of  a  God.  But  the  merely  speculative  in- 
terests of  reason  in  regard  to  all  the  three  sub- 
jects, are  very  small,  and  hardly  worth  pursuing 
through  so  much  toil.    Because,  the  sum  of  our 


86  THE    CRITICAL    PHILOSOPHY. 

philosophical  hunvledge  would  be  very  little  en- 
larged bv  an  affirmative  decision  of  these  ques- 
tions. But  it  is  far  otherwise  in  regard  io practi- 
cal reason,  or  when  the  question  comes  up,  "What: 
ought  we  to  do. 

(2.)  Of  an  idea  of  the  supreme  good,  as  deter- 
mining the  aim  of  pure  reason. — All  the  inter- 
ests of  my  reason  unite  in  these  three  questions  : 
I.  What  can  I  know  ?  II.  What  ought  1  to  do  ? 
III.  What  may  I  hope  fori  T\\q  first  question 
belongs  wholly  to  speculative  reason  ;  and  it  has 
(I  trust)  been  adequately  answered  already. — 
T^hQ  second  question  belongs  wholly  io  practical 
reason.  It  is  not  however  transcoidental,  but 
moral;  and  therefore  does  not  belong  to  this 
Critic.  The  third  question  is  both  j^raciical  and 
theoretical:  because,  when  practical  reason  has 
decided  it  in  a  general  manner,  speculative  Jea- 
son  must]come  in  to  define  particularly  what  we 
may  hope  for. 

The  second  question,  What  ought  1  to  do, 
enquires  after  a  rule  of  duty,  not  after  a  mere 
rule  of  expediency,  or  a  path  to  happiness.  Com- 
plete happiness  would  consist  in  the  full,  entire, 
and  eternal  satisfaction  of  all  our  propensities  or 
desires.  And  a  rule  to  guide  us  to  such  a  state, 
must  be  founded  on  empirical  principles  ;  be- 
cause  experience  alone  can  show  us  what  our 


THE    CRITICAL    PHILOSOPHY.  87 

propensities  are,  nnd  whiit  w'lW  satisfi/ them.  A 
moral  law,  on  the  contrary,  shows  us  wliat  will 
render  us  worthi/  to  be  happy.  It  overlooks  our 
propensities,  and  the  means  of  their  gratifica- 
tion. It  treats  us  as  free  rational  beings,  and 
points  us  to  the  conditions  of  our  being  made 
happv.  It  must  therefore  rest  on  the  mere  ideas 
of  pure  reason,  and  must  be  known  a  priori.  I 
assume  the  existence  of  such  a  moral  laio  ;  and  I 
refer  to  the  moral  judgment  of  every  man,  who 
will  candidly  examine  his  own  moral  feelings, 
for  authority  to  make  the  assumption. — Pure 
reason,  in  her  practical  or  moral  exercise,  is  our 
voucher  for  some  principles  of  the  possibility  of 
experience,  namely,  'for  the  practicability  of 
such  actions  as  will  accord  with  the  precepts  of 
the  moral  law.  For,  if  the  law  imperatively 
commands  certain  actions,  those  actions  must  be 
possible,  and  the  performance  of  them  depends 
on  our  freewill.  And  hence,  the  principles  of 
pure  reason,  in  her  practical  or  moral  capacity, 
must  have  objective  reality. — From  the  absolute 
demands  of  the  moral  law,  we  also  infer  the  pos- 
sibility of  a  moral  system  or  unity  ;  of  which, 
however,  speculative  reason  can  have  no  knowl- 
edge, because  her  province  does  not  extend  over 
the  territory  of /rce  z^^i//.  Amoral  loorld  would 
be  one  conforming  to  all  the  precepts   of  the 


OO  THE    CRITICAL    PHILOSOI'IIF. 

moral  law.  Such  a  world  must  be  possible^  in 
consequence  of  the  freedom  of  the  will ;  and 
such  ought  to  he  the  character  of  the  existing 
world.  It  must  be  an  intellectual  world,  and  not 
a  physical ;  because  it  must  be  free  from  all  com- 
pulsion^ and  must  make  no  allowances  for  the 
weaknesses  and  imperfections  of  human  nature. 
The  idea  of  such  a  world  has  objective  reality^  not 
from  any  actual  intuition  of  it,  but  as  an  object 
of  ^u\'e  practical  reason. — Thus  we  answer  the 
first  of  the  two  questions  of  pure  practical  rea- 
son, (What  ?nust  I  do?) — namely,  obei/  perfectly 
the  moral  law ;  make  the  existence  oj  a  moral 
world  to  be  a  reality  ;  or  in  other  words,  do  that, 
which  will  render  you  worthy  of  happiness. 

The  last  question  is,  If  I  do  so,  may  I  expect 
to  be  happy  ?  And,  from  the  principles  of  pure 
practical  reason,  we  infer  an  affirmative  answer. 
For  we  have  seen,  that  a  moral  world  (one  in 
which  every  man  shall  do  what  he  ought  to  do) 
ought  to  exist ;  such  being  the  imperative  com- 
mand of  the  moral  law.  But  the  possible  exis- 
tence of  such  a  world  presupposes  a  supreme 
moral  ruler  or  lawgiver  who  wills  its  existence  ; 
because,  no  otherwise  can  such  a  world  be  pos- 
sible. Blind  nature  could  never  produce  it.  So 
then,  there  must  be  a  supreme  Reason,  which 
legislates  on  moral  principles,  and  which  is   also 


THE    CRITICAL    PHILOSOPHY.  Oil 

the  author  of  nature.  Such  an  Intdligence^ 
connecting  aperfect  moral  will  in  creatures  with 
their  highest  happiness^  and  thus  causing  all  the 
happiness  which  results  from  morality,  I  denom- 
inate the  ideal  of  the  supreme  good.  Now,  as 
we  do  not  find  the  world  around  us,  or  the  pres- 
ent state  of  things  to  be  such  a  moral  world  as 
we  have  seen  should  exist,  and  in  which  perfect 
happiness  reigns,  we  necessarily  infer  2i  future 
state,  an  unseen  world,  in  which  all  this  shall  be 
realized.  This  future  state  as  distinguished  from 
the  kingdom  of  nature,  Leibnitz  called  the  king- 
dom of  grace.  Practical  reason  commands  us 
to  connect  ourselves  with  the  kingdom  of  grace, 
and  to  expect  happines  in  it,  provided  we  do  not 
render  ourselves  unworthy  of  it.  In  order  to  our 
happiness,  it  is  necessary  that  all  our  conduct 
be  regulated  by  moral  maxims ;  that  is,  by  the 
precepts  of  the  moral  law.  But  reason  cannot 
feel  this  necessity,  if  she  regards  the  moral  law 
as  a  mere  idea  without  objective  reality.  Hence, 
she  is  obliged  to  assume  the  existence  of  an  effi.- 
cient  cause,  a  God,  the  maker  and  executor  of 
this  Jaw.  For  if  there  be  no  God,  and  no  future 
unseen  state,  the  ideas  of  morality  may  excite 
our  admiration  or  wonder,  but  can  never  become 
efficient  motives  controlling  the  will  and  conduct. 
Neither  happiness  alone,  nor  morality  alone,  ("the 


90 


THE    CRITICAL    PHILOSOPHY. 


latter  considered  as  rendering  man  loorthy  of 
liappiness,)  can  be  reasoii's  supreme  good.  We 
must  superadd  tlie  expectation  of  tliis  happiness, 
on  condition  of  being  worthy  of  it.  And  hence 
the  necessity  of  assuming  that  there  is  a  God, 
tlie  lawgiver,  and  the  center  of  tlie  rnorai  unity, 
or  head  of  the  moral  world.  This  supreme  In- 
telligence must  be  one,  not  many  icills,  because 
many  wills  would  destroy  the  wiity  of  the  moral 
world.  He  must  be  omnipotent,  to  order  all 
things  in  subserviency  to  the  unity  of  ihe  moral 
world  ;  omnisctent,  to  know  the  inmost  thoughts 
and  purposes  of  creatures  and  their  moral  de- 
serts;  omnipresent,  to  order  all  events  in  subser- 
viency to  the  interests  of  the  moral  world  ;  and 
eternal,  to  conduct  all  events  to  their  final  issue. 
(3.)  Of  ojnnion,  knoivledge,  and  faith. —  Truth 
consists  in  the  agreement  of  a  proposition  with 
the  objects  of  real  existence.  The  truth  of  a 
proposition  may  be  admitted  either  on  objective 
grounds,  or  on  subjective ;  that  is,  either  for 
causes  existing  in  the  thing,  or  for  causes  existing 
in  our  own  minds.  In  the  former  case,  the  ad- 
mission is  conviction ;  in  the  latter  it  is  persua- 
sion. In  persuasion  there  is  frequently  an  illu- 
sion, the  subjective  ground  being  mistaken  for  an 
objective.     To  prove  whether  we  are  under  such 


^  ,(^^ 
')\^' 


^< 


THE    CRITICAL    PHILOSOPHY.  91 

illasion,  propose  the  case  to  others,   and  see  if 
their  minds  view  it  as  we  do. 

To  admit  without  the  consciousness  of  either 
subjective  or  objective  validity,  is  to  presume  or 
to  he  of  opinion.  If  the  ground  of  the  admis- 
sion is  subjectively  adequate^  but  not  objectively 
sOf  the  admission  is  faith  or  belief:  as,  e.  g. 
when  the  object  Jies  beyond  our  personal  cogni- 
zance, and  we  admit  the  Statement  because  we 
have  confidence  in  the  testimony  of  other?,  or  for 
any  other  satisfactory  reason  existing  in  our  own 
minds.  If  the  ground  is  both  subjectively  and 
objectively  adequate,  the  regarding  as  true  is 
knowledge  ;  we  know  it.  ^ 

We  should  never  venture  to  hold  an  opinion., 
without  knowing  something  about  the  thing, 
which  may  render  it  possibly  true.  In  the  judg- 
ments of  pure  speculative  reason^  opinions  are 
wholly  inadmissible  :  the  proposition  must  con- 
tain what  is  known  a  priori,  and  therefore  have 
apodictical  certainty  or  be  rejected  altogether. 
In  the  transcendental  operations  of  pure  reason, 
an  opinion  is  too  little,  and  knoicledge  too  much 
to  be  expected.  In  the  disquisitions  o^  practical 
reason,  faith  OY  belief  is  admissible;  and  indeed,  y 
generally,  it  is  all  we  can  expect. 

The  two  remaining  chapters  of  the  Critic  of 
pure  Reason,  (viz.  the  Architectonic,  or  syste- 


92  THE    CRITICAL    PHILOSOPHY. 

matic  arrangement,  and  the  History  of  pure 
reason,)  are  so  concise,  and  contain  so  little  to 
interest  the  reader,  that  I  pass  them  in  silence. 

In  these  sketches,  I  have  endeavored  faithfully 
to  exhibit  the  leading  views  of  Kant  in  his  most 
celebrated  work,  and  to  show  in  general  the  spirit 
and  tendency  of  his  Critical  Philosophy.  That 
I  have  in  no  instance  misapprehended  his  mean- 
ing, is  more  than  I  dare  assert.  I  can  only  say, 
I  have  done  the  best  I  could,  to  represent  him 
fairly,  and  intelligibly,  to  my  readers  ;  so  that 
they  might  be  able  to  form  some  correct  estimate 
of  the  merits  and  demerits  of  this  coryphaeus  of 
modern  German  philosophers. 


CHAPTER    IX. 

ANTI-CRITICAL    PHILOSOPHY. 

Effects  of  the  Critical  Philosophy.    Reinhold's  Doctrine  of  Thought, 
Fichte''s  Doctrine  of  Science,  or  Wissenschaftslehre. 

Kant's  Critic  of  pure  Reason,  first  published 
1781,   was  little  noticed  for  a   few  years ;  and 
thus  it  suddenly  arrested  the  attention  of  all  Ger- 
many.    The   majority  of  the  learned  assailed  it, 
as  subverting  many  of  the  best  establislied  truths, 
narrowing  far  too   much  the   boundaries  of  hu- 
man knowledge,    and  rendering   philosophy  a 
meagre  science    of  little    value    or  importance. 
The  Wolfian  dogmatists  considered  it  as  a  direct 
attack  upon  their  doctrines  :  and  the  philosophi- 
zing dogmatists  regarded  it  as  little  short  of  a 
protestation     against    all    philosophy.      Still    it 
found  numerous  friends;  and   it   was  speedily 
admitted  and  expounded   in  all  the  universities. 
And  it  was  soon  apparent,  that  it  had  completely 
subverted  the  older  systems  of  philosophy  ;  and 
that  it  had  roused  the  lovers  of  science  through- 
out Germany,  to  high  enthusiasm  for  metaphysical 
studies,  and  especially  for  investigating  the  foun- 


94  ANTI-CRITICAL    PHILOSOPHY. 

dation,  source,  and  origin  of  rational  knowledg'e. 
During  a  very  few  years,  more  new  and  essen- 
tially different  bases  for  systems  of  philosof  liy 
were  brought  forward,  and  elaborately  discussed, 
in  Germany,  than  in  all  the  rest  of  Europe  since 
the  revival  of  learning.  Some  of  these  were 
only  modifications  of  the  Critical  Philosophy  ; 
others  were  intended  to  subvert  it,  and  to  restore 
the  old  philosophy  remodeled  and  established  on 
sounder  principles  ;  and  others  again  sought  to 
find  entirely  new  principles,  on  which  to  estab- 
Jish  a  more  perfect  philosophy  than  had  ever 
before  been  dreamed  ot. 

The  chief  aim  of  most  of  these  systems  was, 
to  penetrate  into  the  terra  incognita  of  Kant, 
that  is,  into  the  region  of  noumena  and  of  super- 
sensible things.  The  authors  were  unwilling  to 
believe  we  can  know  so  little,  as  Rant  had  rep- 
resented. They  therefore  attempted  to  rend  the 
vail,  which  conceals  the  unknowable;  or  to 
bridge  the  unjuissahle  gulf  of  Kant,  which  sep- 
arates between  phenomena  and  noumena  in  the 
material  world,  and  between  ideas  and  the  ob- 
jects of  them  in  the  world  of  thought. 

One  of  the  earliest  of  these  projectors,  was 
Charles  Leonard  Reinhold,  a  professor  at  Jena 
and  Kiel,  who  died  in  1823,  at  the  age  of  G^. 
His  theory  appeared  as  early  as  1789.     It  was, 


ANTI-CRITICAL    PHILOSOPHY.  95 

that  thinking  (Vorstellen),   or  the  representing 
h  thing  to  our  own  raind,    gives  us  the  desired 
objective  knowledge.      For   our  eQnsci'c).usnes3-' 
assures  us,  that  in  all  tliinldng  there  are  present 
three  things,  the    thinker^   the  thought^  and  the 
thinking.     The  thinker  is  the  subject  of  the  ac- 
tion ;  the  thinking  is  the  «c^  of  the  thinker  ;  and 
the  thought  is  the  product  of  that  act.     Now  in 
this  product  there  is, — (I.)  Something  derived 
from  the  objects  without  the  mind,   and  which  is 
the  matter  or  material  of  which  the  thought  is 
composed  ; — (2.)  Something  derived    from    the 
mind  itself,  namely,  the  fonn  of  the  thought  :— 
and    (3.)  The    consciousness   that   the    material 
when  shaped  by  the   mind,  does  take  that  par- 
ticular form. — But   this    theory  was    soon    put 
down  ;  and  the  author  himself  ingenuously  aban- 
doned it,  when  shown  that  it  does  not  explain  at 
wWihe  nature  of  the  matter  of  thought,  but  only 
the  powers  of  the  mind  in  the  act  of  thinking. — 
This  system   was  called    Vorstellungslehre,  the 
Doctrine  of  Thought. 

Afar  wider  and  more  durable  popularity  at- 
tended the  speculations  of  John  Gottlieb 
FiCHTE,  a  professor  of  Jena,  who  died  in  1814, 
at  the  age  of  52.  At  first  he  embraced  the  Criti- 
cal Philosophy  of  Kant ;  but  afterwards  he 
thought  he  discovered  a  way  to  carry  absolute 


96  ANTI-CRITICAL    nilLOSOPHY. 

science  into  regions,  of  which  Kant  affirms,  we 
can  have  no  knowledge.  His  views  were  first 
published  in  1794. 

His  system  is  entitled  the  Doctrine  of  Science 
(WisscnschaftsleJire) ;  and  he  describes  it  as 
being  the  Science,  which  establishes  the  possibil- 
ity and  the  validity  of  all  science.  Such  a  pre- 
liminary science,  he  said,  must  rest  on  a  single 
fundamental  principle;  and  that  principle  must 
be  so  certain  in  itself  as  to  need  no  proof  from 
without,  and  so  comprehensive  as  to  embrace 
both  the  substance  and  the  form  of  all  scientific 
knowledge.  And  such  a  principle,  be  maintain- 
ed, is  found  in  the  simple  proposition  I  am  I. 
For,  every  thing  is,  ichat  it  is  ;  neither  less  nor 
more.  This  self-evident  trutli  may  be  expressed 
thus:  A=A.  Now  by  substituting  the  /,  of 
which  every  one  is  conscious,  in  the  place  of  A  ; 
and  the  verb  of  existence  am,  of  which  also  we 
are  conscious,  in  place  of  the  copula  ;  we  obtain 
the  proposition  I  am  I  ;  of  which  our  conscious- 
ness, as  often  as  we  reflect  upon  our  own  mental 
acts,  furnishes  the  subject,  ihe  predicate,  and  the 
copula.  Of  course,  this  proposition  has  apodic- 
ticai  certainty  ;  for  it  rests  on  the  ground  of  a 
perfect  and  known  identity  between  the  subject 
and  the  predicate. 


ANTI-CRITICAL    PHILOSOPHY.  97 

Now  by  affirming  this  proposition,  2^  judgment 
is  expressed.  But  to  judge,  is  to  act.  Here  then 
is  a  an  act  of  the  /.  The  /  directly  affirms  its 
own  existence.  It  is  the  actor,  and  at  the  same 
time  the  object  of  its  own  actiou  ;  and  herein 
consists  the  consciousness  which  furnishes  the 
knowledge  of  the  proposition.  But  this  act  of 
the  /,  affirming  itself  to  be  /,  and  nothing  more 
nor  less,  implies  a  stop,  boundary,  or  limitation 
of  the  sphere  of  the  /:  in  other  words,  it  postu- 
lates the  existence  of  something  that  limits  the 
activity  of  the  /,  and  confines  it  to  its  own  sphere. 
Now  this  something  which  limits  the  /,  whatever 
it  maybe,  is  certainly  not  I.  And  hence  the 
proposition  I  am  I,  proves  the  existence  of  tivo 
"things  or  objects  ;  namely,  the  I  wiiich  is  affirm- 
ed, and  the  not  /which  is  postulated.  It  more- 
over proves,  that  these  two  objects  limit  or  bound 
each  other;  so  that  neither  of  them,  in  so  far  as 
it  is  considered  as  bounded  by  the  other,  is  infi- 
nite or  unlimited,  but  is  finite. 

But  what  is  this  not  /,  which  sets  bounds  to  the 
I? — Manifestly  it  is  something  which  owes  its 
existence  to  the  /.  For  the  /,  when  reflecting 
upon  itself  and  its  operations,  voluntarily  or 
spontaneously  limits  and  bounds  itself;  and 
thereby  it  gives  up  its  claim  to  boundless  exis- 
tence and  activity,  and  transfers  a  portion  of  ex- 
7 


yb  ANTI-CRITICAL    PHILOSOPHY. 

istence  and  activity  to  the  not-I ;  vhich  is  to  the 
/  the  external  world,  or  llie  universe  without. 
This  not-I^  therefore,  has  no  existence  hut  what 
the  /gives  to  it,  hy  the  act  of  limiting  iiself  m 
the  judgment,  I  AiM  I.  Of  course  the  world 
around  us,  or  the  universe,  is  only  an  ideal  exis- 
tence, a  world  of  our  own  creation.  We  indeed 
conceive  of  it  as  real,  when  we  consider  it  a& 
limiting  the  I:  but  this  limitation  is  of  our  own 
making;  the  /  is  the  only  real  oc/or.  And  this 
holds  true  of  all  the  individual  objects,  nialerial 
or  immaterial,  which  the  mind  contem[)lates  as 
exterior  to  itself,  and  to  which  collectively  she 
gives  the  ajopellation  not-I.  For  the  /,  in  all  its 
actions,  meets  with  obstructions,  boundaries  or 
limitations  to  its  activity;  and  according  to  the 
variety  in  the  obstructions  or  limitations,  it  forms 
numberless  conceptions  or  ideas  of  supjiosed  or 
postulated  objects,  which  are  endlessly  varied,  and 
which  develop  themselves  continually  in  new  and 
unexpected  forms.  The  conceptions,  so  endlessly 
various,  are  the  postulated  objects,  considered  as 
limitations  of  the  I.  But  as  the  /,  in  all  cases, 
voluntarily  limits  itself,  or  gives  being  to  the  ob- 
structions to  its  own  activity,  the  J  is  the  only 
actor;  and  tiie  various  conceptions  of  objects 
without,  are  only  cerin'in  forms  of  the  activity  of 
the  /;  that  is,  they  are  all  ideal  existences. 


ANTI-CRITICAL    PHILOSOPHY.  99 

We  now  come  to  the  practical  or  moral  part  of 
Fichte's  system.  And  here  again,  he  takes  the 
same  proposition,  I  am  I,  for  his  fundamental 
principle  :  and  he  also  reasons  from  it  in  much 
the  same  manner.  But  he  contemplates  the  I  in 
a  different  character.  In  the  first  or  theoretical 
part,  he  considered  the  /  as  a  merely  intellectual 
activity  ;  here  he  contemplates  it  as  a  free  agent, 
strivinor  to  accomplish  objects   or  to  attain  ends. 

In  itself,  and  as  limiting  the  not-I,  the  practical 
/is  absolute  and  free,  infinite,  and  the  only  real 
existence.  And  as  a  free  activity,  it  is  a  causali- 
ty :  but  in  its  consciousness,  or  when  it  affirms 
itself  in  the  form  I  am  I,  it  always  appears  as 
someth'wgfnite,  something  limited  by  a  not-I ; 
and  its  causality  can  manifest  itself  to  the  con- 
sciousness only  as  an  effort  to  accomplish  some- 
thing ;  which  effort  is  always  obstructed  and 
limited  by  the  not-I.  Hence  the  finite  practical 
/contemplates  itself  as  acted  upon,  limited,  and 
restrained  by  a  nr?i-/;  while  the  absolute  practi- 
cal /contemplates  itself  as  acting  upon,  restrain- 
ing, and  limiting  the  not-I,  and  therefore  feels 
itself  to  be  free,  unlimited  in  action,  and  the 
only  real  existence.  But  the  not-Iis  a  mere 
creature  of  the  /,  as  we  have  before  seen.  And 
lience,  the  inert  and  lifeless  not-I,  by  which  the 
practical  /is  limited  in  its  hee  activity  is  a  mere 


100  ANTI-CRITICAL    PHILOSOPHY. 

ideal  existence.  And  thus  we  arrive  at  a  knowl- 
edge of  the  essential  nature  hoth  of  the  practical 
1  and  its  opposing  not-I ;  just  as  we  previously 
ascertained  the  essential  nature  of  the  theoreti- 
cal /  and  its  opposing  wof-/;  and  in  both,  we 
find  the  f  to  be  the  only  actor^  and  the  only  real 
existence,  and  the  not-I  to  be  a  postulated  ideal 
thing,  which  owes  its  existence  entirely  to  the 
action  of  the  /. 

"  After  thus  annihilating,  by  his  idealism,  the 
evidence  of  the  objectivity  of  any  sensible  world, 
and  leaving  us  only  a  system  of  empty  images, 
(says  Tennemann,)  he  labors  to  establish  by 
means  of  conscience,  a  belief  in  the  reality  not 
only  of  a  sensible  world,  but  also  of  an  intellec- 
tual world  independent  of  it,  and  of  a  supersen- 
sible order  in  the  latter  world  ;  and  moreover 
the  possibility  of  acting  for  ends,  which  may  be 
realized  by  such  action.  He  commences  with 
the  idea  o^  freedom,  i.  e.  a  universal  and  absolute 
independence,  manifesting  itself  in  the  tendency 
of  the  /,  from  which  originates  the  idea  of  inde- 
pendence. The  principle  of  morals,  therefore, 
or  the  moral  law,  (the  law  for  free  actions,)  con- 
sists in  the  necessary  thought  or  purpose  of  an 
intelligent  being,  to  determine  its  free  choice  un- 
conditionally, agreeably  to  the  idea  of  indepen- 
dence ;  or,  in  popular  language,  to  follow  con- 


ANTI-CRITICAL     PHILOSOPHY.  101 

science  unconditionally.  This  determines  what 
is  dutf/.  Virtue  consists  in  being  in  perfect  har- 
mony with  ourselves."  (Tennemann,  Grundriz, 
§.  395,  p.  500.) 

"  But  Fichte's  religious  pldlosophy  attracted 
most  notice.  For  he  there  asserts  expressly, 
that  God  is  the  moral  order  of  the  world  ;  and 
that  to  this  conclusion  the  /is  brought,  by  the 
consciousness  that  its  free  activity  is  bound  by 
the  idea  of  duty.  For,  by  striving  to  realize 
duty,  the  /  strives  after  a  moral  order  in  the 
world  of  its  own  creation  ;  and  thus  it  approxi- 
mates io  God,  and  has  the  life  which  comes 
from  God.  In  this  moral  order  of  the  world, 
happiness  is  the  result  of  morality.  But  this 
happiness  is  not  perfect  felicity ;  which  never 
existed,  and  never  can.  And  thus  all  regard  for 
perfect  felicity  is  excluded.  We  need  no  other 
God  than  this  order  of  the  world  ;  although  we 
are  prone  to  think  of  a  particular  Beings  as  the 
Creator  of  it :  For,  (I.)  It  is  not  possible  to  as- 
cribe intelligence  and  personality  to  God,  with- 
out making  him  a  finite  being  like  ourselves. 
(2.)  To  conceive  of  God  as  a  particular  sub- 
Mance^  is  idolatry^  and  militates  with  the  very 
idea  of  him  ;  because  a  substance  is  something 
which  has  a  sensible  existence  in  time  and  place. 
(3.)  We  can  not  ascribe  existence  to  him,  because 


102  ANTI-CRITICAL    PHILOSOPHY. 

existence  belongs  only  to  objects  of  sense.  (4.) 
There  has  never  yet  been  brought  forward  any 
intelligible  word,  by  which  we  can  express  the 
creation  of  the  world  by  God.  (5.)  The  expec- 
tation o^ perfect  felicity  (Gluckseligkeil),  is  a 
chimera  ;  and  a  God  supposed  to  produce  it,  is 
an  idol  ministering  to  our  pleasure, — the  prince 
of  this  world.  These  representations,  brought 
forward  in  extravagant  paradoxes  and  with  great 
assurance,  (but  which  Fichte  himself  abandon- 
ed afterwards,)  were  treated  as  real  atheism  ; 
and  they  drew  upon  him  very  disagreeable  con- 
sequences, which  he  did  not  altogether-  merit." 
(Tewiem.  p.  502. 

"Fichte  attempted,  by  various  statements  of 
his  doctrine,  to  bring  people  to  understand  him, 
and  he  also  changed  his  views  on  some  points  ; 
as,  among  others  in  regard  to  the  relation  his 
system  bears  to  the  Critical  Philosophy,  (for  at 
first,  he  maintained  them  to  be  in  accordance.) 
and  in  regard  to  the  way  in  which  the  original 
activity  of  the  /is  brought  into  consciousness, 
(for  he  first  attempted  it  by  the  mere  laws  of 
thinking,  but  afterwards  by  an  intellectual  intu- 
ition). But  the  most  striking  difference  between 
the  more  recent  and  the  earlier  form  of  his  Doc- 
trine of  Science,  is,  that  at  first  it  was  idealism^ 
and    afterwards  realism.      In  the   former,   the 


ANTI-CRITICAL    PHILOSOPHY.  103 

starting  point  was  the  activity  of  the  1;  in  the 
latter,  it  is  ike  absolute  existence  of  God,  as  the 
only  real  Being,  who  is  self-existent  and  life 
itself  and  of  whom  the  world  and  consciousness 
are  a  likeness  or  schema  ;  and  objective  nature, 
he  considered,  as  the  absolute  barrier  or  limita- 
tion of  the  divine  activity.  In  producing  this 
change  in  the  Doctrine  of  Science,  Sehelling's 
philosophy,  as  well  as  Fichte's  sense  of  religion, 
seems  to  have  been  operative.  The  Doctrine  of 
Science  excited  great  attention,  and  met  with 
warm  approbation  and  warm  friends  ;  and  like- 
wise with  severe  critics  and  strenuotis  opposers, 
especially  among  the  Kanteans.  And  at  last,  it 
had  the  fate  of  every  system  :  for,  notwithstand- 
ing its  imposing  tone,  (by  which  it  greatly  pro- 
moted an  extravagant  love  of  speculation,  and 
contempt  for  real  knowledge,)  it  could  not  gain 
the  standing  of  a  generally  received  philosophy. 
Yet  it  can  not  be  denied,  that  Fichte's  idealism 
had  great  influence  on  the  spirit  of  his  age  ;  and, 
by  the  force  of  the  author's  peculiar  eloquence, 
14:  fostered  in  many  minds  a  strong  predilection 
for  the  super-sensible."     ( Tennem.  p.  505.) 


CHAPTER    X. 

PANTHEISTIC    PHILOSOPHY. 

Schelling'' s  Doctrine  of  Identity,  Identitatslebre.  Fickte's  altered 
Doctrine  of  Science.  Other  Pantheists:  Bouterwek,  Bardili, 
Esckenmayer,  Wagner,  Krause. 

The  next  system  demanding  our  attention,  is 
SchQW'mg's  Doctrine  of  Identity^  Identitatshhre  ; 
so  named,  from  its  maintaining  the  perfect  iden- 
tity o^  the  knowledge  of  things  and  the  ihijigs 
themselves,  or  the  entire  coincidence  of  the  ideal 
and  real,  the  subjective  and  the  objective.  It  is 
also  called  the  doctrine  of  All-One,  AUeinheits- 
lehre,  or  Alltinslehre :  because  it  maintains  that 
the  universe  is  God,  and  God  the  universe  ;  or, 
that  God  developing  himself  in  various  forms, 
and  according  to  general  laws,  is  the  only  exis- 
tence. 

The  distinguished  author  of  this  system,  Fred. 
Wm.  Jos.  von  Schelling,  was  born  in  1775, 
studied  at  Tubingen  til!  he  passed  Philos.  Dr., 
then  at  Ijcipsic,  and  afterwards  at  Jena  under 
Fichte.  In  1802  he  became  M.  D.,  and  the  next 
year  a  professor  of  philosophy  at  Wurtzburg  : 
thence  he  removed  to  Munich  in  1817,  to  Erlan- 


PANTHEISTIC    PHILOSOPHY.  105 

gen  in  1820,  and  back  to  Municli  in  1827,  where 
he  probably  still  lives,  an  academician,  a  court- 
counsellor,  and  a  professor  of  philosophy. — 
Schelling  became  an  author  at  the  age  of  20, 
being  then  an  admirer  of  Fichte's  philosophy, 
from  which  he  soon  swerved  ;  and  at  the  age  of 
25,  had  published  the  ground-work  of  his  new 
system,  which  he  labored  to  perfect  during  a  few 
years,  and  then  turned  his  attention  to  other  ob- 
jects. For  nearly  30  years  he  has  published 
very  little  on  i)hilosophy  :  and  his  s}stem  has 
never  been  so  fully  and  so  lucidly  explained, 
that  the  philosophizing  public  could  perfectly  un- 
derstand it.  And  this,  in  the  opinion  of  Krug, 
is  one  reason  why  his  philosophy,  which  at  first 
attracted  so  much  notice  and  so  many  admirers, 
is  now  seldom  mentioned  in  the  German  univer- 
sities, and  is  sinking  into  oblivion. 

The  philosophy  of  Schelling  depends  lesson 
logical  demonstrations,  than  on  bold  assumptions 
claiming  to  be  intellectual  intuitions.  Yet  it  does 
not  disclaim  all  support  from  sound  reasoning. 
A  fundamental  principle  with  the  author,  is,  that 
the  very  idea  o^  philosophi/  presupposes  the  pos- 
sibility of  a  perfect  and  known  coincidence  be- 
tween our  knowledge  of  things  and  the  essential 
nature  of  these  things  :  because,  it  is  only  such 
a  knowledge  of  things  that  can  be  justly  called 


106  PANTHEISTIC    PHILOSOPHY. 

philosophical  or  true  knowledge.  Then,  with- 
out stopping  to  inquire,  as  Kant  has  done,  how- 
far  such  knowledge  can  extend,  he  goes  on  the 
supposition  that  there  are  no  definable  limits  to 
it;  and  therefore  his  only  inquiry  is,  how  such 
knowledge  may  be  supposed  to  originate  ;  or, 
how  can  the  fact  be  explained,  that  we  have  such 
knowlediie. 

Now,  if  the  laws  of  nature  were  also  the  laws 
of  human  consciousness,  or  if  the  former  were 
always  exactly  coincident  wiih  the  latter,  then 
our  consciousness  would  contain  an  exact  trans- 
cript, a  perfect  fac-simile,  of  what  is  taking  place 
in  the  natural  world  around  us,  at  least  so  far  as 
our  coirnizance  of  tliini;s  without  extends.  In 
other  words,  our  minds  would  be  mirrors  reflect- 
ing perfect  images  of  the  things  around  us,  and 
of  all  changes  they  undergo.  And  hence,  by 
looking  into  our  own  minds  wc  might  there  read 
the  laws  of  nature,  and  learn  perfectly  the  true 
nature  of  every  thing  that  falls  within  the  circle 
of  our  observation.  Now  this  supposition  so 
perfectly  explains  how  philosophical  knowledge 
is  possible,  and  so  pours  broad  daylight  upon 
what  Wris  before  dark  and  inexplicable,  that  we 
can  not  reasonably  hesitate  to  adopt  it  as  true. 
It  is  therefore  to  be  assutued  with  confidence. 

But  still  a  difficulty  remains  ;  viz.  How  hap- 


PANTHEISTIC    PHILOSOPHY.  107 

pens  it,  that  these  two  mysterious  streams  (the 
colIr^e  of  nature  in  the  objective  world,  and  the 
course  of  human  consciousness  in  tlie  subjective 
or  intellectual  world,)  should  so  perfectly  agree, 
or  he  identical  in  all  their  raeanderings  ?  Our 
actual  observations  can  not  trace  them  back  to 
their  source,  nor  follow  them  down  to  their  final 
termination;  what  then  can  explain  the  mystery 
of  their  entire  coincidence'?  Answer:  Spinoza 
has  shf)wn  us,  that  there  is  only  one  substance,  or 
one  real  existence^  in  the  universe,  namely  God  ; 
who  is  continually  developing  himself,  and  by 
that  development  gives  being  to  all  that  exists, 
whether  material  or  immaterial.  And  here  is  a 
key  to  the  mystery.  The  two  streams  flow  from 
one  and  the  same  fountain,  namely,  God,  as  he 
existed  anterior  to  his  development.  They  are 
equally  in  their  nature  God,  or  the  divine  first 
principle  of  all  things,  who  uitfolds  himself  alike 
in  both.  They  are  therefore  not  two,  but  one 
and  the  same,  in  their  essential  nature,  and  of 
course  also  in  the  laws  of  their  movement.  We 
thus  arrive  at  the  source,  the  grand  central  point, 
from  which  all  things  radiate,  and  in  which  all 
contrarieties  and  diversities  meet  and  coalesce : 
viz.  the  Divine,  the  Absolute,  the  All-One,  in 
its  primitive  state  or  form.  And  all  true  philoso- 
phy must  begin  with  a  knowledge  of  this  primal 


108  PANTHEISTIC    PHILOSOPHY. 

All-One  ;  and  then,  by  tracing  the  developments 
of  ih'is  All-One  till  it  expands  itself  into  the  uni- 
verse around  us,  a  complete  and  perfect  system 
of  philosophy  will  be  obtained. 

This  system,  which  Tennemann  justly  charac- 
terises -diSlUe  poetry  of  the  human  mind,  attempts 
to  explain  exactly  xhe  process  by  which  the  Ab- 
solute or  the  All-One  gradually  developed  itself,  till 
itbecamethe  now  existing  universe.  But  it  would 
carry  us  too  far  to  go  over  the  whole  process, 
and  we  therefore  only  subjoin  the  following  gen- 
eral scheme  of  it. 

I.  The  primitive  form  of  the  Absolute  or  All- 
One,  (God),  is  that  in  which  all  contrarieties  and 
diversities  are  completely  merged  and  lost,  and 
only  an  abstract  identity  of  every  thing  can  be 
apprehended. 

II.  This  Absolute  reveals  itself  in  nature  ; 
which  is  the  Absolute  in  the  copy.  And  it  reveals 
itself  under  two  general  forms  or  aspects ;  the 
one  form  is  that  of  real  existences,  or  things  ; 
the  other  form  is  that  of  ideal  existences,  or  ob- 
jects which  exist  only  in  the  mind,  and  which 
can  never  be  subjected  to  the  senses.  The  ob- 
jects belonging  to  each  form  possess  different 
degrees  or  quantities  of  that  essential  nature 
which  is  common  to  them  as  a  class;  and  this 
difference  in  degree  or  quantity  is  denoted  by  the 


PANTHEISTIC    PHILOSOPHY.  109 

algebraic  expressions  for  the  powers  of  quantities, 
a^,  «2,  a^.  The  real  existences,  or  the  proper 
thino^s,  are  of  three  kinds  or  degress  ;  viz. 

1.  (a^)    The  ponderous,  or  mere  matter. 

2.  (a^)   The  light,  or  moiion,  power,  force. 

3.  (a^)   The  living,  or  organic  beings. 

The  crown  and  complement  of  all  these  real 
existences,  are(l)  3Ian,  the  microcosm  or  world 
in  miniature  ;  and  (2.)  The  external  Universe, 
as  a  whole. 

The  ideal  existences  are  also  of  three  kinds  or 
degress;  viz. 

1.  (a^)  Truth,  the  subject  of  knowledge  and 
ideas. 

2.  (a-)  Goodness,  the  subject  of  religion  and 
feeling. 

3.  (a^)  Beauty,  the  subject  of  taste  and  the 
arts. 

The  crown  and  complement  of  the  ideal%x\s- 
tences,  are  (1)  Society  ;  and  (2)  the  History  of 
man  or  of  the  human  race. 

Schelling  has  devoted  himself  chiefly  to  the 
developments  of  the  Absolute  in  nature,  or  to 
the  real  side  of  his  system  ;  and  has  only  occa- 
sionally, and  in  geneial  terms,  explained  his 
views  of  the  ideal  and  moral  side  of  his  scheme. 
Respecting  morals,  he  maintains  that  to  Icnow 
God  is  the  foundation  of  ail  morality  :  and  that 


110  PANTHEISTIC    PHILOSOPHY. 

there  can  be  no  moral  world,  unless  there  is  a 
God.  Virtue  is  a  state,  in  whicli  the  soul  acts 
agreeably  to  the  internal  necessity  of"  its  nature, 
and  not  conformably  to  some  law  wiihout.  Mo- 
rality is  nho  /lappiness  ;  for  happiness  is  not  a 
mere  perquisite  of  virtue,  but  is  virtue  itself. 
The  tendency  of  the  soul  to  be  in  union  with 
its  center  God,  is  morality.  Civil  Socitty  is  col- 
lective life  conformed  to  the  primitive  divine  im- 
age, so  far  as  respects  religion,  science,  and  the 
arts.  It  is  an  exterior  organization  of  a  selt- 
erected  harmony  in  the  department  of  freedom 
itself.  Hi&tory  as  a  whole,  is  a  gradually  devel- 
oping revelation  of  the  Absolute  or  of  God. 
Beauty  is  "  the  infinite  represented  as  finite." 
Art^  as  an  ability  to  represent  ideas  to  the  senses, 
is  a  clear  perception  of  God  by  the  mind. 

Tennemann  objects  to  this  pliilosophy  :  (1) 
Th[fl  it  subverts  all  virtue  and  moral  obligation, 
by  subjecting  every  thing  to  blind  fatality,  or  to  a 
natural  necessity  ;  for  God  must  develope  him- 
self;  and  whatever  occurs,  must  occur,  from  the 
very  laws  of  nature.  There  is  therefore  no 
freedom  of  action,  and  of  course  no  virtue,  and 
no  morality,  in  any  being  whatever.  (2)  The 
system  has  no  basis  or  foundation  ;  for  the  Ab- 
solute^ in  which  all  things  are  said  to  originate,  is 
a  sheer  nothing.     Because  an  absolute^  i.   e.  an 


PANTHEISTIC    PHILOSOPHY.  Ill 

abstract  Identity^  without  any  relative  Identity, 
or  without  any  things  which  are  identical^  can 
have  no  existence.  (3)  The  form  of  this  system 
has  only  the  appearance  of  being  scientific.  It 
exhibits  no  substantial  proofs,  no  scientific  de- 
ductions, but  only  positive  assumptions  and 
naked  hypotheses.  (4)  It  presumptuously 
claims  to  have  a  perfect  knowledge  of  God  ;  and 
it  identifies  him  with  external  nature,  and  is  so 
far  jjantheism  ;  and  moreover  it  subjects  God  to 
the  higher  conditions  or  laws  of  his  nature,  and 
therefore  denies  him  all  freedom  of  action.  As 
a  whole,  it  is  rather  ihe poetry  than  ilm philosophy 
of  a  reasoning  mind. 

The  pantheistic  principle  of  Spinoza,  or  the 
doctrine  that  God  developes  and  expands  him- 
self into  the  existing  universe,  which  Schelling 
thus  revived  and  made  the  basis  of  his  philoso- 
phy, was  eagerly  adopted  by  vast 'numbers  in 
Germany  ;  and  many  who  did  not  follow  Schel- 
ling's  opinions  on  other  points,  embraced  this 
doctrine  as  true,  and  as  shedding  much  light  on 
philosophy.  Hence  in  different  ways  it  was 
wrought  into  various  new  systems  of  philosophy, 
of  which  it  was  made  to  be  an  essential  element. 
Even  FicHTE  himself,  when  he  found  how  ab- 
Ijorrentto  public  sentiment  was  his  former  doc- 
trine, (namely  that  God  is  only  the  moral  order 


112  PANTHEISTIC    PHILOSOPHY. 

of  the  vvorl(J,)  did  not  hesitate  to  adopt  Schel- 
ling's  idea  of  an  Absolute  Existence,  from  which 
every  thing  finite  is  propaj^ated  or  evolved. — 
From  the  year  1804,  till  his  death  in  1813,  instead 
of  maintaininjr,  as  he  had  done,  that  the  /or  the 
human  mind  is  the  only  real  existence  in  the  uni- 
verse, antecedent  to  which  nothing  real  ever  exist- 
ed, and  around  and  above  which  nothing  real 
now  exists,  he  acknowledged  an  eternal  self-ex- 
isting God  to  be  the  only  and  the  living  source 
of  all  being;  and  that  He,  by  developing  him- 
self, ffivesrea/  though  not  independent  existence 
to  all  human  minds.  These  finite  human  minds 
are  still  the  /  of  philosophy  ;  and  as  they  are 
divine  in  their  origin  and  nature,  being  a  part  of 
God  himself,  they  are  capable  of  understanding 
and  knowing  God,  and  of  loving  and  serving 
him.  As  to  the  external  woild,  or  the  noUl,  it  is 
altogether  inanimate  and  lifeless  ;  it  is  no  part  of 
the  divine  nature  or  essence,  but  is  merely  the 
abutting  and  bounding  of  the  acts  of  God  and  of 
human  minds,  or  the  voluntary  limitations  which 
the  acts  affix  to  themselves;  and  therefore  they 
are  merely  ic?ea/things,  the  creations  of  the  sponta- 
neous activityofthe  living  or  real  beings,  viz.  God 
and  his  progeny.  Fichte  therefore  no  longer  made 
the  /the  sole  foundation  and  source  of  all  phi- 
losophy ;  but  rather  assumed  a  new  foundation, 


PANTHEISTIC    PHILOSOPHY.  113 

namely,  tlie  idea  of  God^  of  which  the  /,  from 
its  participation  in  the  divine  nature,  is  capable 
of  an  immediate  and  true  knoweledge.  l^ut  the 
general  opinion  of  the  learned  was,  that 
Fichte's  new  principle  was  entirely  irrecon- 
cilable with  all  his  former  doctrines.  And 
hence  his  attempt  to  improve  his  system  and  to 
render  it  more  acceptable  to  the  public,  only  tend- 
ed to  convince  people  that  it  had  no  solid  founda- 
tion ;  and  thus  to  induce  his  followers  to  leave 
his  school,  and  seek  for  other  guides-  in  philoso- 
phy. 

Professor  Fred.  Bcuterwek,  of  .Gottingen, 
likewise  supposed  that  there  is  but  one  real  eX' 
istence  in  the  universe  ;  and  that  this  absolute 
Existence  pervades  all  things,  and  constitutes 
their  reality.  Whatever  is  leal^  or  whatever 
truly  exists,  is  a  development  of  the  Absolute, 
or  of  this  one  real  Existence:  all  else  is  merely 
imaginary,  or  ideal,  and  destitute  of  objectivity. 
And  therefore,  to  have  any  true  objective  knowl- 
edge of  things,  or  to  understand  and  know  when 
our  conceptions  have  objective  reality,  must  be 
simply  to  apprehend  the  presence  or  the  absence 
of  the  Absolute  ;  that  is,  it  is  merely  to  perceive 
where  the  Absolute  exists,  and  where  there  is  only 
the  deceptive  appearance  of  its  presence.  But 
mere  thinking  and  reasoning  discursively  on  the 
8 


114  PANTHEISTIC    PHILOSOPHY. 

subject  can  n^ver  detect  the  presence  of  the  Ab- 
solute ;  lor  all  iliinkiiig  and  discursive  reasoning 
have  to  assume  it  as  already  known.  And  hence 
reason  must  possess  an  absolute /?o?z:£r  of  knuW' 
ing  the  real ;  a  power  whicli  neither  thinks  nor 
feels,  hut  which  is  the  foundation  of  all  thinking 
andfeelinor  on  the  subject.  Entertaining  these 
views,  Professor  Boulerwek  published  in  1799, 
whiit  he  called  an  Apodictlc,  or  a  demonstration 
of  true  knowedge  ;  in  which  he  maintained  that 
the  human  mind,  as  it§elf  partaking  of  the  Abso- 
lute, has  immediate  j)crcepiicm  or  knowledge  of 
the  presence  or  absence  of  reality  in  the  objects 
of  its  contemplation.  But  after  a  few  years,  re- 
calling this  opinion,  he  maintained  th^it  reason 
can  have  no  immediate  intuitions  of  the  Abso- 
lute himself,  or  of  his  actual  presence  in  objects  ; 
nevertheless,  feeling  her  power  to  rise  above 
mere  sense,  reason  confides  in  her  conclusions  or 
judgments  respecting  the  presence  of  the  Abso- 
lute. He  moreover  asserted,  that  it  is  the  proper 
business  of  philosophy  to  investigate  this  whole 
subject ;  and  to  ascertain  definitely  how  far  rea- 
son can  go  in  detecting  the  presence  or  absence 
of  the  Absolute  in  objects,  and  where  we  must 
be  contented  with  mere  probabilities  on  this  great 
question. 
Professor  C.  G.  Bardili,  of  Stutgard,  brought 


PANTHEISTIC    PHILOSOPHY.  115 

out  in  1900  a  new  method  of  connecting  the  Ab- 
solute, or  the  Original-One^  (Ur-Eius,  as  he 
denominated  it,)  with  philosophy.  This  Origi- 
nal-One is  the  subject  matter  of  all  logical  think- 
ing :  so  that  Logic  is  a  real  science,  and  the 
only  true  metaphysics.  All  logical  thinkings 
moreover,  is  computation  or  reckoning,  in  the 
mathematical  sense.  That  is,  it  is  the  perpetual 
repetition  and  involution  of  one  and  the  same 
unit,  the  Original-One.  But  abstract  thinking 
has  reference  to  no  definite  object  or  finite  being. 
It  therefore  does  not  afford  us  any  objective 
knowledge,  until  we  apply  it  to  some  definite 
object.  It  only  shews  us  what  is  possible  in  the 
nature  of  things.  But  when  we  apply  it  to  any 
definite  object,  then  real  or  objective  matter  is 
brought  into  the  process:  and  a  judgment  is 
formed  of  that  object,  by  which  the  object  is 
pronounced  to  be  a  real  existence,  or  only  a 
possible  existence.  This  seeras  to  be  the  amount 
of  his  obscure  treatise,  entitled  the  Elements  of 
the  first  Logic,  <fec.,  which  puzzled  the  brains  of 
speculators  for  a  lime,  and  then  was  rejected  as 
a  baseless  phantom. 

Professor  C.  A.  Eschenmayer,  of  Tubingen, 
at  first  agreed  very  well  with  Schelhng;  but  io 
1803,  he  departed  essentially  from  him,  by  main- 
taioiDg  that  the  Absolute  which  reason  intuits,  if 


116  PANTHEISTIC    PHILOSOPHY. 

not  directly  and  immediately  the  Absolute  him- 
gelfjthe  primary  source  of  all  that  exists ;  but  is  only 
an  image  or  likeness  of  him.  And  hence  philo- 
sophical knowledge  is  far  more  limited,  than 
Schelling's  theory  supposes.  The  comprehensi- 
ble and  the  explicable  fall  within  the  sphere  of 
knowledge  or  philosophy  ;  but  the  Absolute  him- 
self, and  whatever  is  incomprehensible  and  inex- 
plicable, belong  to  the  sphere  o^  faith  or  religion. 

So  also  professor  J.  Wagner,  of  Wurtzburg, 
left  the  ranks  of  Schelling's  adherents  in  1804, 
and  has  ever  since  philosophized  in  his  own  way. 
The  Absolute  himself,  says  Wagner,  is  no  ob- 
ject of  our  direct  knowledge  :  but  the  created 
universe  is  the  living  form  of  him  ;  and  the  laws 
of  the  universe  are  the  type  by  which  he  dis- 
plays himself.  Hence  we  must  recognize  him 
as  existing  beyond  our  ken,  and  as  knowable 
only  through  the  laws  of  nature.  And  as  math- 
ematics is  the  science  which  best  investigates  and 
defines  the  laws  of  nature,  philosophy  must  de- 
pend chiefly  on  that  science,  in  connexion  with 
the  history  of  man  and  the  study  of  nature. 

Professor  C.  C.  F.  Krause,  of  Gottingen, 
coincided  with  the  leading  views  of  Eschen- 
lijayer,  as  above  stated.  He  held  the  Absolute, 
or  th€  Original  Beings  (das  Urwesen,  as  he  chose 
to  c^li  him,)   to  be  the  Eternal,  far  above  both 


PANTHEISTIC    PHILOSOPHY.  117 

ihe  natural  and  the  intellectual  worlds,  those  two 
spheres  into  which  the  created  universe  divides 
itself;  and  yet  he  is  the  essential  principle  of 
both,  pervading  them  and  giving  them  life  and 
being,  though  not  discoverable  by  us.  In  his 
opinion,  philosophy  naturally  divides  itself  into 
— (1)  General  Philosophy,  or  Ontology  ; — (2) 
Intellectual  Philosophy  ;- — (3)  Philosophy  of 
nature:— and  (4)  Synthetic  Philosophy. 


CHAPTER    XI. 

PANTHEISTIC    PHILOSOPHY. 

Hegel's  absolute  Idealism :  Logic  the  only  Metaphysics. 

The  most  famous  and  the  most  recent  of  the 
German  pantheists  who  liave  attempted  to  im- 
prove upon  Schelling,  is  Dr.  Geo.  Wm.  Fred. 
Hegel,  a  professor  at  Berlin,  who  died  in  1831, 
at  the  age  of  61.  He  was  born  at  Stuttgard, 
and  educated  at  Tubingen,  where  lie  became  in- 
timate witli  Schelling,  and  adopted  and  for  a  time 
defended  his  philosophy.  But  at  length,  gradu- 
ally deviating  from  Schelling,  he  set  up  a  new 
school,  which  became  very  popular,  and  has  of 
late  altogether  eclipsed  that  of  his  former  friend. 

Both  maintained  the  identity  of  God  and  the 
universe,  and  the  perfect  coincidence  between 
subjective  and  objective  knowledge.  But  He- 
gel's was  a  system  of  absolute  idealism  ;  while 
Schelling's  was  rather  a  system  of  realism.  For 
Schelling,  like  Spinoza,  considered  the  original 
All-One  as  a  real  substance,  which  evolved  itself 
into  the  existing  universe  :  but  Hegel  considered 
mere  ideas  or  conceptions,  as  the  only  real  exis- 
tences ;  he  believed,  that  there  is  nothing  in  the 


PANTHEISTIC    PHILOSOPHY.  119 

universe  more  substantial  or  more  real  than  what 
he  calls  concrete  ideas  and  conceptions.  Ajrain  ; 
Schelling  supposed,  that  reason  has  direct  intui- 
tion oi  ihe  true  nature  of  tilings,  or  of  tlie  ob- 
jects existing  around  us  and  without  us:  but 
Hegel  denied  any  such  intuition  of  objects  with- 
out ;  and  maintained,  tiiat  the  mind  only  looks 
inward  upon  itself,  its  conceptions  and  ideas, 
and  by  analyzing  thern  arrives  at  all  philosophi- 
cal knowledge.  And  hence,  according  to  He- 
gel, a  logical  analysis  of  ideas  and  conceptions, 
is  the  only  real  metaphysics,  or  the  true  and 
proper  science  of  things  ;  and  Logic,  instead  of 
being,  what  it  has  generally  been  regarded,  a 
merely /o?'w<r// science,  or  one  that  treats  only  of 
the  abstract  forms  of  thought  and  the  laws  of 
correct  reasoning,  is  really  and  truly  a  science  of 
things,  and  the  only  source  of  true  philosophical 
knowledge. 

In  accordance  with  these  views,  Hegel  divides 
all  philosophy  into  three  parts  ;  namely,  the 
science  of  Looic,  or  philosophy  in  general  ;  the 
philosophy  of  nature  ;  and  the  philosophy  of 
mind.  The  first  part,  called  Logic,  is  the  science 
of  things  in  general,  and  corres|)onds  with  what 
is  usually  termed  Ontology  and  pure  Metaphys- 
ics. The  second  part,  the  philosophy  of  nature, 
treats  of  time   and  space,   matter  and   motion, 


120  PANTHEISTIC    PHILOSOPHY, 

material  bodies  and  llieir  properties,  and  of  or- 
ganic nature,  geoloj^y,  vegetables,  and  animals, 
Tiie  third  part,  the  pliiiotiophy  of  mind,  treats 
of  the  human  soul  and  its  faculties,  of  right  and 
wrong,  morality  and  duty,  and  of  the  arts,  reli- 
gion, and  pliilosophy.  Only  the  first  part  has 
been  fully  developed  by  the  author,  in  his  Science 
of  Logic,  in  two  vols.  8vo.  first  printed  in  1812 
and  1816.  But  he  has  given  us  a  general  trea- 
tise covering  the  whole  ground  in  his,  encyclo- 
paedia of  the  philosophical  Sciences,  in  one  vol. 
8vo,  first  published  in  1817,  and  again  in  1827 
and  1830.  Both  these  works  are  now  before 
me. 

Hegel  is  the  most  unintelligible  writer  I  ever 
read.  Even  the  most  acute  German  philoso- 
phers complain  of  his  style,  as  being  not  onlj 
very  harsh  and  (\ry^  but  so  extremely  obscure 
that  they  cannot  fully  understand  him.  Al- 
though abundantly  warned  on  this  point,  1  had 
the  temerity  to  take  up  his  Encyclopaedia,  and 
read  it  attentively  from  beginning  to  end,  and 
gome  parts  of  it  a  secoinl,  a  third,  and  even  a 
fourth  time,  comparing  it  ofi»m  with  his  Logic, 
vainly  hoping  to  get  some  idea  of  thai  logical 
analysis  which  he  tells  us  is  the  bnsis  of  all  phi- 
losophy. But,  after  a  fortnight's  hard  study,  I 
was  nearly  as  ignorant  of  the  whole  process^and 


PANTHEISTIC    PHILOSOPHY.  121 

of  every  part  of  it,  as  wlien  I  first  sat  down  to 
examine  it.  The  most  1  could  learn,  was,  that 
he  commences  with  the  idea  of  entity  (das 
Seyn)  in  the  abstract.  He  then  tells  us,  that  his 
second  definition  of  entity,  is,  that  it  is  nothing 
(das  Nichts)  ;  and  that  the  union  of  entity  and 
nothing,  or  the  transition  of  the  one  into  the 
Other,  constitutes  actual  existence  (das  Daseyn); 
which,  he  say>!,  may  be  illustrated  by  the  verb 
to  become  (loerden),  as  whatever  becomes  any 
thing,  pasj^es  over  from  not  being  ihai  thing,  to 
heing  th.it  thing.  It  may  also  be  illustrated  by 
the  import  of  the  noun  beginning  (An fang),  as 
beginning  is  a  transition  from  non  existence  to 
existence.  After  advancing  thus  far,  I  found 
myself  in  the  midst  of  water  so  deep  and  so  tur- 
bid, that  I  could  neither  reach  nor  see  tiie  bot- 
tom. Still  I  sut^ered  him  to  carry  me  forward. 
When  he  had  fully  analyzed  and  explained,  as 
he  averred,  all  that  is  material  in  the  idea  of 
pure  entity,  he  proceeded  to  analyze  and  explain 
the  idea  of  being  (Wesen)y  or  thing,  in  the  ab- 
stract;  and  then  the  \deiis  o(  phenomenon,  and 
actuality,  and  lastly  of  conception,  and  object, 
and  ideas.  This  closed  the  first  part.  Qn  the 
philosophy  of  nature  and  of  mind,  he  was  equal- 
ly obscure  and  incompreliensible :  I  could  un- 
dej-stand  only  here  Qnd  there  a  detached  thought.  ^^^ 


If52  PANTHEISTIC    PHILOSOPHY. 

As  I  am  unable  to  comprehend  liis  works  my- 
self, I  can  (Jo  nothing  better  than  detail  the  opin- 
ions of  others.  I  will  therefore  translate  from 
Krug,  (Eiicyclop.  Philosoph.  Lexicoti,)  such 
parts  of  his  statements  as  seem  most  deserving 
a  place  in  these  sketches. 

In  the  body  of  his  work,  as  printed  in  1833, 
KruiTihus  writes:  "Hegel  was  at  first  a  true 
follower  of  Schelling,  wi:h  whom  he  united  in 
publishing  a  critical  Journal  of  Philosophy, 
Tubiiijr.  1802—3.  In  this  period  of  his  philoso- 
phizing also  appeared  his  Tract  on  the  differ- 
ence between  Fichte's  system  and  that  of  Schel- 
ling.  But  he  gradually  separated  himself  from 
his  master,  and  rejected  in  particular  his  doc- 
trine of  intellectual  intuition,  as  being  an  unwar- 
ranted assumption.  Yet  he  retained  Schelling's 
fundamental  idea,  namely,  the  oneness  of  the 
subjective  or  ideal  and  of  the  objective  or  real  ; 
and  in  the  idea  of  this  oneness  he  searches  for 
that  absolute  knowledge  and  absolute  truth,  to 
which,  according  to  the  demands  of  this  school 
philosophizing  must  soar.  Hetice  also,  he  main- 
tained that  pure  conception  in  itself,  is  entity  ;  and 
that  real  entity  is  nothing  but  pure  conception. 
And  this  he  does,  without  first  demotistrating  the 
unity  of  entity  and  conception,  or,  as  it  should  be 
called,  (since  conception  is  only  the  product  of  the 


PANTHEISTIC    PHILOSOPHY.  123 

thinkinor  mind,)  llie  oneness  ofentity  and  tMnlcing, 
Equally  arbitrary  is  his  assertion,  in  a  practical 
view,  lliat  whatever  is  rational  is  actual,  and 
whatever  is  actual  is  also  rational  ;  a  position, 
which  may  be  considered  as  making  moral  pre- 
cepts, viewed  as  demands  of  reason  upon  the 
will,  altogether  nugatory  and  superfluous,  since 
the  will  can  make  nothing  to  be  real,  but  what 
will  thereby  become  rational.  But  the  weakest 
part  of  Hegel's  system  is  the  aisiheiical  or  the 
philosophy  of  art,  and  the  theological  or  the  phi- 
losoj)l'y  of  religion.  And  here,  one  who  was 
formerly  a  \(iYy  warm  advocate  of  his  system, 
but  who  on  a  better  acquaintance  with  it  cooled 
down  considerably,  (Wtisse,  in  his  Syst.  of 
^sthtnics,)  says,  that  iEstlielics  and  Theology 
begin,  where  Hegel  leaves  olF;  for,  '  what  we 
call  ideas  of  the  Beautifid  and  of  God,  Hegel 
recognizes  only  as  to  their  psychological  and 
historical  apparition;  that  is,  he  con.-iders  them 
as  ))henomena,  and  the  science  of  them  as  a 
part  of  the  phenomenology  of  mind.'  In  short, 
Hegel  seems^ioito  have  fully  perfected  his  sys- 
tem. And  as  he  was  any  thing  rather  than  a 
master  in  the  art  of  composition,  and  as  his  writ- 
ings suffer  as  much  from  their  obscurity  as  from 
a  sort  of  dry  harshness,  it  is  scarcely  possible  to 
form  a  satisfactory  judgment  of  his   philosophy.  > 


124  PANTHEISTIC    PHILOSOPHY. 

Those  who  profess  to  comprehend  it,  discover  in 
it  the  consummated  system  of  pure  rational 
science.  *******  Moreover,  it 
is  a  strikinij  fact,  tliat  among  llie  numerous  fol- 
lowers of  Heijel,  no  one  has  hitherto  heen  able 
to  remove  the  obscurity,  heaviness,  and  drynesa 
of  his  mode  of  philosopliizintf,  by  a  more  clear, 
agreeable,  and  lively  exhibition.  All  use  the 
words,  the  phrases,  and  the  turns  of  expression 
of  their  master  ;  as  if  they  were  magic  formu- 
las, which  would  lose  their  power  by  the  slight- 
est change.  Jurare  in  verba  mogistri  seems  to 
be  no  stranger  in  tins  school.  Yet  this  renown- 
ed philosopher,  who  received  special  favor  from 
the  great, and  thereby  gained  the  more  adherents, 
did  not  fail  of  opposers  who  assailed  him  with 
more  or  less  ardor."  After  recounting  various 
attacks  upon  Hegel's  system,  Krug  proceeds  : 
"It  may  here  be  asked,  whether  this  school  will 
be  able  to  sustain  itself  long,  against  so  many 
and  certainly  not  inconsiderable  oj)posers.  To 
us  it  appears,  this  school  no  lonjjer  has  internal 
union  ;  and  therefore  it  is  n()l  lil^dy  to  escape 
dissolution,  whatever  may  be  d(Uie  from  without 
tobolst(Tit  up,  on  the  false  supposition  that  it  is' 
better  suited  iban  any  other  to  sustain  the  exist- 
ing order  of  thinjrs  in  church  and  slate.  Even 
the  founder  of  it  himself  seems  to  iiave  had  some 


PANTHEISTIC    PHILOSOPHY.  125 

presentiment  of  such  a  result.  For,  afjreeabJy  to 
a  letter  from  Berlin,  (inserted  in  a  Periodical, 
Dec.  17,  1831 J  wiiicli  in  general  speaks  favora- 
bly of  HegeL  he  said  a  little  before  he  died,  that 
he  was  anxious  respecting  ihe  fate  of  his  philos- 
pliy  after  his  decease,  hecanse  among  all  his  dis- 
ciples only  one  understood  him,  and  that  one 
misunderstood  him." 

In  his  supplemental  volume,  printed  in  1838, 
Krug  resumes  his  account  of  Hegel,  thus; 
"  The  three  principal  parts  of  his  system,  are  ; 
Logic^  as  being  the  science  of  idea  in  itself  (an 
sich)  ;  Philosophy  of  Nature,  as  being  the 
science  of  idea  in  its  secondary  state  (in  ihrem 
Andersein);  and  Philosophy  of  Mind,  as  being 
the  science  of  idea  in  its  reversion  from  its  sec- 
ondary state  into  itself.  Accordingly,  there  ap- 
pears every  where  in  this  system  a  triplicity'of 
subjects,  together  witli  their  reconciling  unity,  in 
which  they  are  all  contained  as  momenta  or  ele- 
ments. In  this  system  th(;  oneness  of  Entity 
and  Conception  is  vindicated,  on  tiie  ground  of 
a  supposed  necessity  inherent  in  Conception  to 
move  (develop)  itself;  and  this  it  docs,  by  a 
progressive  negation  ;  so  that,  e.  g.  Entity,  by  a 
negation  of  itself,  passes  into  Existence  ;  and 
God,  by  a  negation  of  himself,  passes  into  a 
World  ;  &c.  For  God   is  in  self  (an  sich)^  and 


126  PANTHEISTIC    PHILOSOPHY. 

must  also  be  for  self  (fur  sich) ;  in  order  to 
which,  he  must  become  his  second  self  ( semem 
Andern),  and  this  is  Nature,  or  the  World.  So 
in  Heorel's  Lectures  on  tlie  Piiilos.  of  Rehgion, 
(published  by  Marheineke  in  1832f  this  funda- 
mental tlio\iglit  is  variously  drawn  out,  that  God 
is  the  eternal,  all-comprelieiiding:  process  of  the 
absolute  idea,  which  returns  from  the  form  of  its 
secondary  state  (ilires  Anderseins),  its  manifes- 
tation in  nature,  into  itself,  and,  by  means  of 
human  consciousness,  attains  to  its  individuality 
(ihrem  Fursichsein)  as  Spirit.  That  this  doc- 
trine comes  near  to  Pantheism,  is  not  to  be  denied; 
notwithstanding  Hegel  and  his  school  will  not 
admit  it,  and  by  the  use  of  biblical  and  religious 
phraseology — to  which  however  they  annex  a 
new  and  professedly  deeper  and  more  occult 
meaning,  they  endeavor  to  give  to  their  doctrine 
a  colormg  of  orthodoxy.  And  hence  Eschen- 
mayer  (in  his  Tract  entitled,  Hegel's  religious 
philosophy  compared  with  the  principles  of 
Christianity,  p.  100,)  passes  the  following  judg- 
ment on  this  philosophy  :  '  It  is  nothing  but  a 
Logic  vaunting  itself  in  Christian  verities.'  And 
he  goes  on,  perhaps  with  too  much  severity : 
'*  Hegel  has  a  God  without  holiness,  a  Christ 
without  free  love,  a  Holy  Ghost  without  illumina- 
tioD,  a  Gospel  without  faith,  an  Apostasy  with- 


PANTHEISTIC    PHILOSOPHY.  127 

out  sin,  Wickedness  witliout  conscious  guilt,  an 
Atonement  without  remission  of  sin,  a  Death 
without  an  oflerin<(,  a  religious  Assembly  with- 
out divine  worship,  a  Release  without  imputa- 
tion, Justice  without  a  judge,  Grace  without  re- 
demption, Dogmatic  Theology  without  a  revela- 
tion, a  this  Side  without  a  that  side,  an  Immor- 
tality witliout  a  personal  existence,  a  Christian 
Religion  without  Christianity,  and  in  general,  a 
Religion  without  religion.'  And  in  an  Article 
on  Hegel's  philosophy,  (in  the  Allg.  Kirchenzeit. 
1836,)  in  which  the  religious  and  ecclesiastical 
part  of  this  philosophy  is  particularly  reviewed, 
the  following  severe  judgment  is  pronounced  : 
'Hegel's  philosophy  is  nothing  in  itself  and  bi/ 
itself ^  nor  was  its  author  in  himself  hut  beside 
himself.^  Compare  also  the  Words  of  a  Lay- 
man on  the  Hegelian-Straussian  Christology. 
Zurich  1836,  8vo.  No  less  unsatisfactory  have 
the  explorers  of  nature  found  Hegel's  theory  of 
the  philosophy  of  nature.  Thus  Link^  (in  his 
Propylaen  &.c.  vol.  I.  p.  46.)  tells  us,  that  HegePa 
system,  although  framed  with  the  greatest  meta- 
physical acuteness,  *  is  of  no  value  in  the  science 
of  nature  ;  indeed,  it  is  painful  to  see  what  blun- 
ders Hegel  makes,  when  he  speaks  on  subjects 
of  natural  science,  astronomy  and  mathematics. 
He  is  also  so  dictatorial  and  so  bitter,  that  one 


128  PANTHEISTIC    PIIILOSOPHV. 

would    laugh    over  him,    if  it  were  a  la«jghable 
thing  to  see  such  a  man  so  self-deceived.'  " 

After  these  ren)aiks,    Krug  fills    nearly  three 
large  8vo  paores  with   notices   of  the   numerous 
works  for  and  against  Hegel's  philos(){)liy,  which 
issued  from   the  German    press  durini;  about  12 
years  ending  in    1837.     After  Hegel's  death  in 
1831,  his  devoted  followers  and  admirers,  (chief- 
ly young  men,  in  and  around  Berlin,)  resolutely 
met  the  asisailants   of  his  system,    and  exerted 
themselves  strenuously  to  recommend  it  and  give 
it  currency.     For   this  end   they    collected  and 
published    a    voluminous    edition     of    Hegel's 
Works,   including   his  private  letters,   and   his 
manuscripts  and  notes  for  Lectures,  with  elabo- 
rate prefaces    and  introductions.     On   the   other 
hand,  numerous  adversaries,  (and   among  them 
were  many  of  the  older  and  graver  philosophers,) 
assailed  the  Hegelian   phdosophy  in   an  uncom- 
promising  manner.      They    analyzed    it,   they 
confuted  it,  ihey  ridiculed    it,  and  held   it  up  to 
scorn  and  contempt.     The   issue  of  the  conflict^ 
I  have  not  the  means  of  knowing. 


CHAPTER   Xn. 

INSTINCTIVE    PHILOSOPHY. 

Instinctire  Philosophy.  JacohVs  Philosophy  of  Faith  or  Instinct.  His 
followers :  Koeppen,  von  fVeiller,  Sulat.  Ability  and  Honesty  of 
the  German  Philosophers.     Schuhe,  the  only  Skeptic  among  them. 

We  have  now  taken  a  brief  view  of  most  of 
those  systems  of  German  [)hilosophy,  which 
profess  to  give  us  a  true  and  scieniific  knowledge 
of  supersensible  thii)g.s;  of  whicli,  Kant  tells  us^ 
we  can  have  no  scientific  knowledge.  And  we 
find,  that  all  these  systems  end,  eitiier  in  absolute 
Idealism,  or  in  what  may  be  called  Pahtheism  ; 
that  is,  they  either  make  all  noumena  and  all 
supersensible  things,  together  with  their  phe- 
nomena, to  be  nothing  but  conceptions  and  ideas 
existing  in  our  own  mii)ds,  and  existing  no  where 
else ;  or  they  reduce  all  things  to  one  primal 
substance,  the  All-One,  or  God,  which  develop! 
itself  according  to  certain  laws  inherent  in  ite 
very  nature,  and  thereliy  presents  to  us  all  the 
variety,  beauty,  and  harmony  of  this  great  uni- 
verse. And  the  latest  and  most  renowned  of 
these  philosophers  makes  this  primal  All-One  to 
be  himself  nothing  but  an  idea' or  conception  of 
the  human  mind. 
9 


130         INSTINCTIVE  PHILOSOPHY. 

0|)posecl  to  all  these  scliools,  and  also  to  th« 
Kanteari  school,  was  the  ceh^hraled  Fred.  Henrj 
Jacobi,  and  a  very  resf)eclah!c  number  of  piiiios- 
ophers  and  divines  who  coincideii  wiih  liim  in 
his  general  views.  Of  this  school  we  now  pro- 
ceed to  givn  some  account. 

Fred.  Hrnry  Jacobf,  privy  counselor  to  the 
king  of  Bavaria,  and  prcfiident  of  the  royal 
academy  of  soierice  at  Muniih,  was  di^iinguisb- 
cd  as  a  fine  writer,  a  poet,  and  a  philosopher. 
He  died  at  Munich  in  1819,  iiiied  7G.  Disgusted 
with  the  speculations  of  the  pliilosophers  around 
him,  he  assailed  ihecn  all  in  their  turn,  yet  with 
candor  and  disciimination.  He  was  also  more 
intent  on  overthrowing  false  systems,  than  on 
propanaiiiig  a  better  one  of  his  own  devising. 
To  Kant  he  awarded  jjreat  merit,  for  successful- 
ly prostrating  the  delusive  speculations  of  the 
former  dogmatists,  and  for  establishing  on  a  firm 
basis  a  pure  system  of  moral  or  practical  philos- 
ophy. But  he  thought  that  Kant  laid  too  much 
stress  on  the  necessity  of  demonstration  in  order 
to  true  knowledge  ;  for,  by  this  error,  he  subven- 
ed all  spocuiative  knowledge  of  supersensible 
things,  and  then  was  unable  to  derive  aiiy  satis- 
factory knowledge  of  them  from  practical  rea- 
son. But  the  other  schools,  in  his  view,  were 
still  more  erroneous.     Their  entire  schemes  were 


INSTINCTIVE    PHILOSOPHY.  131 

fundamentally  wrono:,  anJ  when  carried  out, 
would  necessarily  lead  lo  fatalism  and  to  pan- 
theism. 

He  supposed  that  there  is  a  source  of  true 
rational  knowledge,  wiiicli  tliese  philosophers 
overlook.  They  reject  all  speculative  knowl- 
edge, which  can  not  be  traced  eiiher  to  immedi- 
ate rational  inluitiotis,  or  to  logical  deductions 
from  self-evident  truths;  thus  making  the  intui- 
tions of  reason  and  the  legitiuiate  deductions 
from  such  intiiitions  the  only  sources  of  scientific 
Of  philoso[)hical  knowledge.  But  Jacobi  sup- 
posed, thiJt  we  have  true  knowledge  hy  faith  in 
tlie  operations  of  our  own  fiiculiies.  1'hisyaiM, 
be  considers,  as  a  rational  inslinct,  a  knowing 
from  immed\ale  mental  feeling,  n  rlirect  percep' 
Hon  of  the  true  and  the  supersensible,  without 
any  intervejiingproof;  and  of  courst,it  is  entire- 
ly different  from  what  is  ordinarily  called  faith, 
or  a  belief  founded  on  tesdn'on".  And  the 
knowledge  based  on  this  faith,  is  essentially 
differentfromspeculiitive or  scientific  knowledge; 
which  is  generally  only  second-hand  knowledge, 
or  knowledge  derived  from  intervening  evi- 
dence or  proof.  According  to  Jacobi,  there  are 
two  grand  sources  or  itdets  of  knowledge  to  the 
human  mind  :  first,  ci/erwa/  sense^  by  which  we 
acquire  a  knowledge  of  the  external  world  or  of 


132  INSTINCTIVE    PHIL080PBT. 

material  objects ;  and  secondly,  an  internal 
sense^  the  or<;an  of  truth,  (or,  as  he  afterwardf 
named  it,  Reason^  the  [)ovver  of  immediate 
kno\vledge,)  by  wliieli  we  acquire  a  knowledge 
of  God,  of  what  is  foreseen,  of  free  agency,  of 
immortality,  of  virtue,  in  a  word  of  supersensible 
things.  By  this  twoluld  revelation  to  him,  (and 
Jacobi  believed  in  no  oiher  divine  revelation,) 
man  is  roused  to  self-consciousness,  with  a  feel- 
ing of  his  elevation  above  blind  nature,  or  of  hit 
free  agency.  He  recognizes  God,  and  his  own 
free  agency,  immediately,  by  means  of  Reason, 
Moral  doctrines  also  are  capable  of  confirma- 
tion only  by  feeling.  Reason^  as  being  ihe  facul- 
ty of  ideaSj  which  reveal  themselves  in  our  in- 
most feelings,  iiives  to  philosophy  its  subject  mat- 
ter; and  the  Understandings  as  being  the  faculty 
of  conceptions^  gives  to  that  subject  matter  its 
form.  At  least,  so  Jacobi  expresses  himself  in 
his  latest  writings.  Previoiisly  he  did  not  ex- 
plain himself  with  sufficient  clearness,  respecting 
iXvAi  faith  or  internal  revelation  which  he  regard- 
ed as  the  foundation  of  philosophy;  but  left  the 
point  in  considerable  obscurity.  And  from  tbit 
source,  and  from  his  not  making  a  clear  distinc- 
tion between  Reason  and  Understanding,  and 
finally,  from  the  fact  that  his  theistic  doctnne  of 
faith  and  internal  feeling  was   developed  in  a 


INSTINCTIVE  PHILOSOPHY.         133 

loose  and  unsystematic}  manner,  chiefly  in  oppo- 
sition to  others,  various  misapprehensions  and 
objections  originated.  Still  his  merits,  at  least 
indirectly,  in  rejrard  to  the  progress  of  philoso- 
phy among  the  Germans,  are  undeniable.— 
(Tennem.  Grundritz,  p.  531  &c.) 

Jacobi's  doctrine  was  well  received,  especially 
by  those  who  place  a  higher  value  on  faith  and 
feeling  than  on  the  other  manifestations  of  the 
mind.  On  the  contrary,  it  was  regarded  as  a 
subordinate  mode  of  philosophizing  by  those, 
who  give  rational  thiidiing  a  higher  rank  than 
feeliiii!;.  I5ut  his  want  of  clearness  in  discrimi- 
nating bf'tween  Reason  and  Understanding, 
ieem.s  to  have  led  the  cultivators  of  his  philoso- 
phy to  separate  into  two  parties.  For,  some 
considered  ideas  as  a  divine  revelation  to  the 
mind,  through  the  medium  of  Reason  ;  and  they 
Supposed  the  conceptions  of  the  Understanding 
lo  have  a  negative  relation  to  ideas,  or  that  ideas 
<jan  never  be  reached  by  concejdions  ;  that  ideoM 
are  incomprehensible  and  inexplicable,  they 
manifetit  themselves  in  feeling;  and,  that /a i/ A 
preceiles  all  scientific  knowledge.  But  others 
sjlowed  a  wider  sphere  for  conceptions.  Thej 
considered  philosophy  as  consisting  in  the  union 
of  Reason  and  Understanding,  deriving  its  sub- 
stance (Wesseii)  from  the  former,  and  its  form 


134  INSTINCTITE    PHILOSOPHY. 

from  the  latter:  and  to  this  opinion,  Jacobi,  in 
his  latter  years,  was  nif)st  inclined.  In  the  first 
party,  Frederic  Koeppen  sUu)d3  cons-p'icmnis  ;  in 
the  latter,  James  Salut.  (Tennem.  p.  533  &/C.) 
Frederic  Rueppi;n,  a  friend  and  pupil  of 
Jacohi,  was  horn  at  Lnhec  in  1775,  was  firsts 
preacher  at  Bremen,  and  llien  a  professor  of 
philosophy  at  Landslmt,  whence  he  retnoved  io 
Munich  in  1826,  and  afterwards  to  Eriangen, 
where  he  prohably  still  lives.  Once  cordially  ab- 
tached  to  his  paternal  friend  and  guide,  he  \\a§ 
since  hecome  dissatisfied  with  Jacohi's  j)hHoso- 
phy,  and  now  devotes  himself  to  the  study  of 
the  ancients,  especially  Plato.  As  a  follower  of 
Jacobi,  he  madeyV6fe  agfncTf  his  starting  point; 
as  Jacobi  himself  did.  Free  agency  is  a  self-de- 
termining, self-originating,  and  perfectly  inde- 
pendent activity.  It  is  therefore  an  ariginal 
cause^  the  ground  of  all  existence;  it  is  Being 
properly  so  called.  But  it  is  absolutely  inconi* 
prehensible  ;  even  its  possibility  can  not  be  clear- 
ly perceived  ;  nor  its  actual  existence  be  demon* 
strated.  Ic  is  an  immediate  matter  of  fact,  in 
our  knowing  and  acting.  Nccessiti/ is  an  order 
of  things  establislied  by  free  agency.  The  Di* 
▼ine  aclivity  is  a  perfect,  absolute  free  agency. 
But  the  essence  of  humanity  is,  a  comhinalion 
of  the  internal   and  the  external   man  ;  and  of 


INSTINCTIVE    PIIILOSOPIIT.  135 

course,  man's  free  airency  is  limited.  And 
hence  philosophy  is  dualistic,  reposing  on  both 
sense  hiuI  reason.  And  from  this  dualism,  arise 
the  insurmr)iintable  contradictions  of  human 
tcience.  And,  we  may  add,  (^ays  Ttimcmann^) 
another  {<j<riti mate  consequence,  namely,  that  OD 
this  grouid,  philosophy  itself  is  impos^ihli^;  and 
the  proltleni,  to  establish  it  as  a  strict  and  proper 
science,  falls  of  itself.  Stili,  as  Tenncmann 
admits,  ^he  publi(.-ati(Mi  of  RorppjMi's  views,  as 
well  as  of  Jacobi's,  had  a  salutary  influence  on 
the  philosophy  if  the  day,  in  as  mm h  as  they 
opposed  the  philosophy  and  the  blmd  dooniaiism 
of  the  vschoois,  and  exhibited  in  a  lively  manner 
many  thoughts,  either  appropriately  their  own, 
or  borr«»\ved  I'rom  Plato. 

To  this  branch  of  Jacobi's  school,  behmged 
Cajetan  von  Weiller,  a  learned  clergyman  of 
the  Romish  church,  secretary  of  the  academy  of 
science  at  Munich,  and  a  distinguished  writer, 
who  died  in  1828,  ag^d  64.  But  he  di<l  not,  like 
Jacobi,  make  faith  or  Jeding  the  sole  basis  of 
philosophy  ;  for  belabored  to  discover  for  it  some 
other  and  moreintelligiblegrounds.  He  was  like- 
wise a  believer  in  supernatural  revelation  ;  which 
Jacobi  was  not.  To  the  same  school  bf-longs. 
Christian  Weiss^  born  in  1774,  first  a  professor 
of  philosophy  at  Leipsic,  and  since,  a  school  and 


i36  IN8TINGTITE    PHILOSOPHT. 

government  counselor  at  Merst^burg,  a  write? 
of  considerable  eminence.  (Krug^  and  Ten* 
nem.) 

Ja.  Salat,  a  liberal  Roman  Catholic  priest- 
born  in  1760,  professor  at  Munich,  and  after- 
wards at  Landsiajt,  where  he  slill  resides,  a 
vohiininons  but  inelegfint  wriier,  is  a  strenuous 
opposer  of  Romish  bijfotry,  as  well  as  of  Schel- 
ling^s  anil  HegeTs  phdo.sophy.  He  tftkes  a  mid- 
dle course  between  Kant  and  Jacubi,  and  found* 
philosophy  on  a  revelatiott  through  the  medium 
of  Reason.  That  of'je.ct'we  thing,  which  is  to  us 
the  ground  of  phdusophy,  has  two  aspects; 
first.,  as  being  the  subject  matter  of  phdosophy; 
and  secondly.,  as  being  the  foundali«ui  in  us  or 
the  innate  faculty  for  philosophiziM<r.  This  na- 
tive faculty,  when  suiial-ly  brought  into  action^ 
develops  itself  in  an  ainiduncctmiii  u{  the  Divine, 
anterior  to  any  sid)jective  actiiui  of  the  mind» 
In  consequence  of  this  announcenieiil,  the  mind 
recognizes  the  Divine,  and  eagerly  seizes  npoD 
it.  This  annouucemeni  is  no  Ijijical  act  of  the 
mind,  but  is  a  realization  of  the  Divine  in  the 
mind's  deepest  recesses  ;  whence  it  {)roceed» 
forth  from  the  will.  If  this  aniu>uMcetiienl  is  ap- 
prehended by  the  mind,  it  is  next  to  be  compre- 
hended, to  be  nunJe  mtellijrible,  and  t»)  become 
iOoaelUing  known  i  and  this  is  what    philosopher 


INSTINCTIVE    PHILOSOPHY.  137 

accomplishes  hy  the  aid  of  Understanding.  He 
considers  Metaphysics  as  tlie  whdie  of  scientific 
philosophy;  and  Lojfie,  Anihropolojry,  and  the 
Criticism  of  the  iniellectufd  powers,  as  only  pre- 
paratory studies.  There  are  three  branches  of 
phiU)sophy,  corresponding  with  the  threefold  re- 
lations of  man  ;  viz.  moral  nhilo.-ophy,  the  phi- 
losophy of  rio:ht,  and  the  phdosopliy  of  religion, 
(Krug.aud  2e/m.  p.536; 

We  have  now  completed  oar  survey  of  the 
various  meliiods  devised  hy  Kanl's  successors, 
for  passing  that  impracticnble  gulf,  wjjich,  as 
Kant  supposed,  must  ever  separate  between  nou- 
mena  and  phenomena  in  the  material  world,  and 
between  the  ol-jective  and  the  subjective  in  the 
•piritual  world. 

Before  we  take  our  leave  of  these  acute  but 
adventurous  German  philosopliers,  it  seems  per- 
tinent to  remark,  that  in  general  they  appear  to 
be,  not  only  men  of  great  learning  and  industry, 
but,  what  is  more  important,  sincere  and  honest 
inquirers  after  truth,  men  who  labor  to  discover 
a  true  and  useful  philosophy,  a  philosophy  that 
will  satisfy  the  wants  of  man  as  a  rational  and 
immortal  being.  And  hence,  though  whole 
schools  of  them  have  landed  in  Idealism,  and 
Pantheism  ;  and  though  great  numbers  of  them 
were  rationalists  ortheistSjdisbelievinfj  the  divinti 


Ids  INSTINCTIVE    PIIILOSOPHir* 

inspiration  of  the  Bible ;  yet  not  a  single  indi- 
▼idual,  since  the  pubhcation  of  Kant's  Criticism, 
(so  far  as  1  know,)  has  professed  either  atlieism 
or  materiahsm,  or  advocated  lax  moral  princi- 
ples, or  treated  religion  with  levity  or  contempt,  ox 
denied  a  future  state  of  rewards  and  punish- 
ments, or,  in  a  word,  showed  himself  a  disbelie- 
ver in  the  great  principles  of  natural  religion. 
And  only  a  solitary  individual  among  them  has 
professed  to  be  a  skeptic  ;  and  his  skepticism 
was  of  a  mild  character,  and  was  afterwards  re- 
tracted or  greatly  modified.  With  some  account 
of  that  individual,  we  shall  close  the  present  chap- 
ter. 

Gottlob  Ernst  Schulze^  (born  in  1761,  Dr. 
and  prof,  of  philos.  at  Gottingen,  and  honorary 
member  of  the  Philos.  Acad,  at  Philadelphia  in 
our  country,  died  at  Gottingen  in  1833  ;)  pub- 
lished in  1792  an  anonymous  work,  in  opposi- 
tion to  Reinhold's  theory  and  to  Rant's  Critic, 
entitled:  iEnesidemus  ;  or,  on  the  foundation  of 
prof.  Reinln)ld's  Elemental  Philoso,  hy  ;  togeth- 
er with  a  Defence  of  Skepticism,  in  regard  to  the 
pretensions  of  the  Critic  of  Reason.  This  work 
professed  to  annihilate  the  illusions  of  imagina- 
ry knowledge,  and  to  carry  farther  than  Kant 
had  done,  the  self-knowledge  of  Reason,  by  de- 
tecting the  hereditary  faults  of  all   philosophy. 


INSTINCTiyiC    PHILOSOPHY.  139 

The  result  of  the  investigation  was,  that  tlie  origin 
of  human  knowledge  is  unknowable  ;  and  there- 
fore, there  can  be  no  philosophy  which  shall  ex- 
plain it :  that  all  that  the  schools  tell  us  respect- 
iHg  the  origin  of  knowledge,  is  mere  play  upon 
words  without  meaning;  an»i  that  our  curiosity 
should  be  limited  to  inquiries  respecting  tho 
constiuent  parts  of  knowledge, the  diiferent  kinds 
of  it,  and  the  laws  by  which  conviction  accompa- 
nies its  several  species.  And  this  he  called 
Skepticism,  and  likewise  Antidogmatism,  found* 
ed  on  the  essential  and  necessary  condition  of 
the  mind  of  m;in.  This  skepticism  moreover, 
recognized  the  so  called  facts  of  consciousness; 
ond  it  maintained,  that  the  human  mind,  from 
its  very  coiistitution,  is  obliged  to  recognize  thesa 
facts  of  consciousness  as  real,  and  to  govern 
itself  by  them  in  practice.  After  farther  inquiry 
Schulze  narrowed  down  his  skepticism  still 
more  ;  for,  winle  he  still  denied  the  possibility 
of  infallible  criteria  of  truth,  i.  e.  of  the  argree- 
mentof  our  knowledge  with  the  essential  nature 
of  things,  lie  did  not  divest  the  mind  of  ability, 
to  discover  how  far  our  knowledge  of  particular 
objects  is  in  harmony  with  the  original  constitu- 
tion of  the  human  mind,  and  to  discriminate  be- 
tween such  knowledge,  and  that  which  originate! 
^om  our  peculiar  temperament  or  character  ai 


140  INSTINCTIVE    PHILOSOPHY. 

individuals.  At  length,  being  fully  convinced 
of  the  untenableness  of  skepticism,  he  attempted 
an  investigation  of  the  origin,  the  truth,  the  per- 
fectibility, and  the  limits  of  human  knowledge, 
according  to  the  approved  laws  of  natural  sci- 
ence. His  later  views  of  philosophy  approach 
near  to  the  doctrines  of  Jacobi.  He  agrees  with 
those  who  taking  Plato  for  their  pattern,  regard 
Reason  (distinct  from  the  comparing  faculty,  the 
Understanding)  as  a  source  of  knowledge  of  su- 
persensible things,  and  who  endeavor  by  means 
of  it  to  solve  the  proper  problems  of  philosophy. 
With  his  eye  on  those  feelings,  which  distinguish 
men  fr/5m  brutes,  he  divides  philosophy  into  four 
grand  departments  :  viz.  theoretical  pliilosophy 
or  nletaphysics,  explaining  religious  feeling; 
practical  philosophy,  explaining  moral  feeling ; 
logic  in  the  sense  of  the  ancients,  explaining  in- 
tellectual feeling  ;  and  aesthetics,  explaining  the 
feeling  of  ihe  beautiful.  (Krug^  and  Tennem,, 
p.  637  &c.; 


CHAPTER   XIII. 

FRENCH    PHILOSOPHY. 

The  new  school  in  France  :  its  Origin,  and  Present  State  :  its  Adfo<- 
cates  :  its  Doctrines. 

As  a  conclusion  to  these  sketclies,  we  sliall  no- 
lice  the  part  whicli  France  has  taken  iu  the 
modern  developments  of  philosophy. 

From  near  the  limes  of  Mr.  Locke  till  quitft 
recently,  empiricism,  and  that  of  the  grossest 
kind,  has  reigned  undisturhed  in  France.  About 
the  middle  of  the  last  century,  the  abbe  Gondii* 
lac  expounded  the  philosophy  of  Locke,  omit* 
ting  rejleciion  as  a  distinct  source  of  knowledge. 
Reflection,  he  said,  can  add  noihing  to  the  matter 
on  which  it  reflects.  Itcan  only  recognize, compare, 
generalize,  and  give  form  to  the  ideas\vhichsensa» 
tion  presents.  Of  course,  all  our  ideas  in  his 
Yiew,  are  ideas  of  sensation,  or  in  other  words,  are 
sensations.  This  became  the  reigning  doctrine 
in  France.  The  infidels,  Voltaire,  the  encyclo- 
paedists, &c.  all  embraced  it ;  and  many  of  them 
deduced  from  it  the  materiality  of  the  soul,  athe-- 
ism,  fatalism,  and  sensuality  as  man's  chief 
good.    A  few  ecclesiastics  and  others  feebly  re* 


142  PRENCU    PHILOSOPHY. 

listed  ihe  tendencies  of  this  philosophy  ;  but 
without  exposing  or  clearly  discerning  the  un- 
sound basis  on  wliich  it  rests.  During  tlie  first 
years  of  the  revolution,  (1789—95,)  all  eyes 
were  directed  to  the  portentous  occurrences  of 
the  day,  and  the  only  branch  of  philosophy  much 
regarded,  was  political  philosophy  ;  and  in  that, 
man  was  considered  merely  as  a  reasoning  ani- 
mal, whose  interests  are  all  confined  to  the  pres- 
ent life.  Under  the  Directorial  government, 
(1795—99,)  the  Instiluie  and  the  Normal 
Schools  called  some  attention  to  education,  and 
required  the  study  of  philosophy  on  the  princi- 
ples of  Condillac  and  the  materialists.  Under 
the  Consular  government,  (1799 — 1804  J  philos- 
ophy was  more  zealously  pursued,  but  on  the 
iame  general  principles.  Cabanis  and  Destutt 
de  Tracy  were  the  most  distinguished  writers  on 
philosophy.  Under  the  Imperial  government, 
(1804 — 14,)  a  reformation  m  philosophy  com- 
menced, and  it  had  made  some  progress  before 
the  restoration  of  the  Bourbons.  From  that 
time  onwards  it  has  been  steadily  advancing,  and 
it  now  has  the  weight  of  talent  and  influence  on 
its  side.  The  philosophers  of  the  new  school 
assume  the  name  of  Eclectics;  and  the  name 
appears  appropriate.  We  shall  first  notice  the 
principal  persons  concerned  in  this  reformation 


PRENCH    PHILOSOPHY.  143 

of  philosopljy,  and  then  attempt  some  descrip- 
tion of  their  principles.  ^ 

Peter  Laromiguiere^  hnrn  in  1757,  first  tauglit 
at  Toulouse,  and  afierwanls  at  Paris,  where  ha 
was  a  member  of  the  National  Institute  and  a 
distinguished  writer,  till  his  death  in  1837.  He 
deviated  considerahl}'  fronj  Candillac  ;  for  h« 
maintained  that  the  soul  is  aciive^nuil  not  merelj 
passive,  in  the  acquisi'ion  of  knowltdge.  Sen- 
sation indeed  furnishes  the  materials  for  all  our 
knowledge  ;  hut  the  mind  gives  form  and  shape 
to  those  materials.  The  activity  of  the  mind  is 
therefore  a  source  of  knowledge  as  well  as  sen- 
sation. The  two  aro  coordinate.  Laromiguicre 
being  a  charming  writer  and  a  man  of  great 
acuteness,  liis  doctrines  spread  far  and  were  not 
without  considerable  influence. 

Maine  de  Biran^  who  died  at  Paris  in  1824, 
oged  58,  obtained  a  prize  from  the  Berlin  Acad- 
emy of  Science  in  1809,  for  the  best  essay  on 
this  qiiestton  ;  Is  there  any  inunedifite,  internal 
[intellectual]  iniiiitini;  and  how  does  it  differ 
from  sensible  percaplianl  Cousin  considered  his 
works  so  valuable,  that  he  undertook  to  edit  them 
himself  so  late  as  1834.  De  Biran  was  so  oppos- 
ed to  the  doctrines  of  the  materialists,  that  Iw 
leaned  towards  universal  idealism  :  whenca 
Cousin  compares  hint  with  the  German  Ficlite. 


144  FRENCH    PHILOSOPHY* 

He  is  said  to  liave  adopted  Leibnitz's  doctrine  of 
Monads,  with  aibme  alterations.  He  believed 
that  all  substances,  or  all  real  existences,  are 
active  powers  or  forces  of  some  sort ;  ibat  minds 
or  souls  liave  iiilelli<^ence,  voliiion,  ^c,  \vliil« 
material  substances  bave  only  motive  force.  He 
theref(»re  clearly  distinguisbed  tbe  soul  from  tbe 
body  ;  and  in  examining'  tbe  faculties  and  pow- 
ers of  tbe  former,  be  commenced  wiib  conscious- 
ness. 

John  Pefer  Fred.  AnciUon  was  born  in  1766 
at  Berlin,  wbere  bis  futber  was  minister  of  the 
Fr.  Prot.  cburcb.  He  was  bimself  preacber  to 
the  satne  cbsircb,  tlien  professor  of  pbilosophj 
in  tlie  military  academy  at  Berlin,  member  of 
the  Acad,  of  Sciences,  counselor  of  state  for 
foreign  affairs,  &c.,  and  died  in  1S37.  Ancillon 
wrote  altogf'tiier  in  French  ;  and  be  published 
various  works  on  philosophical  subjects,  jiolitical, 
moral,  &c. ;  in  which  he  appeared  pretty  clear)/ 
to  belong  to  the  school  of  Jacobi.  His  worki 
were  read  in  France. 

Peter  Paul  Royer- C ollard ^  born  in  1763, 
was  first  an  advocate  in  the  parliament  of  Paris, 
and  then  active  but  moderate  in  the  revobition ; 
afterwards,  being  made  dean  of  the  Faculty  of 
Letters  in  the  Normal  School  at  Paris,  he  lectur- 
ed on  philosophy  with  great  applause,  from  1811 


fRENCH    PHILOSOPHY.  145 

to  1814,  when  he  returned  to  political  life,  and 
became  head  of  the  party  called  Doctrinaires, 
which  took  middle  ground  between  the  royalists 
and  ihe  ultra-republicans.  In  his  lectures  he 
brouo;ht  forward  Reid's  doctrine  of  Common 
Sense,  as  an  independent  source  of  true  knowl*- 
edge,  and  urged  it  strenuously  and  successfully 
in  opposition  to  the  doctrine  of  Condillac.-^ 
This  source  of  the  knowledge  of  noumena  and 
supersensible  things,  he  called  naturalinduction ; 
and  he  described  it  as  being  a  spontaneous  and 
necessary  action  of  the  mind.  His  eloquence 
and  his  acute  and  powerful  reasoning  transfused 
this  doctrine  into  nearly  all  liia  pupils  ;  and  thus 
laid  the  foundation  for  the  new  French  school 
in  philosophy.  Yet  only  one  of  hi^  lectures  has 
been  published  entire,  although  many  extracts 
from  them  have  been  given  to  the  public,  espe- 
cially in  JoufFroy's  French  edition  of  Reid's 
works,  Paris  1828. 

Victor  Cousin^  born  in  1792,  and  educated 
under  Royer-Collard,  succeeded  him  in  the  Nor- 
mal School  in  1815,  and  carried  forward  the  re- 
formation in  philosophy  begun  by  his  predeces- 
sor. In  1820  he  was  displaced,  for  his  too  libe- 
ral political  opinions,  and  retired  to  Germany; 
but  he  returned  in  1828,  and  resumed  his  lec- 
tures. His  lectures  for  that  year  contain  an  In 
10 


146  FRENCH    PHILOSOPHY. 

troduction  to  the  liistory  of  philosophy.  These 
have  been  elegantly  translated  by  H.  G.  Linberg, 
and  were  published  at  Boston  in  1832.  They 
contain  the  best  exposition  I  have  seen  of  his 
philosophical  opinions.  In  1829  he  published  a 
course  cfF  lectures  in  two  volumes,  on  the  philos- 
ophy of  the  18ih  century.  The  first  volume 
contains  general  views  of  philosophy  and  its 
history.  The  second  volume  contains  an  elabo- 
rate criticism  on  Mr.  Locke's  Essay,  which  has 
been  well  translated  by  the  Rev.  C.  S.  Henry» 
D.  D.  of  New  York.  On  the  accession  of  Louis 
Philippe  in  1839,  Cousin  was  admitted  into  the 
French  Academy;  and  the  next  year,  he  was 
sent  by  the  king  to  examine  the  literary  institu- 
tions of  Germany,  especially  of  Berlin,  and 
make  report.  On  his  return  in  1832,  he  "was 
made  a  peer  of  France;  and  in  1804,  minister 
of  public  instruction.  He  may  be  considered 
the  corypheus  of  the  eclectic  or  new  school  phi- 
losophers of  France.  But  before  we  examine 
his  philosophical  doctrines,  we  will  notice  some 
others  who  have  co-operated  in  the  reformation 
of  French  pliilosophy. 

The  baron  de  Massias^  for  some  time  French 
consul  general  at  Dantzic,  and  then  charge  d'af- 
fairs  at  Berlin,  published  various  philosopliical 
works,  between  1821  aud  1835  ;  in  which,  it  is 


FRENCH    PIIILOSOrufT^^^  147  ^ 

said,  he  seems  to  come  near  to  Kantean  principles  ; 
but  lie  professes  to  differ  from  Kant,  as  well  as 
from  Royer-ColIarJ  and  Reid.  Krug  could  not 
exactly  define  his  position  ;  but  tells  us,  he  was 
ranked  among  the  new  eclectics  of  France. 

The  baron  Degerando,  born  in  1772,  and 
made  a  peer  of  France  in  1837,  the  author  of 
the  Comparative  Hist,  of  Philosophy,  was  a  fol- 
lower of  Condiliac  in  1802  ;  but  when  he  pub- 
lished the  2d  edit,  of  his  history,  in  1822—3,  he 
accorded  with  Royer-Collard  and  Cousin,  or 
was  an  eclectic. 

Berard^  who  died  m  1828,  at  the  age  of  35, 
published  a  work  in  1823,  in  which  he  main- 
tained the  immateriality  of  the  soul,  and  assailed 
the  doctrines  of  the  materialists  openly  and  vig- 
orously. And  in  the  same  year,  Virey  publish- 
ed a  treatise  on  Vital  Power,  in  which  he  takes 
the  same  ground. 

Theodore  Joiiffroy^  born  in  1793,  and  now 
professor  of  philosophy  in  the  Faculty  of  Litera- 
ture at  Paris,  is  an  active  member  of  the  eclec- 
tic school.  In  1828,  he  published  Reid's  works 
in  French,  with  abstracts  from  Royer-Collard's 
lectures  ;  and  likewise  Dug.  Stewart's  Outlines 
of  Moral  Philosophy.  Jouffroy  devotes  himself 
especially  to  Moral  Philosophy  ;  and  he  comes 
frequently  before  the  public,  in  works  which  ar« 


148  FRENCH    PHILOSOPHY. 

said  to  be  creditable  both  to  his  head  and  his 
heart. 

Philip  Damiron,  educated  under  Cousin,  and 
HOW  professor  of  phiIoso|)liy  in  the  college  of 
Lonis  le  Grand  at  Paris,  is  liie  author  of  a  his- 
tory of  philosophy  in  France  in  the  IQlh  century, 
2  vols.,   first  publislied  in    1828,  and    again  in 

1830.  From  this  work,  Krug  and  Dr.  Henry 
appear  to  have  derived  most  of  their  information 
respecting  the  recent  history  of  French  philoso- 
phy ;  and  on  them  I  am  chiefly  dependent.     In 

1831,  Diuniron  commenced  publishing  a  Course 
of  Philosophy ;  of  which  fourvolumes  had  appear- 
ed inlS34,enibracing  Psychology  and  Morals.  In 
his  history,  Damiron  gives  account  of  twenty- 
seven  French  philosophers  of  the  19th  century  ; 
whom  he  divides  into  three  classes:  viz. 

'"^  I.  Sensualists;  e.    g.  Azias,  Cabanis,  Destutt 

de  Tracy,  G^^ll,  Laromiguiere,  Volney,  &-c. 
!*  II.    Theulogists  ;  e.  g.  Vallanche,  de  Bonald, 

de  Maistre,  de  la  Mennais,  &.c. 
^  III.  Eclectics;  e.  g.  Ancillon,   Berard,    Bon- 

P  t^  Stettin,  Cousin,  Damiron,  Degerando,  Droz, 
^^ /^  Jouffroy,  Kerelrny,  Massias,  Maine  de  Biran, 
*  ''^'    Royer-Colliird,  Vn-ey,  &,c. 

The  French  philosophers  of  the  new  school 
appear  to  be  ingenuous,  liberal-minded,  honest 
men  ;  men  who  have  no  selfish  or  sinister  views, 


FRENCH    PHILOSOPHY.  149 

no  vain  ambition  of  applause,  no  pride  of  learn- 
ing, in  short,  no  other  aim  than  to  discover  and 
to  recommend  the  useful  and  the  true,  in  a 
branch  of  knowledge  long  degraded  and  abused 
in  their  country  by  superficial  and  reckless  men. 
They  are  harmonious  in  their  efforts  to  raise 
))hijosophy  in  France  to  the  rank  of  an  honora- 
ble and  useful  scinnce,  by  the  careful  study  of 
foreign  writers.  Dititring  among  themselves  on 
various  points,  they  are  yet  tolerant  to  each 
other,  and  assume  the  common  sense  of  Eclec- 
tics. Indeed  they  appear  not  yet  to  have  ma- 
tured their  thoughts.  They  all  read  the  Scotch 
philosophers,  Reid  and  Stewart,  and  some  of 
them  also  Kant,  Fichte,  Schelling,  Jacobi,  &c. ; 
and  from  all  these,  as  w(!ll  as  from  Plato,  Aris- 
totle, Des  Cartes,  Leil)nitz,  &c.  they  take  what 
seems  to  them  plausible,  and  too  often,  without 
due  regard  to  the  congruity  or  incongruity  of 
that  syncretism  which  they  call  eclecticism.  At 
least,  this  appears  to  me  to  be  true  of  Cousin,  the 
present  leader  of  the  school.  Dr.  Henry  has  '^ 
indeed  exhibited  a  pretty  coherent  system,  as 
being  held  and  taught  by  Cousin.  But  he  does 
not  refer  us  to  the  works  of  the  author  for  proofs ; 
and  as,  with  the  three  volumes  of  Cousin's  lec- 
tures before  me,  I  can  not  verify  all  his  state- 
ments, and  yet  find  in  Cousin  mvnQ  dogmas  and 


150  FRENCH    PHILOSOPHY. 

positions  which  are  not  distinctly  mentioned  hj 
Dr.  Henry,  instead  of  abridging  the  professor's 
statement,  I  will  subjoin  what  I  have  been  able 
to  glean  directly  from  Cousin.  It  should  be 
recollected,  that  the  works  I  consult  are  not  pre- 
cise and  logical  disquisitions,  but  loose  popular 
lectures,  and  addressed  also  to  a  French  audi- 
ence, whose  fancy  must  be  pleased  to  secure 
their  attention.  Hence,  not  only  is  the  language 
often  popular  rather  than  scientific,  but  in  too 
many  instances  the  reasoning  also.  Most  of  my 
references  are  to  the  Introduction  to  a  Hist,  of 
Philos.  &c.,  translated  by  Linberg,  Boston,  1833. 
According  to  Cousin,  philosophy  is  the  science 
which  strives  to  comprehend  things,  and  to  ac- 
count for  what  takes  place.  It  is  the  result  of 
reflection,  of  the  study  of  ideas  and  of  thought ; 
and  its  aim  is,  to  advance  all  the  great  interests 
of  man.  It  is  one  of  man's  most  real  wants, 
(p.  19—25,  51, 52,  367  &c.)  Philosophy  com- 
mences with  reflection,  with  a  critical  examina- 
tion of  the  human  mind,  or  with  what  is  called 
psychology,  (p.  368  «fec.  380,  390  &c.)  From 
psychology  it  proceeds  to  logic,  metaphysics, 
ontology,  natural  theology,  cosmology,  morality, 
A-c.  And  its  method  or  mode  of  proceeding  is, 
to  begin  with  observation  and  induction,  or  careful 
researches  a  posteriori ;  and   then  to  introduce 


FRENCH    PHILOSOPHY.  151 

analysis  and  deduction,  or  reasoning  a ^nort. 
(p,416&c.  95—103.) 

All  the  facts  of  psycholog^y  are  found  on  the 
records  of  consciousness ;  and  to  these  records 
we  must  go  for  a  knowledore  of  tliem.  It  is  by 
reflection^  «hat  we  inspect  that  record,  and  learn 
those  facts,  (p.  147  &c.  152,  159,  1(31  &,c.  193.) 
Cousin  recognizes  three  faculties  of  the  mind; 
viz.  sensibility^  or  susceptibility  of  impressions 
from  objects  without  ;  volition  or  the  will,  the 
source  of  voluntary  action  ;  and  reason  or  intel- 
lect, the  knowing,  judging,  reasoning  faculty. 
On  the  fii-t,  (sensibility,)  he  says  hut  little  in  this 
volume,  and  he  seems  to  hold  the  common  views 
of  pln]i»sopiiers.  RespFcting  the  will  or  volun- 
tary power,  he  is  singular  in  maintaining  that 
this  faculty  is  the  sole  foundation  of  i)ersonality. 
The  other  faculties  are  not  of  a  personal  nature  ; 
they  are  common  properties  of  our  race  ;  and 
they  would  operate  in  the  same  manner  and 
with  the  same  results,  in  all  men,  if  they  were 
not  influenced  in  individiuds,  by  the  persoiial  fac- 
ulty or  the  will.  (p.  125  &-c.  128,   169,  175  &c.) 

Reason^  or  intelligence,  is  nothing  personal  to 
us  as  individuals.  There  are  not  as  many  rea" 
sons^  as  there  are  reasoning  beings  ;  but  there  is 
one  eternal  reason,  which  is  a  sort  of  common 
property    of  all  intelligent   beings,  and   which 


152  FRENCH    PHILOSOPHY. 

they  all  use  at  pleasure,  according  to  their  ahil- 
ity.  The  infinite  God,  who  is  intelligence  itself, 
enjoys  and  uses  it  without  any  lin»itation  ;  but 
finite  beings  can  make  only  a  limited  use  of  it. 
(p.  125-129,  167,  171.) 

Reason  as  a  faculty  of  the  human  mind,  ope- 
rates in  two  ways  ;  viz.  spontancousli/,  or  with- 
out the  co-operation  of  the  will  ;  and  voluntari- 
ly^ or  under  the  guidance  of  the  will,  as  when 
we  intentionally  reflect,  think,  judge,  A^c.  From 
its  first  mode  of  operation  we  derive  all  our  pri- 
mary knowledge,  and  all  those  general  truths 
which  seem  to  he  innate  or  connate.  This  ope- 
ration of  reason  is  the  Common  Sense  of  Dr. 
Reid  ;  and  by  Cousin  it  is  denominated  the  in- 
stinctive perception  of  truth,  the  instinct  of  rea- 
son, original  perception^  and  also  faith^  and 
inspiration,  (p.  1G2 — 175,  193,  417;  comp.  his 
Hist,  of  Philos.  II.  38S— 392.) 

Reason,  in  both  her  modes  of  operation,  is 
governed  by  three  fundamental  latvs  or  first  prin- 
ciples; which  he  calls  the  elements  of  reason 
and  which  occupy  the  same  place  in  his  system 
with  the  categories  in  the  Rantean  system  :  they 
give  form,  consistency  and  unity  to  all  our 
knowledge.  Moreover,  as  reason  is  not  subjec- 
tive or  personal  to  us,  but  is  universal,  or  the 
common  property  of  all   intelligent  beings,  and 


FRENCH    PHILOSOPHY.  153 

is  the  same  in  man  as  in  God  ;  hence  these  laws 
or  elements  of  reason  are  not  merely  the  laws 
of  our  mode  of  thinking  (as  Kant  erroneously 
maintained,)  but  they  are  the  laws  of  all  rational 
thinking,  and  the  mode  of  God's  viewing  things  ; 
and  of  course  they  accord  with  the  divine  consti- 
tution of  the  universe,  or  with  the  real  nature  of 
things  ;  that  is,  they  have  objective  validity. 
They  are  the  basis,  not  only  of  human  logic, 
but  of  true  metaphysics,  and  of  a  solid  system 
of  ontology.  According  to  these  fundamental 
laws  of  reason,  whatever  exists  above  us,  around 
us,  or  within  us,  falls  under  one  or  the  other  of 
these  two  categories  ;  viz.  (1)  the  finite,  the  mul' 
tiple,  the  particular,  the  limited,  the  dependent, 
the  phenomenal,  &.t;.  or  (2)  the  infinite,  the  one, 
the  universal,  the  unlimited,  the  absolute,  the 
substance  &c.  These  are  the  two  first  catego- 
ries or  fundamental  laws  of  reason.  The  third 
is  the  result  of  an  analysis  of  the  two  preceed- 
log.  It  is,  that  whatever  exists  under  either  of 
these  categories,  stands  in  inunediate  relation 
with  its  corresponding  thing  in  the  other  catego- 
ry ;  so  that  neither  can  be  conceived  as  existing, 
or  as  being  possible,  without  the  other.  Moreo- 
ver, all  the  things  existing  under  the  first 
category,  (the  finite,  the  mu!ti|)le  &-c.)  stand 
related   to  the    corresponding  things  under  the 


154  FRENCH    PHILOSOPHY. 

second  category  as  effects  stand  related  to 
their  causes  ;  that  is,  the  infinite  is  the  cause  of 
the  finite,  tlie  one  of  tiie  rnuhiple,  tlie  universal 
of  the  particular,  the  unlimited  ot  the  limited, 
the  absolute  of  the  dependent,  the  substantial  ol 
the  phenomenal,  &c.  And  finally,  by  summing 
up  separately  all  that  exists  under  each  of  the 
two  first  categories,  we  have,  as  the  sum  total  of 
the  first,  the  world  or  nature  ;  and  as  the  sura 
total  of  the  second,  God  the  author  of  nature  ; 
and  then  this  third  category  unites  the  two  sums 
in  a  harmonious  whole,  which  isihe  universe,  (p. 
108—131,  158 — 160,  418.;  Cousin  seems 
aware,  that  these  views  approximate  so  near  to 
those  of  Schelling,  that  they  may  expose  him  to 
the  ch.irgK  of  pantheism  ;  a  charge  which  he  did 
not  well  know  liow  to  answer,  (p.  132,  141 — 
143,  147, 158,  233,  420.)  Yet  he  did  not  intend 
to  identify  God  with  nature,  or  to  teach  tii;U  there 
is  no  God  distinct  from  the  world,  (p.  16,  132, 
143.)  Creation  he  held  to  be  a  development  of 
(jod's  power,  an  act  of  l)is  will  ;  and  in  some 
sense  a  m»  c  >s«ary  act.  (p.  133  iVc.  142,  153.)  It 
will  also  follow  from  these  laws  of  reason,  that 
God  is  as  comprehensible  by  us,  as  any  other 
object :  and  Cousin  admits  the  inference,  (p. 
132,  133)  Indeed  he  is  so  far  a  Hegelian,  as  to 
believe  that  idf  .        ....»'    '''^^nces,  and  not  the 


FRENCH    PHILOSOPHY.  1  55 

mere  imas^es  or  representatives  of  something 
else.  (p.  21  &c.  123—125,  127,  129,)  And  he 
even  tells  us,  that  ideas  constitute  the  nature  of 
God.  (p.  133,  134,  15S,  165,  166 )  Cousin 
liolds  firmly  to  the  providence  and  moral  govern- 
ment of  God.  He  says  :  "  God's  perpetual 
agency,  in  respect  to  the  world  and  to  humanity, 
is  providence.'*  '*  The  great  deeds  recorded  in 
history,  are  the  decrees  of  God's  moral  govern- 
ment of  the  world."  (p.  224,  225.)  And  he  dis- 
tinctly avows  himself  to  be  a  Christian  j)hil6so- 
pher.  (p.  49,  57,  338,  339.)  He  says  :  "  I  be- 
lieve that  in  Christianity  all  truths  are  contained  ; 
but  these  eternal  truths  may  and  ought  to  be  ap- 
proached, disengaged,  and  illustrated  by  philos- 
ophy. Truth  has  but  one  foundation  ;  but 
truth  assumes  two  forms,  nainely,  mysteiy"  [tlu; 
form  in  which  religion  is  presented  to  the  mind 
in  ordinances  of  worship,  and  in  representations 
intended  to  excite  devotion]"  and  scientific  expo- 
sition :  I  revere  the  one,  I  am  the  organ  and  in- 
terpreter of  the  other," 


CHAPTER    XIV. 

GERMAN    PHILOSOPHY    IN    AMERICA. 

Its  Introduction.     Coleridgeism. 

The  original  design  of  these  sketches,  was, 
merely  to  give  a  general  idea  of  the  principal 
systems  of  German  philosophy.  This  object 
was  pursued  through  the  twelve  first  Chapters. 
Another  Chapter  was  added,  on  the  new  ec- 
lectic pliilosophy  in  France.  And  now,  it  is 
deemed  expedient  to  annex  some  account  of 
those  schemes  of  modified  German  philosophy 
which  have  excited  most  attention  in  our  own 
CDuntry  ;  namely,  the  philosophy  of  Coleridge^ 
as  contained  in  liis  Aids  to  Reflection  ;  the  so 
called  Transcendental  Philosophy^  contained  in 
the  Dial  and  other  recent  works  published  in 
Massachusetts;  and  tlie  philosophic  system  of 
Dr.  Fred.  A.  Rauch^  contained  in  his  Psy- 
cliology. 
^  Until  within  about  twenty  years,  the  empirical 
philosophy  as  tauglit  by  Locke  and  the  Scotch 
writers,  and  which  was  described  in  the  first 
Chapter  of  these  sketches,  had  dominion  in  all 
our  colleges  and  schools,  and  was  regarded  every 
where  as  the  only  true  philosophy.     Berkeley's 


GERMAN    PHILOSOPHY    IN    AMERICA.  IS? 

idealism  was  indeed  received  by  a  few  ;  and,  if  it 
did  not  originate,  it  doubtless  helped  to  give  cur- 
rency to,  that  species  of  pantheism  which  is  fun- 
damental in  the  theology  of  the  Emmons  school. 
Berkeley  made  immediate  divine  agency  the  sole 
cause  of  all  the  phenomena  of  the  material 
world;  and  Emmons  extended  the  same  im- 
mediate agency  throughout  the  intellectual 
world.  But  neither  of  these  very  acute  reason- 
ers  aimed  to  overthrow  the  empirical  mode  of 
philosopliizing.  The  first  only  wished  to 
strengthen  the  argument  from  experience  for 
the  being  of  a  God,  and  the  second  to  reconcile 
the  doctrines  of  Calvinism  with  a  sound  phi- 
losophy. 

A  little  more  than  twenty  years  ago  the  Ger- 
man language,  and  with  it,  German  literature 
and  science  began  to  be  studied  in  this  country ; 
and  soon,  here  and  there  an  individual  was  in- 
duced to  look  with  some  fovor  on  German  phi- 
losophy. But  the  perfect  novelty  of  its  princi- 
ples, and  its  strange  terminology,  rendered  it  al- 
most unintelligible.  Under  these  circumstances 
the  writings  of  Samuel  Taylor  Coleridge,  who 
had  mastered  and  adopted  some  of  the  funda- 
mental principles  of  Kant,  found  their  way  into 
the  country  and  were  eagerly  caught  at  and  read 
by  several   of  our  younger   theologians.      His 


158         GERMAN    PHILOSOPHY    IN    AMERICA. 

/ 

Bios^rapliia  Literaria,  liis  work  entitled  The 
Friend,  and  his  Aids  to  Reflection,  found  as 
warm  admirers  in  this  country  as  in  England. 
In  1829,  Pres.  James  Marsh,  D.D.  now  a  Pro- 
fessor in  Burlington,  Vt.,  published  an  American 
edition  of  the  Aids  to  Reflection,  with  an  elabo- 
rate Preliminary  Essay  vindicating  and  recom- 
mending the  principles  of  the  book.  From  that 
period  Coleridgeism  has  spread  very  considera- 
bly in  A^ew  England.  The  Biographia  Litera- 
ria of  Coleridge,  and  his  Friend,  which  I  read 
hastily  soon  after  their  publication,  are  not  now 
at  hand,  and  I  shall  therefore  confine  my  re- 
marks to  his  Aids  to  Reflection. 

This  work  is  not  so  much  a  treatise  on  phi- 
losophy, as  a  treatise  on  practical  or  experimen- 
tal religion,  and  was  intended  especially  for  the 
use  of  young  men  who  are  studying  for  the  min- 
istry. Dr.  Marsh  well  says  :  "It  might  rather  be 
denominated  a  philosophical  statement  and  vin- 
dication of  the  distinctively  spiritual  and  peculiar 
doctrines  of  the  Christian  system.''''  Coleridge 
was  one  of  the  most  evangelical  men  of  his 
times  in  the  English  Episcopal  church :  and  he 
supposed  he  could  explain  and  establish  in  the 
most  satisfactory  manner  the  religious  doctrines 
which  he  held  in  common  with  Abp.  Leighton 
and  other  early  Puritans,  by   means  of  those 


GERMAN    PIirLOSOPHY    IN    AMERICA.  159 

principles  of  the  Kantean  philosophy  mIucIi  he 
had  imbibed,  and  especially  by  means  of  what 
he  calls  the  inomentous  distinction  hetiveen  Rea- 
son and  Understanding.  By  means  of  this  dis- 
tinction, he  thought  he  could  establish  more 
clearly  and  precis^ely  the  import  of  certain  scrip- 
tural terms,  such  as  carnal,  fleshly,  spiritual,  the 
flesh,  the  spirit,  &c. ;  and  likewise  "establish  the 
distinct  characters  of  Prudence,  Morality,  and 
Religion  ;"  and  finally,  could  shew  the  perfect 
harmony  of  "all  the  peculiar  doctrines  of  the 
Christian  faith"  wilh  reason  or  sound  philoso- 
phy. (Aids  &c.,  p.  62-64,  ed.  New  York, 
1840.) 

But  Coleridge  was  a  poet:  and  poets  seldom 
write  well  on  metaphysical  subjects.  Besides, 
he  has  justly  been  pronounced  a  turgid  and  ob- 
scure writer  :  and  although  in  his  Aids  to  Re- 
flection he  aims  at  a  more  chastened  and  simple 
style  than  in  his  other  prose  writings,  yet  he  has 
preposterously  employed,  in  this  purely  didactic 
work.  Aphorisms  instead  of  logical  definitions 
and  fully  developed  arguments.  He  assumes 
that  his  readers  know  too  much,  or  that  they  can 
understand  him  from  a  mere  hint,  a  passing  re- 
mark, a  brilliant  fragment  of  thought,  without 
any  full  and  clear  delineation  of  his  new  theo- 
ogical  views  ;  and,  like  a  genuine  poet,  he  leaps 


160         GERMAN    PHILOSOPHY    IN    AMERICA. 

in  medias  res,  and  throws  out  his  new  and 
gtrange  ideas,  without  pivparing  our  minds  to 
receive  them,  or  even  to  understand  them.  Thus 
the  all-important  distinction  between  Reason 
and  Understanding,  which  is  the  basis  of  his 
whole  system,  but  of  which  nine  tenths  of  the 
reading  public  have  no  clear  idea,  is  every  where 
held  up  to  view  as  fundamental,  and  yet  is  no 
where  described  or  defined.  And  his  learned 
editor,  catcliing  too  much  of  his  spirit,  says  ex- 
plicitly, (p.  48,) :  "What  is  the  precise  nature  of 
the  distinction  between  the  understanding  and 
reason,  it  is  not  my  province,  nor  have  I  under- 
taken, to  shew.  My  object  is  merely  to  illus- 
trate its  necessity."  The  consequeLice  is,  most 
readers  of  the  book  are  utterly  unable  to  com- 
prehend it ;  and  therefore,  they  strongly  suspect 
the  author  was  groping  in  darkness,  or  that  he 
did  not  see  clearly  those  shadowy  objects  which 
he  would  not  venture  to  describe. 

From  the  language  and  reasonings  of  Cole- 
ridge, as  well  as  from  his  known  partiality  for 
German  philosophy,  it  is  presumable  that  he 
adopted  substantially  that  distinction  between 
reason  and  understanding  which  was  described 
in  the  sixth  Number  of  these  sketches.  There, 
however,  we  had  especially  in  view  the  distinc- 
tion between  what  is  called  theoretical  or  specU' 


GET?MAN    PHILOSOPHY    IN    AMERICA  161 

lat'ivc  Reason,  and  the  Understanding  considered 
as  an  intellectual  focully :  but  Coleridge  is  prin- 
cipally concerned  with  j^r^^t^ica/ Reason,  or  Rea- 
son in  its  relation  to  the  Will  and  to  the  moral 
actions  of  man  ;  in  which  relation,  Coleridge 
says,  it  is  "  tiie  determinant  of  ultimate  ends," 
that  is,  it  is  the  source  of  those  pure  ideas  of 
right,  of  duty,  of  moral  obligation,  which  should 
be  the  supreme  law  of  action  to  a  rational  being. 
To  distinction  from  this  faculty,  the  Understand- 
in<jf  considered  as  a  principle  of  action,  bears  a 
striking  resemblance  to  the  Instinct  of  the  more 
inteliiirent  animals,  tlie  ant,  the  bee,  the  beaver, 
&c.  It  is  the  ability  to  select  and  apply  fit  means 
to  proximate  ends.  Its  views  are  limited  to  the 
object  in  immediate  contemplation ;  and  it  is 
but  another  name  for  ingenuity,  sagacity,  prac- 
tical judgment  in  affairs,  or  the  power  of  jud'y- 
ing  according  to  the  maxims  of  experience. 
(See  Aids,  &c.,  page  241,  note  ;  and  page  353.) 
Coleridge  often  calls  it  "  the  faculty  of  judging 
according  to  sense  ;"  ihat  is  according  to  empi- 
rical wisdom. 

Now  man,  according  to  Coleridge,  was  en- 
dowed by  his  Creator  with  tlie  faculties  of  Un- 
derstanding and  Reason,  which  he  was  to  devel- 
ope  and  employ  in  the  fulfillment  of  his  duties 
as  a  creature  of  God.     His  Understanding  was 


162  GERxMAN    PHILOSOPHY    IN    AMERICA. 

to  supply  in  liim  the  place  of  Instinct  in  the 
brutes  ;  speculative  Reason  was  to  enable  him  to 
cultivate  scientific  knowledge  ;  and  practical 
Reason  was  to  regulate  and  govern  his  moral 
conduct,  or  to  enable  him  to  yield  rational  obe- 
dience to  the  laws  of  his  Creator.  But  by  the 
apostacy,  in  which  all  participate  as  soon  as  they 
become  capable  of  moral  action,  the  Will  of  man 
divorces  itself  from  practical  Reason,  and  sub- 
mits to  the  control  of  the  Understanding  and  the 
natural  propensities.  By  so  doing,  fallen  man 
turns  away  from  those  high  and^ure  principles 
of  right,  of  duty,  of  moral  obligation,  which 
should  be  his  ultimate  aims,  and  fixes  his  regai'ds 
on  proximate  ends,  or  in  the  language  of  an 
apostle,  on  "  the  lust  of  the  flesh,  the  lust  of  the 
eyes,  and  the  pride  of  life."  He  practically,  if 
not  also  theoretically,  discards  the  idea  of  there 
being  any  thing  higher  or  more  excellent  than 
personal  enjoyment  or  individual  happiness : 
and  in  determining  what  will  make  him  happy, 
or  what  is  his  supreme  good,  he  recurs  to  expe- 
rience as  the  best  and  the  proper  criterion. 
Thus,  by  following  his  Understanding  as  his 
only  guide,  fallen  man  is  selfish  and  earthly- 
minded,  until,  by  the  new  birth,  practical  Reason 
is  restored  to  her  throne  in  the  soul. 

But  for  the  full  understanding  of  this  subject, 


GERMAN    PHILOSOPHY    IN    AMERICA. 


163 


tlie  wide  difference  between  nature  and/ree  Will 
must  not  be  overlooked  :  for,  as  Dr.  Marsh  says  : 
**The  key  to  his  system  will  be  found  in  the  dis- 
tinctions which  he  makes  and  illustrates  between 
nature  and  free  Will,  and  between  the  Under- 
standing and  Reason."  (See  Aids,  &c.,  p.  17.) 
Throughout  the  kingdom  o?  nature  accord- 
ing to  Coleridge,  one  universal  law  prevails,  and 
has  absolute  control.  It  is,  that  of  the  necessary 
dependence  of  one  thing  on  another,  or  the  law 
of  cause  and  effect.  To  this  law  not  only  all 
material  bodies,  but  all  vegetable  and  animal  life, 
and  all  the  sensitive  and  elective  faculties  both  of 
brutes  and  of  man's  animal  nature,  are  entirely 
subject.  But  \hefree  Will  of  a  rational  being,  in 
his  opinion,  is  not  subject  to  this  law.  It  acts 
spontaneously,  and  independently  of  any  causa- 
tion from  without.  It  is  not  controlled  by  mo- 
tives as  the  proper  causes  of  its  elections  :  "The 
man  makes  the  motive,  and  not  the  motive  the 
man."  -  (p.  106.)  Now  when  the  Will  renoun- 
ces its  allegiance  to  practical  Reason  and  sub- 
jects itself  to  the  guidance  of  the  Understanding 
and  the  natural  propensities,  it  renounces  its  high 
and  spiritual  character,  and  consents  to  become 
as  it  were  a  part  of  nature  ;  and  thus  the  whole 
man  becomes  carnal,  earthly,  selfish,  and  scarce- 
ly superior  to  the  brutes,  so  far  as  the  discharge 


164  GERMAN    PHILOSOPHY    IN    AMEHICA. 

of  his  duties  and  obligations  as  a  creature  of  God 
is  concerned.  And  this  is  the  radical  principle 
of  sin  or  depravity  in  fallen  man,  or  what  the 
scriptures  denominate  the  iiesh,the  carnal  mind, 
and  the  mindin<?  the  thin^rs  of  the  flesh.  And 
consequently,  the  recovery  of  man  from  this  sin- 
ful state,  is,  making  him  spiritual  or  spiritually 
minded  ;  it  is  excitmg-  his  debased  and  degraded 
Will  to  renounce  its  subjection  to  sense  and  to 
the  Understanding,  and  be  obedient  to  the  com- 
mands of  practical  Reason,  or  to  the  law  of  right, 
of  duty,  of  moral  obligation.  Now  both  scrip- 
ture and  experience  show,  that  when  the  Will 
has  been  long  enslaved  to  sense,  its  energies  are 
paralyzed,  and  divine  aid  or  supernatural  grace 
is  necessary  to  restore  it  to  sound  and  l^ealthy 
action.  Besides,  the  guilt  incurred  by  a  course 
of  criminal  disobedience  to  the  law  of  God,  pre- 
sents an  additional  obstacle  to  the  restoration  of 
the  sinner  to  the  favorable  regards  of  his  Creator. 
And  hence  the  necessity  of  a  divine  Redeemer 
for  fallen  man,  a  Redeemer  who  can  act  both  on 
and  in  the  V/ill,  and  can  stand  up  as  a  Mediator 
between  God  and  sinful  man.  (See  Aids,  &.C., 
p.  297,  iS^c.) 

Coleridge  has  moreover  taken  much  paii>s  to 
ascertain  the  precise  import  of  the  terms  pru- 
dence, morality,  and  spiritual  religion.  Prudence^ 


GERMAN    PHILOSOPHY    IN   AMERICA.  165 

he  says,  has  for  its  chief  organs  the  senses  and 
the  understanding.  Its  sole  aim  is  the  advance- 
ment of  our  personal  interest  or  happiness  ;  and 
it  is  especially  careful  to  guard  against  every 
thing  that  may  do  us  harm,  frustrate  our  plans, 
or  mar  our  happiness.  3Iorality  has  for  its 
chief  organ  the  heart,  or  the  natural  affections 
and  sympathies  of  our  nature  ;  and  it  seeks  the 
happiness  of  others,  hecause  we  find  pleasure  iu 
doing  so.  Spiritual  religion  has  for  its  organs 
free  Will  and  practical  Reason  ;  and  its  sole 
aim  is  to  make  the  whole  conduct  of  the  man  to 
harmonize  with  the  divine  law.  From  these 
definitions,  it  is  manifest  that  a  man  may  have 
and  may  exhibit  much  prudence  and  much 
morality,  and  yet  be  entirely  destitute  of  spir- 
itual religion. 

Such,  according  to  Coleridii^e,  are  some  of  the 
radical  principles  of  mental  philosophy ;  and 
they  are  of  very  high  importance  to  the  right 
understanding  and  the  vindication  of  the  pecul- 
iar doctrines  and  precepts  of  Christianity.  They 
give  us  clear  and  just  conceptions  of  the  apostacy 
of  man,  of  both  original  and  actual  sin,  of  that 
carnal  mind  whicli  is  enmity  against  God,  be- 
cause it  is  not  subject  to  the  law  of  God,  neither 
indeed  can  be  ;  and  hence  also,  of  that  redemp- 
tion which  is  bv  Jesus  Clirist,  of  regeneration  by 
'      II* 


166  GERMAN    PHILOSOPHY    IN    AMERICA* 

divine  grace,  and  of  that  holiness  williout  which 
no  man  shall  see  the  Lord.  Not  that  this  philo- 
sophy, or  any  other,  is  competent  to  teach  us 
originally  all  the  peculiar  doctrines  of  Christian- 
ity, or  to  demonstrate  their  truth,  without  the 
aid  of  revelation.  But  when  these  momentous 
truths  are  revealed  to  us,  this  philosophy  enables 
us  to  comprehend  them,  and  to  see  that  they  are 
reasonable,  and  are  worthy  of  all  acceptation  as 
comina:  from  God. 


CHAPTER   XV. 

AMERICAN    TRANSCEXDEXTALISM. 

Propriety  of  the  Name.    Its  Origin.    Its  Radical  Principles. 

That  species  of  German  Philosophy  which 
has  sprung  up  among  the  Unitarian  Clergy  of 
Massachusetts,  and  which  is  advocated  especial- 
ly in  a  recent  periodical  called  the  Dial,  is  known 
by  the  appellation  Tkanscendentalism.  The 
propriety  however  of  the  appellation,  may  be 
questioned.  Kant,  who,  so  far  as  I  know,  first 
brought  the  term  Transcendental  into  philosophy, 
would  certainly  not  apply  it  to  this  or  to  any 
similar  system.  He  would  denominate  it  Trans-  . 
CENDENT,  not  Transcendental.  The  difference, 
according  to  his  views,  is  immense.  Both  terms 
indeed  denote  the  surpassing  or  transcending  of 
certain  limits ;  but  the  limits  surpassed  are  en- 
tirely different.  That  is  called  Transcendental, 
which  surpasses  the  hmits  of  sensible  or  empi- 
rical knowledge  and  expatiates  in  the  region  of 
pure  thought  or  absolute  science.  It  is  therefore 
truly  scientific  ;  and  it  serves  to  explain  empiri- 
cal truths,  so  far  as  they  are  explicable.  On  the 
other  hand,  that  is  called  Transcendent,  which 


168  AMERICAN    TRANSCKNDENTALISM. 

not  only  f^oes  beyond  empiricism,  but  surpasses 
the  boundaries  of  human  knowledge.  It  expa- 
tiates in  the  shadowy  region  of  imaginary  truth. 
It  is,  therefore,  falsely  called  science  :  it  is  the 
opposite  of  true  philosophy.  A  balloon  sent  up 
by  a  besieging  array  to  overlook  the  ramparts  of 
a  fortification,  if  moored  by  cables,  whereby  its 
elevation,  its  movements,  and  its  safe  return  into 
camp  are  secured,  is  a  transcendental  thing  ;  but 
if  cut  loose  from  its  moorings  and  left  to  the 
meicy  of  the  winds,  it  is  transcendent ;  it  has  no 
connection  with  any  thing  stable,  no  regulator ; 
it  rises  or  descends,  moves  this  way  or  that  way, 
at  hap-hazard,  and  it  will  land,  no  one  knows 
where  or  when.  Now,  according  to  the  Critical 
Philosophy,  all  speculations  in  physical  science 
that  attempt  to  go  beyond  phenomena,  and  all 
speculations  on  supersensible  things  which  at- 
tempt to  explain  their  essential  nature,  are  trans- 
cendent  ;  that  is,  they  overleap  the  boundaries  of 
human  knowledge.  In  violation  of  these  can- 
ons, Fichte,  Schelling,  and  Hegel  plunged  head- 
long into  such  speculations,  and  yet  called  them 
Transcendental ;  and  the  new  German  Philoso- 
phers of  Massachusetts  follow  their  example. 

Waiving  however  this  misnomer, — as  every 
real  Kantian  must  regard  it,  we  will  call  this 
philosophy   Transcendental;  since  its  advocates 


AMERICAN    TRANSCENDEJhTALISM.  169 

choose  to  call  it  so,  and  seeing  the  name  has 
hecome  current  in  our  country.  And  we  will 
first  inquire  into  its  ori;L;in  among-  us,  and  then 
proceed  to  notice  its  prominent  characteristics. 

Origin  of  Transcendentalism  among  us. 

Accordinn;  to  tlieir  own  representations,  the 
believers  in  this  philosophy  are  Unitarian  clergy- 
men, who  had  for  some  time  been  dissatisfied 
with  the  Unitarian  system  of  theology.  They 
tell  us,  they  found  it  to  be  a  meagre,  uninterest- 
ing system,  which  did  not  meet  the  religious 
wants  of  the  community.  While  laboring  to 
improve  their  system  of  theology,  or  to  find  a 
better,  they  cast  their  eyes  on  foreign  countries. 
There  they  discovered  a  different  philosophy 
prevailing  ;  a  philosophy  which  gives  an  entirely 
new  version  to  Christianity,  invests  it  with  a  more 
spiritual  character,  with  more  power  to  move  the 
soul,  to  call  forth  warm  emotions,  and  to  produce 
communion  with  God.  This  phdosophy  they 
have  now  embraced.  Such,  they  inform  us,  was 
the  oriirin  of  Transcendentalism  amonij  them. — 
But  it  may  be  more  satisfiictory  to  give  their  own 
statements  on  this  head. 

The  Rev.  G.  Ripley,  or  whoever  Composed 
the  long  anonymous  letter  to  Prof.  Norton,  on 
his   Discourse    before  the   Alumni  of  the  Cam- 


170  AMERICAN    TRANSCEXDEXTALISM. 

bridge  Theological  School,  in  1830,  says  (pages 
11,  12)  :  '-'  In  our  happy  state  of  society,  as  there 
is  no  broad  line  of  distinction  between  the  clergy 
and  the  rest  of  the  community,  they  [the  Alumni] 
iiad  shared  in  the  influences,  which,  within  the 
last  few  years,  have  acted  so  strongly  on  the 
public  mind  :  with  intelligent  and  reflecting  men 
of  every  pursuit  and  persuasion,  many  of  them 
had  been  led  to  feel  the  necessity  of  a  more 
thorough  reform  in  iheology :  they  were  not 
satisfied  that  the  denial  of  the  Trinity  and  its 
kindred  doctrines  gave  them  possession  of  all 
spiritual  truth  :  they  wished  to  press  forward  in 
the  course  which  they  had  begun,  to  ascend  to 
higher  views,  to  gain  a  deeper  insight  into  Chris- 
tianity, to  imbibe  more  fully  its  divine  spirit,  and 
to  apply  the  truths  of  revelation  to  the  wants  of 
society  and  the  progress  of  man.  Their  experi- 
ence as  pastors  had  brought  them  into  contact 
with  a  great  variety  of  minds  ;  some  of  which 
were  dissatisfied  with  the  traditions  they  had 
been  taught ;  the  religion  of  the  day  seemed 
too  cold,  too  lifeless,  too  mechanical  for  many  of 
their  flock  ;  they  were  called  to  settle  difficul- 
ties in  theology  of  which  they  had  not  been 
advised  in  the  school ;  objections  were  presented 
by  men  of  discernment  and  acuteness,  which 
could  not  be  set  aside  by  the  learning  of  books  ; 


AMERICAN    TRANSCENDENTALISM.  171 

it  was  discovered  that  many  had  become  unable 
to  rest  their  religious  faith  on  the  fou||dation  of  a 
material  philosophy,  [viz.  the  empirical  philoso- 
phy of  Locke ;]  and  that  a  new  direction  must 
be  given  to  their  ideas,  or  they  would  be  lost  to 
Christianity,  and  possibly  to  virtue.  The  wants 
of  such  minds  could  not  be  concealed,"  &-c.  .  . 
.  ..."  In  the  course  of  the  inquiries  which 
they  had  entered  into,  for  their  own  satisfaction 
and  the  good  of  their  people,  they  had  become 
convinced  of  the  superiority  of  the  testimony  of 
X\iQ  soul  to  the  evidence  of  the  ex^eniflZ  senses; 
the  essential  character  of  Christianity,  as  a  prin- 
ciple o^  spiritual  faith,  of  reliance  on  the  Uni- 
versal Father,"  &-c. 

The  Rev.  O.  A.  Brownsox,  in  his  Charles 
Elwood,  (Boston,  1840,  p.  261,)  says:  "It  can 
not  have  escaped  general  observation,  that  reli- 
gion, for  some  time,  has  failed  to  exert  that  in- 
fluence over  the  mind  and  the  heart  that  it  should. 
There  is  not  much  open  skepticism,  not  much 
avowed  infidelity,  but  there  is  a  vast  amount  of 
concealed  doubt,  and  untold  difficulty.  Few,  very 
iQW  among  us  but  ask  for  more  certain  evidence 
of  the  Christian  faith  than  they  possess.  Many, 
many  are  the  confessions  to  this  effect,  which  I 
have  received  from  men  and  women  whose  reli- 
gious character  stands  fair  in  the   eyes  of  the 


172  AMKKICAX    TIIANSCEXDEXTALISIM. 

church.  I  Jmve  been  tol.l  by  men  of  unquestion- 
able piety,' 'that  the  oniy  means  they  have  to 
maintain  their  behef  even  in  God,  is  never  to 
suffer  themselves  to  inquire  into  the  grounds  of 
that  belief.  The  moment  they  ask  for  proofs, 
they  sa}^  they  begin  to  doubt.  Our  churches  are 
but  partially  Med,  and  the  majority  of  those  who 
attend  them  complain  that  they  are  not  fed." — 
— "Surely,  tiien,  it  is  time  to  turn  Christianity 
over  and  see  if  it  have  not  a  side  which  we  have 
not  hitherto  observed.  Perhaps  when  we  come 
to  see  it  on  another  side,  in  a  new  light  it  Vt  ill 
appear  unto  us  more  beautiful  and  have  greater 
power  to  attract  our  love  and  reverence." 

The  Rev.  R.  W.  Emehsox,  in  his  Address  to 
the  Senior  Theological  Class,  at  Cambridge,  in 
183S,  says,  (page  17,)  "  It  is  my  duty  to  say  to 
you,  that  the  Jieed  luus  never  greater  of  a  new 
rcuelatlon  than  now.  From  the  views  I  have 
already  expressed,  you  will  infer  the  sad  convic- 
tion, which  I  have,  I  believe,  with  numbers,  of 
the  universal  decay  and  now  almost  death  of 
faith  in  society.  The  soul  is  not  preached.  The 
church  seems  to  ^o^^cr  ^0  ?7s/<7//,  almost  all  life 
extinct."  Again,  (page  24,)  he  says  :  "  I  think 
no  man  can  go  with  his  thoughts  about  him,  into 
one  of  our  churches,  without  feeling  that  what 
hold  the  public  worship  once  had  on  men,  is  gone 


AMERICAN    TRANSCENDENTALISM.  173 

or  going.  It  has  lost  its  gra&p  on  the  affection 
of  the  good,  and  the  fear  of  the  bad.  In  the 
country  neighborhood?,  half  parishes  are  signing 
off, — to  use  the  local  term."  ....  And  (on 
})age  21.)  he  says  :  "  The  prayers  and  even  the 
dogmas  of  our  church,  are  like  the  zodiac  of 
Denderah,  and  the  astronomical  instruments  of 
the  Hindoos, wholly  insulated  from  anything  now 
extant  in  the  life  and  business  of  the  people. 
They  mark  the  height  to  which  the  waters  once 
rose." 

For  the  perfect  accuracy  of  these  statements, 
I  cannot  vouch  from  my  own  personal  knowl- 
edge. Nor  are  they  here  adduced  to  prove  the 
actual  state  of  the  Unitarian  congregations,  but 
simply  to  show  how  defective  the  Transcenden- 
talists  consider  the  Unitarian  theology,  and  of 
course,  the  grounds  of  ^//eir  dissatisfaction  with 
it. 

The  author  of  an  elaborate  and  highly  inter- 
esting article  in  the  Dial  for  April  1841,  entitled 
the  Unitarian  Movement  in  ISqw  England,  has 
given  a  very  philosophical  account  of  the  origin 
of  the  Unitarian  community  in  this  country,  as 
well  as  of  the  recent  rise  of  the  sect  of  Trans- 
cendentahsts  in  that  community.  According  to 
this  able  writer,  the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity,  and 
the  connected  doctrines  of  man's  deep-rooted 
12 


174  AMERICAN    TRA^SCENDE^TALISM. 

depravity,  and  his  dependence  on  divine  grace 
for  a  recovery  to  holiness  and  happiness,  will 
admit  of  a  satisfactory  explanation  and  vindica- 
tion, only  on  the  principles  of  the  Platonic,  or 
(as  we  have  called  it)  the  metaphysical  philoso- 
phy. On  the  principles  of  the  sensuous  or  empi- 
rical philosophy,  as  he  supposes,  a  Trinity  in  the 
Godhead  is  an  absurdity,  and  the  connected  doc- 
trines mysterious  and  inexplicable.  But,  as  is 
well  knovv^n,  from  the  days  of  Locke  this  latter 
philosophy  held  the  ascendency  ;  or  rather,  it 
was,  until  quite  recently,  the  only  philosophy 
known  in  the  country.  While  addicted  to  such 
a  philosophy,  our  theolot^ians  could  not  reason 
closely  on  the  articles  of  their  faith,  without 
meeting  with  difficulties  and  perplexities  :  and 
they  were  in  great  danger  of  falling  into  different 
opinions  respecting  the  Christian  doctrines.  At 
the  same  time,  the  orthodox  creeds  forbade  any 
deviation  from  the  established  faith.  The  result 
was,  that  those  most  given  to  free  inquiry,  fell 
into  Unitarianism,  and  the  doctrines  connected 
with  that  system.  Thus  originated,  according 
to  this  writer,  the  Unitarian  movement  in  New 
England:  for  he  says  expressly,  (page  431,) 
"  We  regard  it  [Unitarianism,]  as  the  result  of 
an  attempt  to  explain  Christianity  by  the  sensual 
philosophy,   instigated  by  a  desire  to  get  rid  of 


AMKRICAN    TRANSCEXDEXTALIS3I.  175 

mystery,  and  to  make  every  thing  clear  and 
simple." 

Tlie  proximate  causes  of  the  rise  of  Trans- 
<;endentahsm  among  the  Unitarians,  are  thus 
described  by  this  writer,  (page  422 — 3) :  "  The 
Unitarian  movement  disenthralled  the  minds  of 
men,  and  bade  them  wander  wheresoever  they 
might  list  in  search  of  truth,  and  to  rest  in  what- 
soever views  their  own  consciences  miirht  ao- 
prove.  The  attention  of  our  students  was  then 
called  to  the  literature  of  foreisrn  countries. — 
They  wished  to  see  how  went  tlie  battle  against 
sin  and  error  there.  They  soon  found  a  differ- 
ent philosophy  in  vogue,  and  one  which  seemed 
to  explain  the  facts  of  their  own  experience  and 
observation  more  to  their  satisfaction,  than  the 
one  they  had  been  accustomed  to  meet  in  their 
books.  In  most  cases  the  pleasure  of  the  dis- 
covery was  heightened  by  the  fact,  that  these 
men,  in  their  previous  inquiries,  had  come  to  the 
same  or  similar  conclusions.  In  some  cases 
they  had  been  too  ditiident  to  express  them, 
while  in  others  the  expression  of  them  had  called 
forth   manifest  indications  of  disapprobation,  i^ 

not  of  open    persecution." The   concluding 

sentences  in  this  quotation  shew,  that  the  Trans- 
cendentalists,  before  they  became  acquainted 
with  foreign  philosophy,  were  not  satisfied  witii 


176  AMERICAN    TRANSCENDENTALISM. 

the  Unitarian  system  of  theology  ^  and  that  some 
of  them  had,  at  that  time,  arrived  at  nearly  their 
present  theological  views,  the  expressions  of 
which  then  met  the  disaj)probation,  if  not  the 
open  persecution  of  the  staunch  Unitarians. — 
The  inconsistency  of  the  Unitarian  body  in  ad- 
vocating unhmited  freedom  of  inquiry,  and  then 
censuring  the  Transcendentaiists  for  practising 
it,  is  severely  rebuked  in  the  following  passage, 
(page  434,)  "  They  have  made  a  great  move- 
ment in  favor  of  freedom  of  inquiry,  and  thor- 
ouo:hness  and  fearlessness  of  investigation  ;  and 
now,  like  the  witch  of  Endor,  they  seem  terrified 
at  the  spirit  they  have  called  up.  This  would 
seem  to  indicate  that  the  movement  in  favor  of 
freedom  and  liberty  was  not  the  offspring  of 
pure,  disinterested  love  of  truth  and  princij)le." 
The  defects  of  the  Unitarian  theology  are  de- 
scribed by  this  able  writer,  in  the  following  terms, 
(page  436,)  "  Unitarians  make  Christianity  too 
plain,  plainer  than  from  the  very  nature  of  the 
case  it  can  possibly  be." "  There  is,  more- 
over, a  degree  of  religious  experience  that  Uni- 
tarianism  fails  to  satisfy,"  [Page  438] :  "  Uni- 
tarianism  is  sound,  sober,  good  sense.  But  the 
moment  a  i)reacher  rises  to  eloquence  he  rises 
out  of  his   system,"     [^^gG  440]  :  "  We  think 


AMERICAN   TRANSCENDENTALISM.  177 

that  in  its  principles  and  logical  tendency,  it  is 
allied  to  the  most  barren  of  all  systems." 

Characteristics  of  the   Transcendental  Philoso- 
phy. 

None  of  theTranscendentahsts  of  this  country 
are  Philosophers  by  profession.  Nearly  all  of 
them  are  clergymen,  of  the  Unitarian  school ; 
and  their  habits  of  thought,  their  feelings,  and 
their  aims,  are  manifestly  theological.  Nor  do 
they  give  us  proof  that  they  have  devoted  very 
great  attention  to  philosophy  as  a  science.  They 
have  produced,  I  believe,  no  work  professedly  on 
the  subject,  not  even  an  elementary  treatise  ; 
and,  if  I  do  not  mistake,  they  have  brought  for- 
ward no  new  views  or  principles  in  philosophy. 
So  far  as  I  can  judge,  they  have  merely  taken 
up  the  philosophy  of  Victor  Cousin,  and,  after 
comparing  it  according  to  their  opportunity  with 
that  of  the  more  recent  German  schools,  have 
modified  a  little  some  of  its  dicta,  and  applied 
them  freely  to  scientific  and  practical  theology. 
At  the  same  time  they  take  little  pains,  to  eluci- 
date and  explain  the  principles  of  their  new  phi- 
losophy. They  address  us,  as  if  we  all  read  and 
understood  their  favorite  Cousin,  and  were  not 
ignorant  of  the  speculations  of  the  German  pan- 
theists :  and  their  chief  aim  seems  to  be,  to  shew 
12* 


178  AMERICAN    TKANSCENDENTALISM. 

US  how  much  better  thisGallo-Germanic  philoso- 
phy explains  the  religion  of  nature  and  of  the 
bible,  than  the  old  pJiilosophy  cf  Locke  and  the 
Scottish  school.  Whoever,  therefore,  would  un- 
derstand the  Transcendental  writers,  must  first 
understand,  if  he  can,  the  French  philosopher 
Cousin  and  the  German  pantheists. 

The  philosophy  of  Cousin,  as  well  as  that  of 
the  modern  Germans,  we  have  attempted  to  de- 
scribe very  briefly,  in  the  preceding  chapters  ; 
and  to  them  the  reader  is  referred. 

Cousin  maintains  that,  by  taking  a  higher 
point  of  observation,  he  has  brought  all  previous 
systems  of  philosophy  to  harmonize  with  each 
•other.  [See  his  Introd.  to  Hist,  of  Phil,  by  Lin- 
berg,  page  414.]  He  therefore  adopts,  and  uses 
at  pleasure,  the  peculiar  phraseology  of  all  the 
systems,  as  being  all  suited  to  express  his  own 
new  views.  This  causes  his  writings  to  exhibit, 
iiot  only  great  variety,  but  apparently,  if  not 
really,  great  inconsistency  of  terminology.  And 
Jience  different  persons,  aiming  to  follow  him  as 
a  guide,  may  easily  mistake  his  meaning,  and 
adopt  different  principles  ;  or,  if  they  adopt  the 
same  principles,  they  may  express  themselves  in 
a  very  different  manner.  And,  if  we  suppose 
the  same  persons,  with  only  a  moderate  share  of 
philosophic  learning   and    philosophic    tact,  to 


AMERICAN    TRANSCENDENTALISM.  179 

attempt  to  re-construct  the  philosophy  of  Cousin, 
by  comparing  it  with  the  German  systems  from 
which  it  is  taken,  and  at  the  same  time  to  adopt 
Cousin's  lax  use  of  language  ;  we  may  easily 
conceive,  what  confusion  of  thought  and  obscu- 
rity of  statement  may  appear  on  their  pages. 
Now  the  Transcendentalists,  if  I  do  not  mistake, 
have  thus  followed  Cousin.  Of  course,  they 
differ  considerably  from  one  another ;  some  fol- 
lowing Cousin  more  closely,  and  others  leaning 
more  towards  some  German  ;  some  preferring 
one  set  of  Cousin's  terms,  and  others  another, 
or  coining  new  ones  to  suit  their  fancy.  After 
all,  Linberg's  translation  of  Cousin's  Introduc- 
tion to  the  History  of  Philosophy  may  be  consid- 
ered as  the  great  store  house,  from  which  most 
of  them — e.  g.  Brownson,  Emerson,  Parker,  &c. 
— have  derived  their  peculiar  philosophical  opin- 
ions, their  modes  of  reasoning,  and  their  forms 
of  thought  and  expression. 

The  radical  principle  of  the  Transcendental 
philosophy,  the  corner  stone  of  the  whole  edifice, 
is,  Cousin's  doctrine  that  Spontaneous  Reason 
acquaints  us  with  the  true  and  essential  nature 
of  things.  According  to  this  doctrine,  Reason, 
when  uncontrolled  by  the  Will,  or  when  left  free 
to  expatiate  undirected  and  uninfluenced  by  the 
voluntary  faculty,  always  apprehends  things  as 


180  AMEIUCAN    TRANSCENDENTALISM. 

tliey  arc,  or  has  direct  and  absolute  knowledf^e 
of  the  objects  of  its  contemplation.  This  clair- 
voyance of  Reason,  Cousin  calls  "  an  instinc- 
tive perception  of  truth,  an  entirely  instinctive 
development  of  thought," "  an  original,  irre- 
sistible, and  unreflective  perception  of  truth," 
"pure  apperception,  and  spontaneous  faith," — 
"  the  absolute  affirmation  of  truth,  without  re- 
flection,— inspiration, — veritable  revelation." — 
[Introd.  &c.  pages  163,  167,  172,  166.]  The 
characteristics  of  this  kind  of  knovvledofe,  as 
being  immediate,  and  infallible,  though  not  al- 
ways perfectly  distinct  at  first,  and  as  being 
divine,  or  as  coming  from  God  either  directly  or 
indirectly,  all  Transcendentalists  maintain.  But 
in  what  manner,  or  by  what  mode  of  action,  our 
Reason  acquires  this  knowledge,  they  do  not  dis- 
tinctly inform  us.  Whether  our  Creator  has  en- 
dowed us  with  an  intellectual  instinct,  a  power 
of  rational  intuition ;  or  whether  the  rational 
soul,  as  itself  partaking  of  the  divine  nature, 
has  this  inherent  sagacity  An  and  of  itself;  or 
whether  the  divine  Being,  God  himself,  is  al- 
ways present  in  the  soul  and  acting  in  it  by  way 
of  inspiration,  these  philosophers  seem  not  to 
have  decided.  They  use  terms,  however,  which 
fairly  imply  each  and  all  of  these  hypotheses, 
and  especially  the  last.     But  however  undecided 


AMERICAN    TRANSCENDKXTALISM.  181 

on  this  point,  which  is  of  so  much  importance  in 
a  philosophic  view,  on  tlie  g'eneral  fact  that  all 
rational  beings  do  possess  this  knowledge,  they 
are  very  explicit ;  and  some  of  them  attempt  to 
prove  it,  by  reasoning  from  the  necessity  of  such 
knowledge  to  us,  and  from  the  current  belief  of 
mankind.  [See  Cousin's  Psychology,  Chap.  vi. 
and  a  writer  in  the  Dial,  vol.  ii.  page  80,  &c.] 

The  effects  of  this  principle,  when  carried  into 
theology,  are  immense.  It  dispels  all  mysteries 
and  all  obscurities  from  this  most  profound  of 
all  sciences,  and  gives  to  human  Reason  absolute 
dominion  over  it.  For,  it  makes  the  divine  Be- 
ing, his  government  and  laws,  and  our  relations 
to  him,  and  all  our  religious  obligations  and  in- 
terests,— every  part  of  theology,  theoretical  or 
practical, — perfectly  comprehensible  to  our  Rea- 
son in  its  spontaneous  operation.  It  makes  all 
the  doctrines  of  natural  religion  the  objects  of 
our  direct,  intuitive  knowledge  :  we  need  no  ex- 
planations and  no  confirmations  from  any  books 
or  teachers ;  we  have  only  to  listen  to  the  voice 
of  spontaneous  Reason,  or  to  the  teachings  of 
our  own  souls,  the  light  that  shines  within  us, 
and  all  will  be  perfectly  intelligible  and  absolute- 
ly certain.  And  hence,  we  need  no  external 
revelation^  no  inspired  teacher,  to  solve  our 
doubts  and  difficulties,  or  to    make   any  part  of 


182  AMERICAN    TRANSCENDENTALISM. 

natural  religion,  or  any  principle  of  moral  duty, 
either  more  plain  or  more  certain.  We  are,  all 
of  us,  prophets  of  God,  all  inspired  tlirough  our 
Reason,  and  we  need  no  one  to  instruct  and 
enlighten  us.  Tlie  great  Seers  of  ancient  times, 
Moses  and  t!ie  prophets,  Christ  and  the  apostles, 
were  no  otherwise  inspired  than  we  all  are  ;  they 
only  cultivated  and  listened  to  spontaneous  Rea- 
son more  than  ordinary  men  ;  and  this  enabled 
them  to  see  further  and  to  speak  and  write  better 
than  other  men  on  rcli<rious  subjects.  If  we 
would  determine  whether  the  hibh  was  ^vritten 
by  inspired  men,  we  need  not  pore  upon  the  so 
called  external  evidences,  miracles,  prophecies, 
&:.c.  but  merely  listen  to  the  testimony  of  our  own 
souls,  the  teachings  of  spontaneous  Reason,  or 
what  is  called  the  internal  evidence,  and  we 
shall  at  once  see  the  clear  and  infallibie  marks 
of  inspiration.  And  to  understand  the  bible,  we 
need  no  aid  from  learned  interpreters.  Only  give 
us  the  book  in  a  language  we  can  read,  and  the 
suggestions  of  our  own  inspired  minds  will  ena- 
ble us  to  compreliend  perfectly  the  import  of 
every  sentence,  and  to  see  clearly  what  is  divine 
and  what  is  human,  or  what  originated  from 
spontaneous  Reason  and  wliat  from  human  in- 
firmity, in  the  holy  scriptures.  And  of  course, 
every  man  is  competent  to  decide,  definitely  and 


AMERICAN    TRANSCENDEXTALISM.  183 

infallibly,  all  the  controversies  among  theologians 
and  all  the  disputes  between  different  sects  of 
Christians,  respecting  the  doctrines  taught  in  the 
bible.  In  short,  not  only  the  profound  researches 
of  philologists,  antiquarians,  and  biblical  com- 
mentators, but  also  the  elaborate  discussions  of 
didactic  theologians,  polemic,  apologetic,  and 
metaphysical,  are  all  of  little  or  no  value  in  the- 
ology. Instead  of  depending  on  them,  the  the- 
ological inquirer  should  rather  retire  to  solitude 
and  silence,  and  while  musing  on  religious  sub- 
jects, with  the  bible  and  the  book  of  nature  be- 
fore him,  he  should  refrain  from  giving  any  de- 
terminate direction  to  his  thoughts,  and  allowing 
them  to  flow  on  spontaneously,  he  should  listen 
to  the  voice  of  Reason  as  she  expatiates  freely 
in  the  open  field  of  visions ;  then  he  will  be 
caught  up,  as  it  were,  to  the  third  heaven,  and 
will  see  all  that  the  inspired  prophets  saw ;  his 
knowledge   will  be    superhuman  and  divine. 

But  to  understand  more  fully  the  metaphysics 
of  the  Transcendental  writers,  we  must  not  over- 
look their  ontological  doctrines.  If  Reason  ac- 
quaints us  with  the  true  and  essential  nature  of 
all  things,  then  the  field  of  ontology  is  open  fully 
to  our  inspection,  and  we  may  form  there  a  per- 
fectly solid  and  safe  science.  Accordingly,  all 
Transcendentalists,  on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic, 


184  AMERICAN    TRANSCKNDKNTALISM. 

assume  some  system  of  oiitoloiry  as  the  basis  of 
their  speculations.  The  prevaihng  system  among 
the  modern  Germans,  and  that  to  which  Cousin 
and  his  American  followers  assent,  is  pantheistic: 
that  is,  it  resolves  the  universe   into  one  primor- 
dial  Bein^,   who    develops    himself  in    various 
finite  forms  :  in  other  words,   it   supposes  God 
and  the  developments  of  God,  to  be  the  only  real 
existences,  the  ro  7ri/.v,tlie  entire  universe.     But 
when  they  attempt  to  explain  this  general  state- 
ment, the  Germans  bring  forward  difi'ierent  hypo- 
theses.     Some,   following    Spinoza,   invest  the 
primordial  Being  with  the  essential  attributes   of 
both  a  substance   and  a  person  ;  and   they  sup- 
pose   him    to     create     from      himself,     or    to 
form     out    of     his     own     substance,      all    ra- 
tional   and    sentient    beings    and    all    material 
things.     Others,  with  Schelling,  suppose  him  to 
be  originally  neither  a  person  nor  a  substance, 
but  the   elementary  principle  of  both,  which,  in 
developing   itself,  becomes  first  a  person   and  a 
substance,  and  then  a    universe   of  beings  and 
things.     Others  follow  Hegel,  and  adopt  a  sys- 
tem of  pure  idealism.     They  suppose    concrete 
ideas  to  be    the  only  real   existences,    and  the 
logical  genesis  of  ideas  to  be  the  physical  gen- 
esis of  the   universe.     Take  the  simple  idea  of 
existence,  and  abstract  from  it  every  thing  coi> 


AMKRICA?^'    THANSC; 


ceivable,  sotlmt  it  shall  become  evanescent ;  and 
in  tha#evanescent  state, while  fltvctimtiiig  between 
something  and    nothing,  it  is  the  pf'hTiitivS^,  the 
generative  principle  of   all  things.     For  it  is  the 
most  comprehensive  or  generical   of  all    ideas, 
including  all  other  ideas  under  it  as  subordinate 
genera  and  species  ;  and  therefore,  when  expan- 
ded or  drawn   out    into  the    subordinate   genera 
and  species,  it  becomes  the  ro  ttxv^  the  universe 
of  beings  and   things.     Vacillating    among    all 
these  theories,   especially   between  the   two  last, 
and  trying  to  amalgamate  them  all  in  one,  Cou- 
sin, without   exhibiting   any  very  definite  ideas, 
merely  declares  the  Infinite  to  be   the  primitive, 
and   all  that  is   finite  to   be  derivative  from  the 
Infinite,  while  yet  both  the  Infinite  and  the  finite 
are  so  inseparable  that  neither  can  exist  without 
the  other. The  appellation  Pantheists^  it  ap- 
pears, is  unacceptable  to  Cousin,  and  to  most  of 
liis  American  followers  ;  but  some  of  the  latter 
voluntarily  assume  it ;  and  they  unscrupulously 
apply   it  to   all   Transcendentalists.     That  the 
doctrines  of  the  Transcendentalists,  as  well  as 
those    of  Spinoza,  Schelling,    and    Hegel,    are 
really  and  truly  pantheistic^  appears   from   the 
fact  that  they  all  hold  to  but  one  essence,  or  one 
substance,  in  the  universe.  They  expressly  deny, 
that  God  created   or  produced  the  world  out  of 
113 


180  AMERICAN    TRANSCEXDE\TAL1SM, 

nothings  or  that  he  gave  existence  to  beings  and 
things  the  substance  or  matter  of  which  had  no 
previous  existence :  tliey  say,  he  created  or 
brought  forth  the  world //ow  himself^  or  formed 
it  out  of  his  own  suhstaiice ;  and  also,  that  he 
still  exists  in  the  created  universe,  and  the  cre- 
ated universe  in  him,  thus  constituting  an  abso- 
lute unity^  as  to  essence  or  substance.  That  the 
e^iihei  pantheistic  may  properly  be  applied  to 
such  doctrines,  seems  not  to  be  deniable.  [See 
Krug's  Philos.  Lexikon  ;  art.  Pantheismus.'] 

As  Pantheists,  the  Transcendentalists  must 
behold  God,  or  the  divine  nature  and  essence,  in 
every  thing  that  exists.  Of  course,  none  of  them 
can  ever  doubt  the  existence  of  God^  or  be  in 
the  least  danger  of  atheism  ;  for  they  cannot 
believe  any  thing  to  exist,  without  finding  God 
in  it :  they  see  him,  they  feel  him,  they  have 
sensible    perception    of    his    very    substance   in 

every  object  around. Moreover,  if  our  souls 

are  only  portions  of  the  Divinity,  if  they  are 
really  God  working  in  us,  then  there  is  solid 
ground  for  the  belief  that  si^ontancous  Reason 
always  sees  the  true  nature  of  things,  or  has 
divine  knowledge  of  the  objects  of  its  contem- 
plation.  And  again,  if  it  is  the  Divine  Nature 

which  lives  and  acts  in  all  creatures  and  things, 
then  all  their  action  is  Divine  action.     All  crea- 


AMERICAN    TRANSCENDENTALISM.  187 

ted  inteljigences  think,  and  feel,  and  act,  as 
God  acts  in  them  ;  and  of  course,  precisely  as 
He  would  have  tliein.  There  can,  then,  be 
nothing  icrong^  nothing  sinful.,  in  the  character 
or  conduct  of  any  rational  beinir.  .  There  may 
be  imperfection,  or  imperfect  action,  because  the 
whole  power  of  God  is  not  exerted  ;  but  every 
act,  so  far  as  it  goes,  is  just  what  it  should  be, 
just  such  as  best  pleases  God.  And  hence, 
though  men  may  sigh  over  their  imperfections, 
or  may.  ardently  desire  and  strive  to  become 
more  perfect,  yet  they  can  have  no  reason  for 
repentance^  for  sorrow  and  shame  and  self-con- 
demnation, for  any  thing  they  have  done  or  have 
omitted  to  do.  Neither  can  they  feel  themselves 
to  need  any  radical  change  of  character,  to  make 
them  acceptable  to  God  ;  or  any  Redeemer,  to 
rescue  them  from  impending  perdition.  All 
they  need,  is,  to  foster  the  divinity  within,  to 
give  it  more  full  scope  and  more  perfect  action  ; 
then  they  will  become  all  that  it  is  possible  they 
should  be,  and  all  they  can  reasonably  desire. — 
These  inferences  from  their  principles,  are  not 
palmed  upon  Transcendentalists  by  their  adver- 
saries, but  are  admitted  and  defended  by  their 
ablest  writers.  Says  one  of  them,  whom  we 
have  before  quoted,  [Dial,  vol.  i.  pages  423 — 4,] 
"  Holding  as  they  do  but  one  essence  of  all^things, 


188 


AMF.RICAX    TItANSCENDEN  rALIS>r. 


which  essence  is  God,  Pantheists  must  deny  the 
existence  of  essential  evil.  All  evil  is  negative, 
— it  is  imperfection,  non-growth.  It  is  not  es- 
sential, but  modal.  Of  course  there  can  be  no 
such  thing  as  hereditary  sin, — a  tendency  posi- 
tively sinful  in  the  soul.  Sin  is  not  a  wilful 
transgression  of  a  righteous  law,  but  the  difficul- 
ty and  obstruction  which  the  Infinite  meets  with 
in  entering  into  the  finite.  Regeneration  is  noth- 
ing but  an  ingress  of  God  into  the  soul,  before 
which  sin  disappears  as  darkness  before  the  ris- 
ing sun.  Pantheists  hold  also  to  the  atonement, 
or  at-one-ment  between  the  soul  and  God.  This 
is  strictly  a  unity  or  oneness  of  essence,  to  be 
brought  about  by  the  incarnation  of  the  spirit  of 
God,  [in  us,]  which  is  going  on  in  us  as  we  grow 
in  holiness.  As  we  grow  wise, just,  and  pure, — 
in  a  word,  holy, — we  grov/  to  be  one  with  him 
in  mode,  as  we  always  were  in  essence.  This 
atonement  is  effected  by  Christ,  only  in  as  far 
as  he  taught  the  manner  in  which  it  was  to  be 
be  accomplished  more  fully  than  any  other,  and 
gave  us  a  better  illustration  of  the  method  and 
result  in  his  own  person  than  any  ojie  else  that 
has  ever  lived." 


CHAPTER    XVI. 

PHILOSOPHY    OF    DR.    RAUCH. 

Biographical  Notice. — His  Psychology — Transcendental — 
Hegelian. — Outline  of  his  Philosophy. — Its  bearing  on 
Theology. 

The  Rev.  Frederic  A.  R.vuch,  Ph.  D.,  late 
President  of  Marshall  College,  Penii.,  was  born 
in  Hesse  Darmstadt,  in  the  year  1806.  His  fa- 
ther, a  pious  and  orthodox  clergyman  of  the  Ger- 
man Reformed  Church,  is  still  living,  and  is  an 
active  pastor  in  the  vicinity  of  Frankfort  on  the 
Maine.  Dr.  Ranch  received  his  education  at 
Marburg,  Giessen,  and  Heidelberg,  and  became 
a  Professor  in  the  two  last  named  places.  In 
some  of  his  lectures  at  Heidelberg  he  uttered  his 
thoughts  too  freely  on  the  affairs  of  government, 
and  found  it  necessary  to  flee  the  country.  He 
came  to  America  in  1831.  The  next  year,  he 
took  charge  of  the  classical  school  connected 
with  the  Theological  Seminary  of  the  German 
Reformed  Synod  at  York,  Pennsylvania ;  and 
on  the  removal  of  that  institution  to  Mercersberg 
in  1836,  he  was  made  President  of  the  College, 
and  Professor  of  Biblical  Literature  in  the  Sem- 
13* 


190  riTiLosoniY  of  dr.  raucii. 

inaiy.  He  died  on  tlie  2d  of  Marcli,  1841,  in 
the  35l1i  year  of  his  age.  (Sec  an  Obituary  No- 
tice in  the  New  York  Observer,  Marcli  27,  IS41  ; 
and  the  Prehminary  Notice  to  Ranch's  Psychol- 
ogy, 2d  edition.) 

Dr.  llauch  was  one  of  that  class  of  German 
philosopliers,  who,  embracing  fully  the  transcen- 
dental speculations  of  Schelling  and  Hegel,  have 
labored  to  reconcile  them  with  the  religion  of  the 
bible.  The  two  most  prominent  men  of  this  par- 
ty in  Germany,  have  been  Dr.  Philip  Marheine- 
ke  of  Berlin,  and  Dr.  Charles  Daub  of  Heidel- 
berg. The  former  is  still  living,  and  is  the  editor 
of  the  Works  of  Hegel,  and  also  of  the  Works  of 
Daub,  who  died  in  1836.  The  biographer  of 
Dr.  Rauch  characterizes  Daub,  as  being  a  "  gi- 
ant in  the  sphere  of  mind,"  and  "  a  man  who 
had  followed  Kant,  Schelling,  and  Hegel,  to  the 
farthest  bounds  of  speculation,  without  surren- 
dering for  a  moment  his  firm  hold  upon  the  great 
objects  of  faith."  This  metaphysical  giant,  wlio 
travelled  the  whole  round  from  Kantism  to  He- 
gelism,  is  best  known  by  his  mystical  work  on 
the  nature  and  origin  of  Evil,  intitled,  Judas  Is- 
cariot,  or  Evil  in  its  relation  to  Good  ;  Heidelb. 
1816 — 18.  8vo.  Dr.  Rauch  was  the  favorite 
pupil  of  Daub  ;  who,  it  is  said,  "had  fixed  his  eye 
upon  him  as  a  young  man  of  more  than  common 


rillLOSOPIlY    OF    DI?.    RAUCII.  191 

promise,  who  might  be  expected  to  do  good  ser- 
vice in  the  cause  of  science,  in  tiie  department  to 
which  he  wished  to  consecrate  his  hfe."  The 
doctrines  wliicli  Daub  instilled  into  the  mind  of 
his  pupiJ,  Dr.  Ranch  appears  to  have  brought 
with  him  to  America,  and  to  have  retained  as  long 
as  he  lived. 

The  first  and  only  publication  of  Dr.  Ranch 
in  this  country,  was  his  Psychology,  or  View  of 
the  Human  Soul,  including  Anthropology;  first 
published  in  1840,  and  revised  by  him  for  a 
second  edition,  1841.  Tiie  subject  of  this  w^ork, 
like  that  of  most  German  treatises  on  Psycholo- 
gy, and  like  the  English  treatises  on.  Mental  Phi- 
losophy, is  Empirical  Psychology,  not  Rational 
or  Speculative  Psychology.  That  is,  it  embra- 
ces that  knowledge  of  the  human  Mind,  whic4i 
is  derived  from  experience  and  observation  ;  not 
that  which  is  obtained  by  philosophical  specula- 
tions on  the  nature  and  properties  of  the  soul.  It 
therefore  has  but  little  to  do  with  Philosophy 
in  tlie  proper  sense  of  the  term,  or  with  strictly 
rational  science.  It  treats  of  empirical  knowl- 
edge, not  of  that  which  is  scientific.  Still  there 
is  a  philosophy  underlying  it,  which  it  is  not  dif- 
ficult to  discover  ;  and  that  philosophy  is  mani- 
festly transcendental^  and  derived  from  the  school 
of  Hegel, 


193  PHILOSOPHY    OF    DR.    RArCH. 

Dr.  Ranch,  being  a  man  of  genius,  and  famil- 
iar with  the  numerous  and  learned  works  of  the 
Germans  on  Psychology,  and  having  access  to 
the  more  recent  investigations  of  his  countrymen 
in  physical  science,  has  been  able  to  embody  in 
his  work  much  that  is  new  and  interesting  to 
American  readers,  especially  in  the  mode  of 
explaining  and  illustrating  the  mental  phenome- 
na. In  the  first  part  of  his  work  entitled  Anthro- 
pology, he  treats  largely  o^  Life,  both  in  vegeta- 
bles and  animals  ;  of  Instinct,  as  a  part  of  ani- 
mal nature  ;  and  of  the  influence  of  external 
Nature  on  the  Mind,  and  of  the  Mind  on  the 
body.  In  the  second  part,  or  l*sychology  prop- 
er, he  treats  oi  Self -consciousness,  the  distinguish- 
ing mark  of  a  rational  being  :  and  of  our  two 
mental  faculties,  Reason  and  Will.  Reason  in 
man  has  three  modes  of  action.  Sensation,  Intel- 
lect, and  Pure  Thinking.  The  Will,  in  the 
natural  or  unregenerate  man,  follows  the  natural 
Desires,  Inclinations,  Emotions,  and  Passions  : 
in  the  regenerate,  it  follows  the  Divine  Will. 
Some  concise  remarks  on  true  and  false  Religion 
conclude  the  work.  The  short  chapter  on  Pure 
Thinking,  is  the  only  part  of  the  book  that  di- 
rectly treats  on  speculative  Philosophy  :  but  phi- 
losophical remarks  and  observations  occur 
throughout  the  work. 


PHILOSOPHY    OF    DJl.    KAUCH.  193 

As  a  phiJosoplier,  Dr.  Raueli  was  a  Transcen- 
dentalist :  for,  he  maintains  that  our  Reason 
gives  us  objective  knowledge  of  things,  and  not 
merely  subjective  knowledge.  Thus  in  the  de- 
partment of  nature  or  the  material  world,  he  sup- 
poses our  knowledge  to  extend  beyond  Phenom- 
ena, and  to  embrace  what  Kant  calls  Noumcna. 
After  describing  the  Conceptions  of  the  Under- 
standing as  being  mental  Images  of  objects  exis- 
ting in  nature,  he  says,  page  227  :  "  The  image 
is  the  same  as  the  thing  it  represents, . . .  the  same 
as  the  object;  for  it  cannot  be  without  it,  and,  un- 
less it  includes  what  the  object  includes,  it  is  not 

its  true  image The  image  has  therefore  the 

same  contents  as  the  object,  with  this  difference, 
the  one  has  them  as  they  exist  in  the  mind,  ide- 
ally, the  other  as  they  are  in  the  material  thing 
really.  We  would  say,  therefore,  by  the  power 
of  conceiving,  the  contents  of  an  object,  and  the 
object  itself,  become  contents  oj  our  conceptions 
or  images."  So  also,  in  regard  to  supersensible 
objects,  or  things  in  the  world  of  thought  and  of 
ideas,  he  supposes  we  have  power  to  discover 
their  real  essence,  or  their  ontological  nature. — 
Describing  the  objects  which  are  the  subject  mat- 
ter of  Pure  Thinking,  he  says,  page  281:  "They 
are  wholly  general  ;  and  as  such  have  no  exis- 
tence independent   ofthiid\ing.     Yet  they  truly 


194  PHILOSOPHY    OF   DR.    RAUCH, 

exist ;  tlicj  are  not  a  mere  abstraction  ;  tliey  are 
the  pure  being  and  nature  of  individual  things, 
their  soul  and  ///c."  And  we  sliall  see,  as  we 
proceed,  that  lie  undertakes  to  tell  us  prcciscFj 
what  is  the  essential  tiature  of  the  human  soul  or 
mind;  of  life  also,  both  in  vegetable  and  animal 
bodies  ;  and  indeed,  of  all  the  mysterious  po2^'t7s 
which  operate  in  any  part  of  the  created  uni- 
verse. 

Being  a  Transcendentalist,  Dr.  Rauch  was  di- 
ametrically opposed  to  tli^e  views  of  Kant,  whos*? 
Critical  Philosophy  has  for  its  chief  aim  to  over- 
throw all  Transcendentalism,  or  as  Kant  would 
rather  call  it,  Transcendentism.  Kant  supposed 
an  impassable  gulf  to  lie  between  subjective  and 
objective  knowledge  in  all  created  things.  But 
Transcendentalists  either  discover  no  gulf  there, 
or  they  suppose  they  have  found  out  a  way  to 
transcend  and  fairly  get  over  it. 

As  a  Transcendental  philosopher,  Dr.  Rauch 
belonged  to  the  school  of  Hegel,  and  not  to  that 
of  Schelling.  For,  his  whole  chapter  on  Pure 
Thinking  shews  that  he  did  not,  with  Schelling, 
regard  ^a  knowledge  of  the  essential  nature  ©f 
things  as  attainable  by  mere  inspection,  or  by  a 
rational  intuition  ;  hut,  with  Ilegel,  he  consider- 
ed such  knowledge  as  the  result  of  a  logical  pro- 
cess^ a  generalization y  or  as  he  denominates  it. 


VKrLOSOPHY    OF    DR.    RAUCH.  195 

Pare  Thinking.  Thus  he  writes,  page  275: — • 
*'  Thinking  is  the  true  basis  of  all  our  knowledge, 
for  until  we  have  penetrated  our  conceptions  by 
thought,  until  we  know  their  nature,  their  ground, 
their  connexion  with  each  other,  we  have  no  sci- 
encey  He  says  also,  page  277  :  "  Thinking  is 
that  activity  of  mind  which  generalizes.  *  *  * 
The  generality  here  s]>oken  of,  is  not  gained  by 
<^ih  sir  action^  but  by  position  ;  it  is  not  the  pro- 
duct o^man,  nor  of  any  object^  it  is  neither  sub- 
jective nor  objective^  but  above  both  ;  its  origin 
is  in  pure  reason,  as  such.  It  exists  not  meielj 
in  our«thoughts,  but  equally  as  much  in  nature; 
it  is  in  the  sphere  of  nature  the  genus  ;  in  the 
sphere  of  mind  the  identity  ;  and  in  that  of  sci- 
ence the  generality.'''  In  the  passage  quoted 
a  few  paragraphs  back,  he  says  of  these  general- 
ities :  *'  They  are  the  pure  being  and  nature  of 
individual  things,  \he\v  soul  and  life^ 

According  to  Dr.  Rauch's  philosophy,  a  crea- 
ted substance  or  things  is  a  mere  activity  or  pow- 
er of  acting;  and  not,  as  is  generally  supposed, 
an  inscrutable  essence,  with  inherent  qualities 
and  accidents.  Of  course,  as  many  kinds  of 
activity  as  exist,  so  many  kinds  of  substances  or 
things ,  are  there  in  the  universe.  These,  i£ 
seems,  are  ascertained  to  be  four  in  number, 
viz.  (1)  Mind  or  soul,  an  activity  that  has  self- 
consciousness,   intelligence,  and  will  :  (2)  Ani- 


196  PHILOSOPHY    OF    DIJ.    KAUCH. 

mal  Life,  a  plastic  power  having  sensation  or 
feeling,  and  generating  organic  bodies,  wiiich  it 
nourishes  and  matures,  and  then  transmits  itself 
tlirough  them  to  a  progeny  of  similar  activities  ; 
(3)  Vegetable  Life,  a  plastic  power  without  feel- 
ing, which  produces  organized  bodies  with  roots 
and  leaves,  and  matures  seeds,  whereby  it  prop- 
agates itself;  and  (4)  Lifeless  3Iattcr,  which  can 
act  only  mechanically,  or  by  impulse,  attraction, 
repulsion,  decomposition,  dispersion,  combina- 
tion, aggregation,  &.c.  These  four  kinds  of  ac- 
iivities,  variously  combined,  and  operating  upon 
and  with  each  other,  and  under  various  ^rcum- 
stances  and  condition?,  constitute  the  created 
universe,  and  produce  all  its  varied  phenomena. 
Of  course,  a  thorough  knowledge  of  these  four 
activities  involves  or  includes  a  perfect  and  sci- 
entific knowledge  of  the  entire  universe  of  crea- 
ted beings  and  things:  for,  each  of  these  activi- 
ties is,  in  the  sphere  of  nature,  the  genus  of  all 
the  beings  and  things  under  it;  in  the  sphere  of 
rnind  or  thouglit,  it  is  their  idcntitij  ;  and  in  the 
sphere  of  science  or  logical  arrangement,  it  is 
their  generality,  or  that  which  comprehends  and 
embraces  them  all.  If  now  curiosity  enquires, 
what  is  the  essential  nature  of  these  all-compre- 
hending activities  ;  Dr.  Ranch  is  prompt  to  an- 
swer. Each  of  them  is   a  definite  Thought  com- 


PHFLOSOPHY    OF    DR.    RAUCH.  197 

bined  with  a  Volitioji  of  God.  The  infinite 
Mind  conceived  them,  and  the  divine  fiat  made 
them  reahties.  Four  divine  thoughts,  therefi)re, 
combined  ^^  ith  divine  volitions,  constitute  the  en- 
tire created  universe  :  and  God  and  his  thoughts 
are  all  that  exists  or  has  any  being. 

Some  of  the  passages  in  Dr.  Rau  h's  Psych- 
ology involving  such  sentiments,  '  ere  follow. 
Page  43  :  '*  Most  of  us  are  in  the  habit  of  con- 
sidering nature  and  its  manifold  powers  as  a 
mechanical  whole,  whose  parts  have  been  brought 
together  by  some  mechanic,  and  whose  powers 
ezist  side  hy  side,  without  having  any  afiinity  to, 
or  connection  with  each  other.  But  the  oppo- 
site of  all  this  is  the  case.  Nature  is  a  system, 
not  a  conglomeration  ;  alive  and  active  in  all  its 
elements  and  atoms,  it  is  filled  with  powers,  from 
the  mechanical,  chemical,  magnetic,  and  galvan- 
ic, up  to  the  organic,  all  of  which  flow  invisibly 
into  each  other,  affect  and  determine  each  other. 
Eternal  laws  divell  in  them,  and  provide  that 
while  these  powers  receive  and  work  with  and 
through  each  other,  none  interferes  with  the  other, 
or  in  any  degree  changes  its  nature,  but  supports 
and  upholds  it.     Thus  we  have  a  constant  life, 

powers  flow  up  and  down,   to  and  fro.'''' Page 

183  :  "  All  life,  wherevei  it  exists,  is  formed  and 
organized.     Form  is  not  and  cannot  be  the  re- 


198  PHILOSOPHY    OF    DR.    RAUCH. 

suit  of  matter,  which  is  chaotic  and  shapeless. 
Form  in  man,  and  throughout  the  universe,  is 
the  result  o^ thought.  Hence  life^  being  formed, 
does  not  proceed  from  matter ;  but  is  a  thought 
of  God^  accompanied  hy  the  divine  will^  to  be  re- 
alized in  nature,  and  to  appear  externally  by  an 
organized  body.  As  the  thought  gives  the  form, 
so  the  divine  will,  resting  in  the  thought,  and  in- 
separably united  with  it,  works  as  power  and  law 

in  all  nature The  animal,  with  its 

members  and  senses,  what  else  can  it  be  but  a 
divine  thought  exhibited  in  an  external  form  V' 
Page  184  :  "  The  soul  of  man  is  likewise  a  di- 
vine thought,  a  creation  of  God,  filled  with poic- 
er  to  live  an  existence  of  its  own.'''' — Page  150: 

"  The  mind  is  pure  activity But  this 

activity  takes  different  directions,  and  unfolds  it- 
self in  different  ways,  and  thus  it  may  be  said  to 
be  the  union  of  manifold  activities,  all  of  which 
are  internally  united.'''' — Page  195:  "  The  soul 
contains  in  its  simple,  identical  activity,  all  that 
afterwards  appears  in  succession,  under  the  form 
of  faculties.  They  are  but  the  development  of 
the  energy  of  the  soul." — Page  S56  :  "  Reason 
has  not  its  origin  in  itself ;  its  author  is  God, 
whose  ivill  lives  in  it  as  its  law.''"' — Page  185  : 
Man  is  soul  only,  and  cannot  be  any  thing  else. 
This  soul)  however,  unfolds  itself  externally  in 


PH1L0S50PHY    OF    DR.    RAUCH.  199 

the  life  of  the  hody^  and  internally  in  the  life  of 
mind.  Twofold  in  its  development,  it  is  one  in 
its  origin,  and  the  centre  of  this  union  is  our  per- 
sonality."— Page  184:    "The   particles  of  the 

body are  not  at  all  a  part  o^man;  they 

are  dust,  and  only  their  connection  and  the  life 
connecting  them,  is  truly  human." — Page  283: 
*'  That  which  truly  is  in  nature,  are  the  divine 
thoughts,  the  divine  laws :  and  all  the  rest  is  but 
matter." — Page  191 :  "  It  is  not  nature  nor  mat- 
ter that  produces  personality,  but  God^  who  is 
the  ground  of  all  personality.  We  can  know  a 
thing  thoroughly  only  when  we  are  acquainted 
with  its  ground — so  man  must  know  God  before 
he  can  become  trxdy  acquainted  with  himself'' 

In  his  Preface,  page  iv..  Dr.  Ranch  tells  us 
that  one  great  object  which  he  aimed  to  accom- 
plish, was,  "  to  give  the  science  of  man  a  direct 
bearing  upon  the  other  sciences,  and  especially 
upon  religion  and  theology.'*''  And  it  must  be 
admitted  that  he  every  where  manifests  profound 
reverence  for  God,  and  a  deep  sense  of  the  im- 
portance of  religion.  But  whether  his  philoso- 
phy is  favorable  to  sound  views  of  religion,  de- 
serves more  examination  than  comports  with  the 
design  of  these  sketches.  If  I  have  not  entirely 
misunderstood  him,  he  is  a  Transcendentalist 
and  a  Pantheist  pf  the  school  of  Hegel.     It  is 


^00  PHILOSOPHY    OF    DR.    EAUCH. 

also  noticeable  that  his  book  makes  no  allusion 
to  any  special  Revelation  from  God,  or  to  an 
apostasy  of  man,  the  intervention  of  a  Savior, 
the  forgiveness  of  sin  in  consequence  of  an  atone- 
ment, a  future  judgment,  and  eternal  retribidittns 
after  the  jjresent  life.  At  the  same  time,  his  pan- 
theistic, transcendental  principles  seem  to  leave 
little  or  no  room  for  these  cardinal  doctrines  of 
the  Bible  ;  which  are  either  discarded,  or  essen- 
tially changed,  by  all  German,  as  well  as  Amer- 
ican Transcendentalists.  He  utterly  denies  the 
freedom  of  the  Will  in  the  natural  man  ;  and  he 
gives  to  the  divine  Will  an  absolute  control  over 
the  human,  in  the  regenerate.  See  page  155, 
&c.,  292,  &c.,  309 — He  affirms  that,  by  nature, 
or  in  his  natural  state,  man  is  wholly  incapable 
of  holiness.  See  pages  383,  398. — He  explicitly 
says :  "  Religion  is  not  a  mere  quality,  but  the 

substance  of  man He  ceases  to  be  man, 

in  the  full  sense  of  the  term,  when  he  has  no  re- 
ligion." See  Pre'",  page  iv. — He  defines  true  re- 
ligion to  be,  "  a  peculiar  activity  of  God,  which, 
announcing  itself  to  the  heart  of  man,  changes 
it,  converts  it,  and  restores  man  to  peace  with 
himself,  with  the  world,  and  with  God."  See 
page  388.  He  thus  explicitly  admits  a  regenera- 
tion of  the  sold  by  the  power  of  God ;  but  he 
makes  it  to  be  a  change   of  man's  substance  or 


PHILOSOPHY    OF    DR.    RAUCH.  201 

nature ;  a  change  too,  which  seems  to  consti 
tute  tlie  whole  of  man's  redemption,  or  to  leave  n© 
room  for  the  pardon  of  sin  through  an  atone- 
ment, and  no  work  for  a  Mediator  between  G  )  J 
and  man.  The  simple  activity  of  God  upon  the 
heart,  accomplishes  the  whole  business.  Inshort, 
like  other  Trancendentahsts,  he  seems  to  mike 
religion  in  man,  to  be  an  operation  of  God,  car- 
rying out  and  perfecting  the  Creation  of  a  ration- 
al soul. 


ERRATA. 

Pa£e    17, 1.   24,  for  encyclopedists  r.  encyclopyedist!?. 

18  and  20,  Running  Title,  forlsiPKRiAL  r.  Empirical. 

24,     10,  for  cannot  be,  r.  can  be. 

48,      5,  for  No.  I   r.  Chap.  I. 

64,    26,  after  knowledge,  insert  a  comma. 

83,     15,  for  number  r,  chapter. 

93,      3,  for  thus  it  r.  then  it. 

95,    20,  for  powers  r.  process. 
106,     18,  for  all  changes  r.  all  the  changes, 
112,     14,  for  of  philosophy  r.  of  his  philosophy. 

"       23,  for  the  acts  r.  these  acts. 
114,  bottom  line,  for  Stutgard  r.  Stuttgard- 

126,      8,  insert  a  )  after  1832. 
26,  for  Chris  r.  Christ. 

140,  8,  after  who,  insert  a  comma. 

141,  13,  after  ideas,  insert  a  comma. 
146,    18,  for  1804  r.  ]840. 

"       26,  r.  charge  d'affaires. 

148,  5,  for  Lonis  read  Louis. 
"       18,  for  Azias  r.  Azais. 

149,  11,  for  common  sense  r.  common  name. 

150,  13,  for  1833  r.  1832. 

160,  26,  for  Number  r.  Chapter. 

163,  7,  after  nature,  insert  a  comma. 

"  9,  after  It  is,  omit  comma. 

165,  3,  for  happiness  r.  well-being. 

176,  3,  for  expressions  r.  e.xpression. 

[  For  want  of  suitable  type  the  omission  of  the  accents 
in  German,  Greek  and  French  words  must  remain  without 
con  ection. —Pmtcr, 


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